Beacom In and For Seventeenth Judicial Dist., Adams County v. Board of County Com'rs of Adams County
| Decision Date | 17 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81SA289,81SA289 |
| Citation | 657 P.2d 440 |
| Parties | Paul Q. BEACOM, as District Attorney In and For the SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ADAMS COUNTY, Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF ADAMS, State of Colorado, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Paul Q. Beacom, Dist. Atty., Marc P. Mishkin, Deputy Dist. Atty., Brighton, for petitioner-appellee and cross-appellant.
S. Morris Lubow, Adams County Atty., Ann Victoria Hopcroft, Kathryn Schroeder, Asst. County Attys., Brighton, for respondent-appellant and cross-appellee.
The petitioner, Paul Q. Beacom, the district attorney for the 17th Judicial District, filed a petition on November 13, 1979 in Adams County District Court seeking a writ of mandamus 1 to require the respondent Adams County Board of County Commissioners (board) to fund the full amount of his budget request for 1980 and a declaratory judgment that the employees of his office were employees of the 17th Judicial District 2 and not county employees subject to a variety of county administrative requirements. The respondent board counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the employees of the district attorney's office were county employees for a variety of purposes, and that the district attorney was bound by the board's budget determinations. The district court ordered that the district attorney's budget be increased for certain items, holding that before the board may adopt a budget for less than the amount requested by the district attorney for necessary expenditures, the board must file suit and maintain the burden of showing the expenditures are not necessary. The court also ruled that persons employed in the district attorney's office were employees of the judicial district and not state or county employees. Finally, the court answered a number of the questions raised by the parties about the division of administrative duties between the district attorney and the county. Both the district attorney and the board appealed the rulings of the district court. 3 We reverse the judgment of the district court.
In the fall of 1979, Beacom submitted to the board a budget request of $1,468,992 for the operation of his office for calendar year 1980. The board considered the district attorney's request, along with approximately 80 other budget requests seeking a total of $72,000,000 for the calendar year. On November 13, 1979, the board set a budget of $60,000,000, including $1,238,047 for Beacom's office. Two county commissioners and several other county officials testified that the board determined the district attorney's office budget by projecting the 1979 expenditures for the office. The district attorney's budget for 1979 was $993,720. The budget approved by the board for 1980 was approximately 20% larger than the 1979 budget and included six new positions and substantial salary increases for all the district attorney's employees. Among the items disallowed by the board were one of the three investigators and one of the two chief trial deputies requested. Other items the board rejected included additional health insurance benefits for dental and optical care; $12,400 for trips for 25 deputy district attorneys to Continuing Legal Education programs out-of-state; an automobile radio communication system for senior staff and investigators; and $10,000 for the cost of printing a monthly newsletter for county law enforcement agencies.
The district court approved a budget of $1,371,299 for the district attorney's office, including the requested investigator position and pay, but excluding an appropriation for an additional chief deputy district attorney because section 20-1-201(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) provides that the district attorney may not appoint more than one chief deputy district attorney without the prior approval of the board of county commissioners. 4 The court determined that the board based its denial of the requested chief trial deputy position on budgetary restraints, see section 30-25-201, C.R.S.1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12) () (limitation on county mill levy as source of revenue), and that the board's action was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The court also determined that there was no statutory authority for the district attorney to maintain fringe benefits for his employees, and therefore, the sums allowed for fringe benefits including health insurance were within the discretion of the county commissioners. The court disallowed the radio communication systems, the newsletter and out-of-state travel because they were not necessary for maintaining the district attorney's office and, therefore, were subject to discretionary review by the board. 5
Beacom's second claim was for a declaration that the personnel in his office were employees of the 17th Judicial District. He requested that the court direct the board not to interfere with his classification of employees, determination of salaries, and participation in county fringe benefit programs. During the summer of 1979, the district attorney hired an office administrator and sought approval from the county to provide his own administrative services for payroll, insurance deductions and payments, personnel classification, and assorted other administrative duties. From our review of the record, we cannot ascertain whether the board made a determination on this issue. The district court partially addressed the issue in the context of the budgetary dispute. 6 With respect to the declaration sought by the district attorney, the court stated that administrative matters concerning the district attorney's office are internal responsibilities to be handled by his staff; however, since the 17th Judicial District is composed of one county, the court observed that it would be more economical for the Adams County Treasurer to pay the district attorney's expenses. 7
The board, by counterclaim, sought a declaration that the employees of the district attorney's office were county employees for the purpose of unemployment compensation; worker's compensation; social security coverage; retirement and pension plan participation; group health, life and disability insurance; all other fringe benefits; the "peace officers" statute (section 29-5-111, C.R.S.1973) (1977 Repl.Vol. 12); the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act" (section 24-10-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973) (1982 Supp.); and section 30-2-104, C.R.S.1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12, 1982 Supp.), relating to the county pay, classification and benefit plan; and that the district attorney was bound by the budget laws contained in article 25 of Title 30, C.R.S.1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12, 1982 Supp.) and article 1 of Title 29, C.R.S.1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12, 1982 Supp.). In response, the court ruled that the district attorney was bound by the budget laws only if the items for which funds were requested were not necessary expenses of the office under article 1 of Title 20, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8, 1982 Supp.). The court determined that the district attorney was required to provide social security coverage as a fringe benefit under section 20-1-307, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) and may obtain liability insurance coverage under 24-10-115, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 10), but that his direct provision of any other fringe benefits would require a grant of authority from the General Assembly.
On appeal, the board points to the district court's failure to adequately consider section 30-11-107(2), C.R.S.1973 (1977 Repl.Vol. 12, 1982 Supp.) in ruling that the district attorney is entitled to full funding for the necessary expenditures of his office. We agree with the board that section 30-11-107(2) controls, giving the board the discretion to approve or disapprove items in the district attorney's budget request and placing the burden on the district attorney to prove the necessity of a requested budget item denied by the board. Our resolution of this issue does not require determination of whether employees of the district attorney's office are county, state or judicial district employees. That issue was improperly before the district court, and our addressing it would constitute an advisory opinion in the context of this case.
Section 30-11-107(2) provides:
(a) Subject to the provisions of part 1 of article 1 of title 29, C.R.S.1973, ["Local Government Budget Law of Colorado"] the board of county commissioners of each county has exclusive power to adopt the annual budget for the operation of the county government, including all offices, departments, boards, commissions, other spending agencies of the county government, and other agencies which are funded in whole or in part by county appropriations. All such entities shall make appropriate budget recommendations each year to the board of county commissioners for the operation of their respective offices; but the final budget determination of each board of county commissioners shall be binding upon each of the respective offices, departments, boards, commissions, other spending agencies of the county government, and other agencies which are funded in whole or in part by county appropriations.
(b) Every decision made by the board of county commissioners in exercising its budget-making power shall be presumed to be a valid exercise of the power granted by paragraph (a) of this subsection (2).
(Emphasis added.) All expenses of the district attorney's office, compensation and benefits for his employees, and a portion of his salary are paid with county funds. Therefore, the office of the district attorney is an agency which is "funded in whole or in part by county appropriations." 8
In 1977, the General Assembly added subsection (2) to section 30-11-107. The amendment nullified the effect of Kanaly v. Wadlow, 31...
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