Beale v. Roberson

• Decision Date: 30 June 1847
• Citation: 7 Ired. 280,29 N.C. 280
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: JAMES BEALE v. MARIOT ROBERSON et al.

7 Ired. 280

29 N.C. 280

JAMES BEALE

v.MARIOT ROBERSON et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1847.

In an action for malicious prosecution, where probable cause is alleged, it is the duty of the Court to direct the jury, that, if they find certain facts from the evidence, or draw from them certain other inferences of fact?? there is or is not probable case; thus leaving the questions of fact to the jury, and keeping their effect, in point of reason, for the decision of the Court as a matter of law.

The cases of Leggett v. Blount, No. Ca. Term Rep 123, Plummer v. Gheen, 3 Hawks 66, Cabiness v. Martin, 3 Dev. 454, and Swaim v. Stafford, 4 Ired. 392 and 398, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Chatham County, at the Spring Term, 1847, his Honor Judge MANLY presiding.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for having maliciously and falsely sued out a warrant, and prosecuted him, with two other persons, before a Justice of the Peace, for a felonious assault and robbery of the defendant Roberson on the high-way. Upon not guilty pleaded, the evidence was, that on a certain day, Roberson and the plaintiff, and the two other persons, who were prosecuted with the plaintiff, were in the town of Pittsborough together, and, that in the afternoon, Roberson, who was in a state of intoxication, set out on horseback for his residence, which was in the country in that vicinity: Afterwards, but how long did not distinctly appear, the witnesses saying, about an hour or more, the plaintiff and the two other persons, likewise left Pittsborough together, to return, as they said, to their respective homes. The road, which led to the residences of Roberson, and the plaintiff and his companions, was the same for two miles and a half from Pittsborough, but at this distance there was a fork, and the road on one hand was Roberson's, and that on the other, of the other persons. When the plaintiff and the two others were on trial before the Justice of the Peace, Roberson was sworn and examined as a witness to support the prosecution. And on this trial, after the plaintiff had given in evidence, the acquittal and discharge of himself and the others by the Magistrate, the defendants, for the purpose of showing probable cause, gave in evidence the examination of Roberson, before the Magistrate, in which he stated, that he proceeded on his return home, to the fork, and then took his own branch of the road and had gone half a mile on it, when he was overtaken by persons on horseback, and that he turned his face around to see who they were, and discovered that they were three in number, and that two of them rode horses of the same color with that of the horses of two of the persons accused, but did not observe the color of the other horse; and that, as he turned, and before he recognised either of the persons, who had come up, he was knocked from his horse by a violent blow across the head with a stick: and being then interrogated by the accused, whether he knew or believed that they had stricken him, the said Roberson replied, that he had no right to say they did; for he did not see them, and could not, indeed, say, whether the persons were white or black. And the defendants gave further evidence, that a short time after the blow was given to Roberson, as fixed by him in his examination, the three accused persons crossed Rocky River, in company, a mile or two farther on their way.

Upon the foregoing evidence, the presiding Judge directed the jury, “that it was essential to the defendants' justification, that they should have had probable cause for deeming the plaintiff guilty, and taking legal proceedings against him.” And his Honor further stated to the jury, “that it was not easy to define in precise terms, what probable cause was; but that he believed it to be such cause for proceeding as would have actuated a rational mind, imbued with ordinary respect to the rights of others: and should the jury conclude, in making an application of the facts proved, that the evidence before the minds of the defendants furnished them, at the time, with reasonable grounds of suspicion and for suing out the warrant, the plaintiff could not recover.” And his Honor further stated to the jury, “that if the defendants knew or believed, that the plaintiff was innocent, they would then have no cause for what they did; yet, on the other hand, that it was not inconsistent with probable cause, though there was at the time no certain belief or settled conviction, in the minds of the defendants', of the plaintiff's guilt.”

The counsel for the plaintiff insisted, that the Court was bound to inform the jury, as a matter of law, whether the facts given in evidence, or any of them, and, which did, or did not, amount to probable cause, and prayed the Court to direct the jury, that the evidence in this case, if believed by them, did not amount to probable cause. But his Honor declined giving any further directions, and the jury gave a verdict for the defendants; and from the judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Badger and McRae, for the plaintiff .

Manly, for the defendant .

RUFFIN, C. J.

This case brings up again the question, whether probable cause is matter...