Beaman v. Yakima Valley Disposal, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 56405-1,56405-1
• Citation: 116 Wn.2d 697,807 P.2d 849
• Parties: , 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2034, 123 Lab.Cas. P 10,414, 6 IER Cases 1697 Rick L. BEAMAN, Appellant, v. YAKIMA VALLEY DISPOSAL, INC., a Washington corporation, Respondent. En Banc
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 697

116 Wn.2d 697

807 P.2d 849, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2034,

123 Lab.Cas. P 10,414,

6 IER Cases 1697

Rick L. BEAMAN, Appellant, v. YAKIMA VALLEY DISPOSAL, INC., a Washington corporation, Respondent.

No. 56405-1.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

April 4, 1991.

Abeyta & Nelson, P.S., Rodney K. Nelson, Derek L. Sutton, Yakima, for appellant

Lofland & Associates, Gary E. Lofland, Yakima, for respondent.

DURHAM, Justice.

Rick Beaman brought a state law wrongful discharge action against his employer. The action was based on the terms of an implemented offer effectuated by the employer after the collective bargaining agreement expired and the parties were unable to reach a new agreement. ¹ The trial court concluded that the action was preempted by federal labor law under the "potentially subject to" test of San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Because the action properly belonged in federal court, it was dismissed. We affirm.

Beaman worked for Yakima Valley Disposal, Inc. (Valley) from 1978 until he was terminated on September 29, 1987. While Beaman was employed at Valley, the employees of Valley were represented by Teamsters Local 524 (Union). On March 1, 1986, the collective bargaining agreement reached in 1983 expired. ² The parties were unable to reach a successor agreement and on June 1, 1986, Valley implemented its final offer.

                Valley told Beaman that the implemented offer would be his new employment contract.   The implemented offer provided that "[d]iscipline and discharge shall be for just cause."   It also provided grievance procedures to be followed by any employee challenging a discharge as being imposed without just cause
                

Beaman was discharged on September 29, 1987. He told his supervisors that he felt he had been unfairly discharged without just cause. He was not reinstated. On November 16, 1987, Beaman contacted a Union representative about the discharge. On November 18, a Union business representative wrote to Valley stating that the Union wished to meet with Valley to grieve the discharge pursuant to the terms of the implemented offer.

In a letter written December 3, 1987, Valley denied the Union's request for a meeting. The denial was based on Valley's assertions that the Union had abandoned its interest and that Beaman had failed to follow the grievance procedures.

On January 20, 1988, Beaman filed a complaint against Valley alleging "violation of promises of specific treatment in specific situations", discharge in violation of public policy, and claims for unpaid overtime. The first cause of action is based on Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), a case in which this court modified the common law doctrine of employment at will. Thompson held:

[I]f an employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable components of the employment relationship.

Thompson, at 230, 685 P.2d 1081.

On May 24, 1988, Valley moved to dismiss Beaman's first cause of action as being preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. In the alternative, Valley moved for partial summary judgment as to the first cause of action. The other causes of action were The trial court first noted that there was no evidence that the Union had been decertified or that Valley had withdrawn its recognition of the Union. Further, because there were Union contacts with the employer "right up until the end of 1987", the court said that it could not find there had been abandonment of interest by the Union. The court went on to say that resolution of the state cause of action would require resolution of issues within the province of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), including questions of impasse, the legal status, effect, and enforceability of the implemented offer, and the legal status of the Union. In granting Valley's motion to dismiss, the court stated that the "potentially subject to" test of San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), required a ruling in Valley's favor.

                not subject to the motions.   On July 1, 1988, the trial court found that Beaman's first cause of action was preempted and granted Valley's motion to dismiss
                

An order of dismissal was entered on July 20, 1988 and Beaman appealed. The Court of Appeals certified the case to this court. ³

We begin with a caveat. This opinion does not decide which party was right or wrong. The only issue before us is jurisdiction; that is, if the federal court or the state court should be the ultimate finder of fact. By ruling in either party's favor on the jurisdictional issue, we in no way indicate approval of that party's conduct in the underlying action. Any party in these circumstances can properly raise Our discussion begins with a brief overview of preemption as it has been applied to the area of labor law. Preemption of state law is a purely jurisdictional issue. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 1912, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986). Congress' power to preempt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of article 6 of the federal constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Congressional power to legislate in the area of labor relations is long established. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937). However, because "[t]he precise extent to which state law must be displaced ... has never been determined by the Congress", the Supreme Court has said it "cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1919, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971). Deciding if a state action is preempted by federal law requires review of congressional intent. Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 74 S.Ct. 161, 164, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953). " 'The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.' " Malone v Congressional intent to preempt, however, often is not clear.

                jurisdictional issues and our ruling on them is separate and distinct from assessing the factual merits of the case.   Indeed, many facts relevant to the ultimate resolution of this case are not to be found in this record.   Moreover, as the trial court noted, the important issues of impasse, the legality of the implemented offer, and the legal status of the Union itself are not for this court to decide.   Any attempt to weigh the evidence on the limited record before us would not only be premature, but could easily lead to hasty and conjectural conclusions.   By focusing on the subject matter of this case as opposed to the facts, it is possible to properly limit our inquiry and not stray into the province of the eventual finder of fact.
                White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting  Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 222, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)).
                

[I]n such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States.

Malone, 435 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. at 1190.

In the area of labor law, three theories of preemption have developed: preemption based on section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); the Machinists doctrine, found in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Empl. Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976); and the Garmon doctrine, found in San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242, 79 S.Ct. 773, 778, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).

The parties agree that section 301 preemption, which addresses "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization", 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), does not apply because there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect for the court to interpret. Valley argues that Beaman's claim is preempted under both the Machinists doctrine and the Garmon doctrine. Because we agree that Beaman's cause of action is preempted under Garmon, we need not decide the applicability of the Machinistsdoctrine. ⁴ Accordingly, our discussion is limited to the application of the Garmon doctrine.

Congress entrusted the administration of labor policy to a centralized administrative agency, with a specially constituted tribunal to insure uniform application of its When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.... Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations....

substantive rules and to avoid conflicts inherent in a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242-43, 79 S.Ct. at 778.

At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations...