Beard v. Branson
| Decision Date | 30 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. M2014-01770-SC-R11-CV.,M2014-01770-SC-R11-CV. |
| Parties | Linda BEARD v. James William BRANSON, et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Philip N. Elbert, James G. Thomas, and Jeffrey A. Zager, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Linda Beard.
David L. Johnson, Nashville, and James T. McColgan, III, and Sherry Fernandez, Cordova, Tennessee, for the appellee, Trinity Hospital, LLC.
Holly Kirby, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., and Cornelia A. Clark, Sharon G. Lee, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.
We granted permission for this appeal to determine whether a surviving spouse who files a wrongful death lawsuit is acting as a legal representative of the decedent and whether a wrongful death lawsuit filed pro se by the surviving spouse is void ab initio based on the spouse's pro se status. In this case, the decedent's surviving spouse filed a pro se wrongful death health care liability lawsuit shortly before the one-year statute of limitations lapsed. After expiration of the limitations period, the spouse retained an attorney and filed an amended complaint. In the ensuing discovery, the defendants learned that the decedent had two daughters, both of whom were statutory beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. They argued that the spouse's initial pro se complaint was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the decedent and the other statutory beneficiaries and that it was, therefore, void ab initio ; thus, the filing of the amended complaint could not relate back to the date of the initial complaint, and the lawsuit was time-barred. The trial court denied the summary judgment motions and permitted the amended complaint to relate back to the date of the initial pro se complaint. It then conducted a jury trial; the jury found both defendants liable and awarded damages. The defendant hospital appealed the denial of summary judgment. Adopting the defendant's argument, the Court of Appeals reversed. The plaintiff now appeals. Under the plain language of Tennessee's wrongful death statutes, the decedent's right of action "pass[es] to" the surviving spouse upon the decedent's death, and the surviving spouse asserts the right of action for the benefit of himself and other beneficiaries. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a) (2009 & Supp. 2016). Consequently, we hold that the surviving spouse did not file the initial pro se complaint as the legal representative of either the decedent or the decedent's estate. As we construe our wrongful death statutes, in filing the pro se complaint, the surviving spouse was acting to a large extent on his own behalf and for his own benefit pursuant to his right of self-representation. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the initial pro se complaint was not void ab initio , it served to toll the statute of limitations, and the trial court did not err in allowing the filing of the amended complaint to relate back to the date of the initial complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment, and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues that were properly raised on appeal but not addressed.
On September 13, 2004, Ruth Hartley ("the decedent") was admitted to Defendant/Appellee Trinity Hospital ("Trinity") in Erin, Houston County, Tennessee, for elective colon surgery. The surgery was performed by Defendant James William Branson, M.D. ("Dr. Branson").
After the surgery, the decedent developed medical complications. On September 28, 2004, after the decedent had endured several days of vomiting, diarrhea, and piercing abdominal pain, she was transferred by helicopter to Centennial Medical Center in Nashville, Tennessee, for emergency surgery. By the time she arrived, she was already in septic shock. The next day, during the surgery, the decedent went into cardiac arrest and died.
On September 12, 2005, with the statute of limitations looming, the decedent's surviving spouse, Denver Hartley, filed a pro se wrongful death health care liability lawsuit against Trinity and Dr. Branson (collectively, "defendants"). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101 et seq. (Tennessee Health Care Liability Act). The pro se complaint listed Mr. Hartley as the plaintiff, "Individually and as the Surviving Spouse of Ruth Hartley, Deceased." Mr. Hartley signed it "as the Surviving Spouse of Ruth Hartley." Although the complaint was actually prepared by an attorney who was informally assisting Mr. Hartley, it was signed only by Mr. Hartley and was not signed by an attorney.1
In the complaint, Mr. Hartley alleged inter alia that Trinity and Dr. Branson negligently failed to diagnose and treat the decedent's condition and that their breach of the standard of care caused his wife's death. The complaint included a request for damages on behalf of Mr. Hartley only; it did not mention any other surviving heirs of the decedent. It sought damages for the decedent's pain and suffering, the economic value of the decedent's life, Mr. Hartley's loss of consortium, funeral expenses, and other damages resulting from the defendants' negligence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 (2009).
In November 2005, the defendants filed separate motions to dismiss Mr. Hartley's complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Both motions asserted that Mr. Hartley was not permitted to file this lawsuit pro se. Mr. Hartley's complaint, they claimed, was filed in a representative capacity on behalf of the decedent and, as a non-attorney, Mr. Hartley could not file a lawsuit for another in a representative capacity. The defendants contended that the filing of the complaint constituted the unauthorized practice of law by Mr. Hartley. As such, they argued, the pro se complaint was a nullity and therefore the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
After both motions to dismiss were filed but before they were argued, Mr. Hartley formally retained an attorney, Philip N. Elbert, to represent him in this lawsuit. On February 15, 2006, Mr. Elbert filed a notice of appearance as legal counsel for Mr. Hartley.3
On February 27, 2006, Mr. Hartley, through counsel, filed a response opposing the defendants' motions to dismiss. The response explained that Mr. Hartley contacted Mr. Elbert shortly before the one-year anniversary of his wife's death, but Mr. Elbert was unable to fully investigate the claim consistent with his ethical obligation before expiration of the limitations period. Consequently, Mr. Elbert assisted Mr. Hartley with the preparation and filing of his pro se complaint in order to prevent the cause of action from becoming time-barred while Mr. Elbert did his investigation of the claims. As to the motions to dismiss, Mr. Hartley argued in his response that they should be denied because, under Tennessee's wrongful death statutes, the decedent's cause of action passed to Mr. Hartley when she died. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a) (2009 & Supp. 2016). Because the cause of action belonged to Mr. Hartley, the filing of the pro se complaint did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Mr. Hartley's response further maintained that, even if the appearance of counsel was deemed necessary, the formal notice of the appearance of Mr. Elbert as counsel cured any error and should relate back to the date of the initial complaint.
On March 2, 2006, Mr. Hartley filed an amended complaint signed by Mr. Elbert as Mr. Hartley's attorney of record. He also filed a second memorandum in opposition to Dr. Branson's motion to dismiss.
Soon thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss.4 On July 3, 2006, the trial court entered an order denying both defendants' motions. In the order, the trial court held that Mr. Hartley was permitted to file the wrongful death action pro se because, under section 20-5-106, the decedent's cause of action passed to Mr. Hartley as the surviving spouse, and the decedent had no other statutory beneficiaries. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). The trial court reasoned that, "[w]hen there are statutory beneficiaries, the surviving spouse will be proceeding in a representative capacity on behalf of himself and any statutory beneficiaries," but because Mr. Hartley was the only beneficiary, he was representing his own interests and not proceeding in a representative capacity. Therefore, it held, Mr. Hartley was permitted to represent himself in the wrongful death action, and his initial complaint was not a nullity. Discovery ensued.
In the course of discovery, it was revealed that the decedent and Mr. Hartley had two adult daughters, Linda Beard and Tammy Veach. This new information prompted the defendants to file motions for summary judgment. The defendants asserted that, because Mr. Hartley was not the decedent's sole statutory beneficiary, he was asserting a wrongful death claim in a representative capacity on behalf of the other statutory beneficiaries.5 As Mr. Hartley is not an attorney, the defendants argued, he was not permitted to represent the other beneficiaries. They again claimed that the initial complaint was a nullity and its filing did not toll the statute of limitations.
While the summary judgment motions were pending, Mr. Hartley, through counsel, filed a motion to amend the complaint "[o]ut of an abundance of caution" to add himself as a party plaintiff in a representative capacity on behalf of the decedent's children, should they elect to claim an interest in the lawsuit in the future. Both of the defendants responded by arguing that the motion to amend should not be granted because the original complaint was a nullity, so there was nothing to amend.
In November 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment.6 In March 2007, the...
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