Beal v. State
| Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010–KA–01613–SCT.,2010–KA–01613–SCT. |
| Citation | 86 So.3d 887 |
| Parties | Dennis Jerome BEAL v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
86 So.3d 887
Dennis Jerome BEAL
v.
STATE of Mississippi.
No. 2010–KA–01613–SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 1, 2012.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 2012.
[86 So.3d 889]
Earnestine Alexander, Jackson, Steven Waldrup, Attorneys for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. KlingfussScott Stuart, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before DICKINSON, P.J., RANDOLPH and PIERCE, JJ.
PIERCE, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. Dennis Jerome Beal allegedly offered Lieutenant Tommy Jones, a Madison County Sheriff's Department deputy, $10,000 in hopes that Jones could make Beal's pending drug charge disappear. On April 28, 2010, Beal was indicted by a Madison County grand jury for bribery as a habitual offender. On September 15, 2010, a Madison County jury unanimously found Beal guilty of bribing Jones, and the trial court sentenced Beal to ten years in prison as a nonviolent habitual offender. Beal appeals his conviction, and this Court reverses and remands.
¶ 2. The following facts were gleaned from the testimony and evidence presented at trial. Beal sold a confidential informant, who was working for the Madison County Sheriff's Department (“MCSD”), cocaine on March 28, 2009, but Beal was not immediately arrested. The MCSD chose to arrest Beal later when he visited his probation officer. Jones took custody of Beal, and during transit, Jones gave Beal an opportunity to “help his self.” At this time, Beal did not offer any information to “help his self,” but Jones gave Beal his cell number in case Beal changed his mind.
¶ 3. On October 21, 2009, Beal contacted Jones by phone to “meet up” and talk. Later, they met at the Capitol Body Shop in Ridgeland, Mississippi, to discuss what Beal could do to “help his self.” At this meeting, Jones testified that he informed Beal about what needed to be done, but that Beal explained that he had nothing to offer because several people knew Beal had been charged and arrested in Madison County. As the conversation continued, Beal asked Jones if he could give Jones money to “secure his freedom.” Beal offered to pay Jones about $5,000, but no money ever changed hands at this meeting. When the conversation was coming to a close, Jones informed Beal that the proposition to secure his freedom was not “out of the question.” Once Beal left, Jones contacted his superiors to inform them about the state of the investigation.
¶ 4. As the investigation continued, Beal contacted Jones on November 23, 2009, to meet again and talk. Jones agreed to meet Beal at the Lowe's in Madison, Mississippi, and during this recorded conversation,
[86 So.3d 890]
Beal upped the ante and offered Jones $10,000, which Beal would pay off as a part of a “program.” However, no money changed hands during this meeting either, and the investigation continued.
¶ 5. On February 5, 2010, Beal and Jones met again at the Lowe's in Madison, Mississippi. But this time, Jones and his superiors had decided to arrest Beal after the meeting, because it seemed apparent from telephone communications between Jones and Beal that money would change hands at this meeting. The meeting took place at about nine o'clock at night, and when Beal arrived, he entered Jones's vehicle. Once the conversation began, Beal handed Jones an envelope containing money. The envelope contained only $4,000, rather than $10,000, but Beal said he would pay another $6,000 later when he had acquired more money from his car-selling business. Once Beal left the scene, MCSD deputies arrested him.
¶ 6. On April 28, 2010, a Madison County grand jury indicted Beal for bribery as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99–19–83. Beal moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that there was a problem with the charging language of the indictment as it related to Beal's habitual-offender status. The Madison County District Attorney's office (“MCDA”) admitted, pretrial, that the indictment language included a scrivener's error. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment and permitted the MCDA to amend the indictment to reflect that Beal qualified as a nonviolent habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99–19–81, rather than a violent habitual offender under Section 99–19–83. Thus, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court issued an order on September 14, 2010, before trial began, amending the indictment to reflect the appropriate habitual-offender status.
¶ 7. The trial began on September 14, 2010, and with its first witness, the State elicited testimony regarding a videotape that allegedly depicted Beal selling cocaine to a confidential informant. Beal's counsel objected, stating that the videotape was “not relevant here.” However, the trial court overruled that objection, finding that the State was only describing “the process of the drug purchase.” The State continued with its line of questioning and elicited testimony gleaned from the contents of the videotape. Later, as the trial ensued, Beal's counsel moved to view and publish the videotape to the jury upon the belief that the videotape did not show what the State's witness claimed. However, the State objected, arguing that the videotape was not relevant. The trial court ruled that there was no reason why Beal's counsel could not view the videotape, but found that the videotape would be “substantially prejudicial” to the defense if the jury saw the videotape and, thus, excluded it. At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the jury unanimously found Beal guilty of bribery.
¶ 8. As a result, the trial court sentenced Beal to ten years without early release, probation, or parole. During the sentencing hearing, Beal's counsel moved ore tenus for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the trial court informed Beal's counsel that it was inappropriate for the court to take up such motion until sentencing was concluded, suggesting that a written motion be filed. On October 1, 2010, Beal filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative, a new trial, and the trial court denied that motion on January 11, 2011. On the same day, Beal's counsel filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, Beal alleges:
I. The trial court erred by not quashing the indictment because the charging language illustrates improper
[86 So.3d 891]
influence bearing upon the grand jury;
II. The trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment;
III. It was prejudicial error for the trial court to deny the defendant's request that the State deliver a copy of the videotape for the defendant's viewing;
IV. It was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow the State to establish motive by eliciting testimony from its witness concerning a videotape the defendant had not viewed;
V. It was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow the State to make improper and inflammatory opening and closing statements to the jury that were misleading;
VI. The trial court erred in not finding the defendant entrapped as a matter of law.
¶ 9. When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment, this Court employs a substantial-evidence/manifest-error standard of review,1 but when a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of an indictment, this Court employs a de novo standard of review. 2 Additionally, this Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when considering whether a trial court erred in admitting or excluding evidence.3 Moreover, this Court refuses to overturn a jury verdict unless it is “so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” 4
II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment.5
¶ 10. Beal argues that the charging language of the indictment for the bribery charge was fatally defective because it unduly influenced the grand jury, and the trial court erred in allowing the State to correct the charging language before trial. The State proffers, however, that these issues are procedurally barred since those issues were not presented to the trial court initially. After having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find that the question of whether the court erred with regard to the charging language of the indictment and amendment of that language has been properly preserved for appeal. Beal clearly contested those issues before the trial court by moving to dismiss the indictment pretrial and by making objections regarding the indictment during trial.
¶ 11. Mississippi law is clear—“an indictment should be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
[86 So.3d 892]
charged and should fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.” 6 “Formal and technical words” are unnecessary so long as the crime can be “substantially” “described” without such language.7 But, it is recommended that the code section under which the indictment is drawn be used.8 And amendments of indictments are permissible as to form but not as to the substance of the crime charged.9 Ultimately, indictments are subject to amendment so long as the amendment does not materially alter the facts that “are the essence of the offense on the face of the indictment as it originally stood or materially alter a defense to the indictment as it originally stood as to prejudice the defendant's case.” 10
¶ 12. Recently, this Court decided Gowdy v. State, and in that case, the Court found that an amendment to an indictment prior to sentencing but after conviction was improper.11 This Court found that the State cannot amend an indictment to seek a greater sentence than one associated with the crime originally charged, as that would constitute an unfair...
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