Beardsley v. Crane
| Decision Date | 05 April 1893 |
| Citation | 54 N.W. 740,52 Minn. 537 |
| Parties | Amelia P. Beardsley v. Henry L. Crane |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Argued January 12, 1893
Appeal by plaintiff, Amelia P. Beardsley, from an order of the District Court of Hennepin County, Lochren, J., made September 24, 1892, denying her motion for a new trial.
Section thirty-five (35) in township one hundred and seventeen (117) north, of range twenty-three (23) west, in Hennepin county is fractional, and lies on the south bank of Lake Minnetonka. If it were a full section, its north line, except for a few rods at the northeast corner, would lie some distance into this lake. Another lake, called Christmas Lake, encroaches upon the section from the east, so that the south two-thirds of the east line is lost in that lake. A third lake, called Galpin's Lake, encroaches upon the section from the west so that the point where the quarter post on the west line should stand is some distance out into this lake. The government surveyors of the public lands could only establish the northeast and the southwest corners of the section and the quarter post on the south line. See map of this section.
[SEE ILLUSTRATION IN ORIGINAL]
On January 7, 1881, Frank J. Stoddard owned the fractional southeast quarter of the section, and conveyed to William Chatfield a piece bounded as follows: "Commencing on the west line of the southeast quarter of section thirty-five (35) in township one hundred and seventeen (117) north, of range twenty-three (23) west, sixty-eight (68) rods north of the southwest corner of said quarter section; thence north twenty-one (21) rods and ten (10) links; thence east sixty-nine and one-half (69 1/2) rods to Christmas Lake thence south-easterly along the bank of said lake twenty-three and one-half (23 1/2) rods; thence west eighty (80) rods to the place of beginning; containing ten acres more or less." The parties soon after discovered that the distance to the lake was greater than was stated in the deed, and Chatfield paid Stoddard for the excess, over ten acres, and Stoddard, on May 29, 1883, made and delivered to Chatfield another deed of the land, describing it the same as in the first, except the length of the north line was stated to be ninety (90) rods, and the length of the south line one hundred (100) rods, and quantity twelve and one-third (12 1/3) acres, more or less. This second deed recited that it was given to correct an error in the description in the first deed. This and the adjacent lands were then covered with timber.
Stoddard and Chatfield obtained the assistance of a neighbor who had some knowledge of surveying, and in the spring of 1881, ran out and marked what they supposed to be the north line of the land sold. In the summer of 1881, they built a wire fence along the line so located by them. Chatfield on September 3 1884, conveyed to the defendant. Stoddard conveyed the adjacent land on the north to the plaintiff. She claimed that the wire fence was too far to the north and on her land twelve (12) feet at the west end and twenty-eight (28) feet at the east end at Christmas Lake, and brought this action in March, 1891, to recover possession of this narrow strip lying between the wire fence and the correct boundary line. Defendant contended that Stoddard had orally agreed with Chatfield that the wire fence should be the line between them; that they made a practical location of the boundary line which had ever since been acquiesced in by the parties interested.
At the trial, on January 27, 1892, defendant had a verdict, and the trial court refused to set it aside, and plaintiff appealed.
Order reversed.
Daniel Fish, for appellant.
It is necessary in surveying this land, to ascertain the true position of the north and south quarter line. The other boundaries are not government lines, nor are any of them parallel with such lines. Stoddard owned the whole tract, and could carve it up and sell it in such parcels as he saw fit. And what parcels he chose to sell must be ascertained from a perusal of his deeds. Where the grant describes the premises by distinct and definite boundaries from which the lands may be located, no extrinsic facts or parol evidence can be resorted to, to control or vary the description. Drew v. Swift, 46 N.Y. 204; Lawrence v. Palmer, 71 N.Y. 607; Armstrong v. Du Bois, 90 N.Y. 95; Fratt v. Woodward, 32 Cal. 219; Bond v. Fay, 94 Mass. 86.
The position of the quarter post in the south line of the section as originally fixed by the government survey, is well known. There is no opposite corresponding quarter post on the north. In such case, the rule is to run due north for a quarter line. U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 2396, 2397. In the absence of anything in the deed manifesting a contrary intention, it is always presumed that a rectangular figure is intended. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Holmes v. Trout, 7 Pet. 171. Where the call is "eastwardly" or the like, if there is no point fixed for the termination of the line, the course will be presumed to have been intended to run at right angles to the base. Fratt v. Woodward, 32 Cal. 219. The reason is that without such construction the direction of the line is indefinite and uncertain, and it is not to be presumed that the parties intended to leave the direction in doubt. 2 Devlin, Deeds, § 1035, and cases cited.
There is no ambiguity in the deeds that would warrant a resort to parol evidence to make their meaning clear. There can be no difficulty in marking out on the ground the premises actually described. The starting point is definitely fixed, and the first course follows the quarter section line due north. By no possibility can the deeds be construed as covering the land sued for.
The answer sets up an oral agreement between Stoddard and Chatfield whereby they established the north boundary line where the wire fence was placed. The theory of this defense seems to be, that it was competent for the parties to bind themselves irrevocably by parol, to a boundary differing from that described in the deed. Both parties supposed they had fixed the north line correctly, and acquiesced in that line because they so supposed. Afterwards it was discovered that the description covered twelve and a third acres, through an error of the surveyor, in the length of the tract. In measuring from the lake back to the west boundary, "a tally" (20 rods) was dropped. The excess was paid for, and a new deed taken, varying from the first deed only in the length of these lines and in the area supposed to be embraced in the description. There was never any question raised as to "where the boundary line ought to be." There was no compromise of a disputed boundary such as the courts have sometimes held to be conclusive. In the absence of such a dispute, a mere parol agreement, if there were one, is not binding upon either party. Land can be conveyed only by deed. The statute of frauds settles that. The utmost that can be claimed in this case is, that the line of the wire fence was established, and the fence erected, under the mutual belief of the owners that its site was the true boundary of the area conveyed. Both parties were mistaken, and the theory of the trial court seems to have been that such a mistake once made can never be corrected, unless the party having the advantage shall voluntarily surrender it. Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285; Hass v. Plautz, 56 Wis. 105; Pickett v. Nelson, 79 Wis. 9.
Shaw & Cray, for respondent.
When the second deed from Stoddard to Chatfield was made, Chatfield intended to buy all the land included in the boundary actually occupied by him, and up to that particular line of wire fence. The gist of the contention of plaintiff upon this evidence was, and is, that the evidence was incompetent, because in conflict with the general rule that parol evidence will not be admitted to vary the terms or description in a deed. But the application of the rule in this class of cases is subject to so many and diversified exceptions and variations, as to render it exceedingly precarious to rely upon. The intention of the parties is to govern the question of boundary line. Parol and extrinsic evidence may be given to determine that intention, when there is an ambiguity or doubt in the deed itself. An ambiguity or doubt may arise either upon the language of the deed itself, or when that language comes to be applied to the locus. If, when a surveyor attempts to locate upon the ground the description in the deed, elements of uncertainty and doubt are found in the situation, which render the meaning and application of the description in the deed uncertain, then there exists an ambiguity or doubt, which may be solved by the admission of evidence of extrinsic circumstances. This case was such as to present such an ambiguity or doubt, and justified the court in admitting evidence of extrinsic circumstances to determine the real intention of the parties. Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261.
It is elementary that agreements in respect to disputed boundary lines are not within the statute of frauds, because they cannot be considered as relating to the title. Tyler, Boundaries, pp. 254, 284, 285, 288. Evidence of what is called a practical location of the boundary was competent. In this case the line was agreed upon between the parties claiming the land on both sides of it, and acquiesced in for ten years. What we principally rely upon as being the feature of this case and coming within this doctrine is, that the line which we claim, has been agreed upon between the parties claiming the land on both sides thereof. Lebeau v. Bergeron, 14 La. An. 489; Bolton v. Lann, 16 Texas, 96; Clark v. Tabor, 28 Vt. 222.
Action in ejectment to recover possession of a narrow strip of land situated in...
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