Beamer v. Waddell

• Decision Date: 26 January 1943
• Docket Number: 27728.
• Citation: 45 N.E.2d 1020,221 Ind. 232
• Parties: BEAMER, Atty. Gen., v. WADDELL.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

45 N.E.2d 1020

221 Ind. 232

BEAMER, Atty. Gen., v. WADDELL.

No. 27728.

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 26, 1943

George N. Beamer, Atty. Gen., Glen L. Steckley, Deputy Atty. Gen and Walter O. Lewis, Deputy Atty. Gen., for George N Beamer.

Edward C. Eikman, of Indianapolis, for William B. Waddell.

Charles A. Lowe, Chairman, of Lawrenceburg, Carl M. Gray, of Petersburg, and Howard S. Young, of Indianapolis, Committee for Indiana State Bar Ass'n, amicus curiae.

SHAKE Judge.

The record discloses that the defendant William B. Waddell has been a member of the bar of this court since June 23, 1905. On January 30, 1942, said defendant as relator instituted an original action in this court for a writ of mandate against the Honorable Herbert E. Wilson as judge of the Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 5. In considering said case it came to our attention that there were matters connected therewith that might call for disciplinary action. The attorney general was directed to make an investigation and to report his findings, which he did. Subsequently, by permission, the attorney general instituted this proceeding which is one for the disbarment of the defendant. The information contains eleven specific charges of professional misconduct. It is unnecessary at this time to consider the details of these charges further than to observe that they relate to acts committed in various counties of the state not connected with any proceeding pending before this court.

The defendant has appeared specially for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter. He contends that under Chapter 88, Acts 1937, §§ 4-3608 to 4-3618, Burns' 1933 (Supp.), §§ 830 to 840 Baldwin's 1937 Supp., exclusive jurisdiction to disbar attorneys is vested in the circuit and superior courts. On the other hand, the attorney general and amicus curiae urge that this court has inherent power to deal with the subject and that, in its most favorable light, Chapter 88 merely confers concurrent jurisdiction in proper cases on the circuit and superior courts.

The practice of the law has always been considered a privilege rather than a natural or vested right. Hulbert v. Mybeck, 1942, Ind.Sup., 44 N.E.2d 830. Even under § 21 of Art. VII of the Constitution of 1851, the admission of an attorney was regarded as a judicial act which could not be lodged elsewhere than in the courts. Garrigus v. State ex rel. Moreland, Auditor, 1884, 93 Ind. 239. Good moral character being a prerequisite to the granting of the privilege of practicing law, its continuance is a condition precedent to the right to retain such a license. In re McDonald, 1928, 200 Ind. 424, 164 N.E. 261. As a general proposition a court authorized to admit an attorney has power to suspend or disbar him in the absence of legislation vesting exclusive jurisdiction for that purpose in some other tribunal. See 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 18b, and 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 251, where the cases supporting this principle are collected. Reasonable conditions may also be attached to the right of those already admitted to the bar to continue in the practice of the law. Thus in Blake's Case, 1818, 1 Blackf. 483, it was held that practicing attorneys might be required to take an oath that they had not engaged in a duel after June 29, 1816, as provided in an act which became effective on January 3, 1817. (Laws 1817, Ch. XXXIX, p. 180.)

In 1931 the General Assembly adopted an act entitled 'An Act concerning attorneys at law, giving the supreme court exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys to practice law in all courts and repealing all laws in conflict therewith.' Section 1 of this act provided 'That the supreme court of this state shall have exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys to practice law in all courts of the state under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.' Section 2 repealed all laws or parts of laws in conflict. Acts 1931, Ch. 64, p. 150, § 4-3605, Burns' 1933, § 825, Baldwin's 1934. We think that when the General Assembly conferred upon this court exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys to practice in all the courts of the state it thereby made all attorneys, including those previously admitted under pre-existing statutes, subject to such reasonable regulations respecting their right to continue in the practice as this court might, in its judicial discretion, see fit to prescribe. In the discharge of its responsibility this court might, and perhaps should, have required all previously admitted attorneys to be enrolled as members of its bar. Instead, such attorneys were tentatively recognized as such, and provision was made for their voluntary enrollment upon motion and showing of good moral character. See Rule 41-3 adopted July 13, 1931. By a subsequent rule adopted April 17, 1940, it was provided:

'The bar of this state shall consist of all attorneys in good standing who, prior to July 1, 1931, were duly admitted to practice law by the circuit courts of this state, and all attorneys in good standing who, subsequently thereto, have been or hereafter shall be admitted to practice by this court.'

It was clearly not contemplated by the legislature when it passed the act of 1931 or by this court when it adopted the above rules that there should be two groups of recognized attorneys in this state or that part of such attorneys should be responsible to this court and part should not. We must conclude that, in the absence of other legislation on the subject, the act of 1931 is sufficiently broad in its necessary implications to authorize this court to entertain a proceeding for the disbarment of any attorney of this state irrespective of whether he was admitted prior to or since the passage of said act. This conclusion finds support in the case of Lane v. Campbell, 1938, 214 Ind. 376, 14 N.E.2d 552, in which it was held that the act of 1931 repealed the provision of the statute under which the courts of each county had power to determine whether attorneys practicing or offering to practice therein by virtue of admissions in...