Beal v. Lowell & D. St. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1892
• Citation: 32 N.E. 653,157 Mass. 444
• Parties: BEAL v. LOWELL & D. ST. RY. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

157 Mass. 444

32 N.E. 653

BEAL v. LOWELL & D. ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

December 3, 1892

COUNSEL

J.K. Berry and Berry & Upton, for plaintiff.

C.S Lilley, for defendant.

OPINION

ALLEN J.

The only exception taken was "to the charge as above given relating to the law of the due care required of a passenger on electric steam cars." The case was not withdrawn from the jury, but was submitted to them to determine all the questions of fact, including that of the plaintiff's due care. No special request for instructions was made. No particular was pointed out, in respect to which the charge was objected to, except as above. The presiding judge expressly told the jury that he was not going to decide the question whether the plaintiff was careless or not, but that he should leave it to them; and he ruled that, "if standing upon the platform, as above described, would be an act of carelessness, or a failure to exercise such a degree of care as men of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same circumstances, and he was thereby hurt, he could not recover." This was correct. There was no error in the rule of law. The criticism of the plaintiff's counsel really comes to this: that the tone of the charge was unfavorable to the plaintiff. But this is a matter not to be revised on a bill of exceptions, unless some rule of law was incorrectly stated, or unless the charge violated the statute which provides that the courts shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, (Pub.St. c. 153, § 5;) or unless it is apparent that the attention of the jury was so far diverted from the true questions of the case as to amount to a mistrial, and a failure of justice. General criticisms of a charge are always discountenanced by an appellate court. Its functions are limited to correcting errors of law. In the present case, we find no rule of law incorrectly stated. The question of the plaintiff's due care was properly a question for the jury. The rule as to contributory negligence was given accurately. No objection was taken, at the conclusion of the charge, that it was in violation of the statute which forbids courts to charge with respect to matters of fact, nor has the argument before us been put upon that ground, nor has the statute itself been referred to or cited by the plaintiff's counsel. The attention of the jury was not diverted from the true questions of the case,...