Bean v. Matteucci

• Decision Date: 20 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-35119,19-35119
• Parties: Travis Leroy BEAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dolly MATTEUCCI, Superintendent, Oregon State Hospital, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

986 F.3d 1128

Travis Leroy BEAN, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Dolly MATTEUCCI, Superintendent, Oregon State Hospital, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-35119

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 8, 2020 Portland, Oregon

Filed January 20, 2021

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we consider whether the district court erred in denying Travis Leroy Bean's ("Bean") petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on abstention under Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Bean's habeas petition challenged an Oregon Circuit Court order authorizing his involuntary medication to restore his competency to stand trial for murder. In abstaining, the district court determined that intervention by a federal court would be inappropriate given the important state interests at stake in the pending criminal prosecution. Bean contends that he faces irreparable harm from the threat of forced medication and that therefore the district court should have applied the extraordinary circumstances exception to Younger abstention. We hold that the district court erred in denying Bean's habeas petition on Younger abstention grounds, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

In September 2016, Bean was charged with two counts of murder in Douglas County, Oregon. In December 2016, the Douglas County Circuit Court entered an order finding Bean incompetent to stand trial because he suffered from a delusional disorder and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital ("OSH") for further evaluation and treatment. The court ordered the OSH to evaluate Bean to determine "whether there is a substantial probability that, in the foreseeable future, the defendant will have the capacity to stand trial, pursuant to ORS [Oregon Revised Statute] 161.370(5)."

In March 2017, Dr. Benjamin Goldstein of the OSH notified the circuit court that Bean remained unable to aid and assist in his defense due to a delusional disorder. In Dr. Goldstein's opinion, Bean might become competent to stand trial within three to six months with treatment including antipsychotic medications. Dr. Goldstein further opined that Bean "demonstrated no danger to self or others or any grave disability" and thus did not qualify for involuntary medication through the state hospital. Later in March 2017, Bean's treating physician administratively applied for permission to forcibly medicate Bean, per ORS 161.370, but an Administrative Law Judge determined that Bean did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication.

In June 2017, Dr. Goldstein submitted a second evaluation to the court. Dr. Goldstein opined that there was "no substantial probability in the foreseeable future that Mr. Bean will be restored to trial competence." As Dr. Goldstein explained, delusional disorders do not improve on their own and antipsychotic medications were necessary to overcome Bean's disorder. But the OSH lacked authority to forcibly administer antipsychotic medications because Bean did not pose a danger to himself or others.

In August 2017, the Douglas County District Attorney moved the circuit court to issue an order directing that Bean be forcibly medicated to restore his competency to stand trial. In April 2018, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Sell v. United States , 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), and State v. Lopes , 355 Or. 72, 322 P.3d 512 (2014). Under Sell , the government may forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges to restore the defendant's competency to stand trial "only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests." 539 U.S. at 179, 123 S.Ct. 2174 ; see also Lopes , 322 P.3d at 524. Following the hearing, the circuit court concluded that the state had met its burden under Sell and entered an order on July 16, 2018, authorizing the state to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to restore Bean's competency to stand trial.

Unlike a federal district court's Sell order, which is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, in Oregon a circuit court's Sell order is not directly appealable. The only avenue of review is a mandamus petition in the Oregon Supreme Court. See, e.g. , Or. State Hosp. v. Butts , 358 Or. 49, 359 P.3d 1187, 1190 (2015). In July 2018, Bean sought a writ of mandamus from the Oregon Supreme Court directing the circuit court to strike the Sell order. The Oregon Supreme Court denied the writ.

In November 2018, Bean filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district court for the District of Oregon. Section 2241 provides a general grant of habeas authority that is available for challenges by a state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, such as a defendant in pretrial detention. See Dominguez v. Kernan , 906 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2018). Bean sought an order enjoining the state court's Sell order on three grounds, asserting that (1) his forcible medication, (2) his custody at OSH, and (3) the state's failure to provide an immediate mechanism for review of the Sell order violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

In response to Bean's petition, the state argued that in light of the ongoing criminal prosecution, the district court should abstain under Younger. Alternatively, citing Nettles v. Grounds , 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), the state asserted that Bean's claims were not cognizable in habeas because he did not challenge the validity of his confinement or its duration and that the court should dismiss the petition on that basis. The district court denied Bean's habeas petition on Younger abstention grounds without reaching the question of whether Bean's claim is cognizable in habeas. The district court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability.

A previous panel of our court concluded that Bean's first two claims "made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3), and issued a certificate of appealability on the following issue: "whether the district court erred in denying the petition based on the abstention doctrine pursuant to Younger ."

II.

We review de novo a district court's Younger abstention determination. Rynearson v. Ferguson , 903 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2018). "We conduct the Younger analysis ‘in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the federal action was filed.’ " Id. (quoting Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano , 657 F.3d 876, 881 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011) ).

III.

Before turning to Bean's challenge to the district court's abstention under Younger , we first address the state's assertion that Bean's claim is not cognizable in habeas and that therefore the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We conclude that the state mischaracterizes the cognizability question as a subject-matter jurisdiction issue.

In Nettles , upon which the state relies, we applied the principle that habeas relief is available only for state prisoner claims that lie at the core of habeas and that an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "is the exclusive vehicle for claims that are not within the core of habeas." 830 F.3d at 930, 931. There, success on the merits of the state prisoner's claim for expungement of a disciplinary violation received in prison would not necessarily have led to immediate or speedier release from prison. We therefore held that the claim did not fall within the core of habeas corpus and that the petitioner had failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas relief. Id . at 935. In short, Nettles is about a petitioner's obligation to satisfy the elements of his claim for habeas relief and not about a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ("It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." (emphases removed)).

A district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition alleging a violation of federal law under federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ; Dunne v. Henman , 875 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1989). Provided certain requirements are satisfied and the claim is within the core of habeas as required by Nettles , 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants district courts the authority to issue habeas relief. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Thus, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction and the authority to rule on Bean's petition.¹ But rather than exercising its subject-matter jurisdiction, the court abstained under Younger and never reached the issue of whether Bean's claim is cognizable in habeas.² Satisfied that the district court indeed had subject-matter jurisdiction, we turn to the issue certified for our review: the propriety of the district court's decision to abstain under Younger from exercising that jurisdiction.

IV.

Bean argues that the district court erred in dismissing his habeas petition on Younger abstention grounds because the doctrine does not apply where there is a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." According to Bean, his involuntary medication would effectively be unreviewable later and constitutes irreparable harm, thus triggering the extraordinary circumstances exception to the Younger doctrine. In response, the state contends that even assuming irreparable harm, federal intervention is not warranted. The state argues that the extraordinary circumstances exception only applies where a federal court's intervention is "discrete and finite" and that Young...