Beardsley v. Johnson

• Citation: 105 Conn. 98,134 A. 530
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 30 July 1926
• Parties: BEARDSLEY v. JOHNSON ET AL.

134 A. 530

105 Conn. 98

BEARDSLEY v. JOHNSON ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 30, 1926

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Leonard J Nickerson, Judge.

Suit by Samuel F. Beardsley, administrator, c. t. a., against Cornelia E. Johnson and others, to construe the will of Luzon W. Clark, deceased. Reserved by the superior court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors on questions of law arising under facts recited in the pleadings. Questions answered.

Maltbie J., dissenting.

Samuel F. Beardsley, of Bridgeport, in pro. per.

Howard L. Shaff, of Bridgeport, for defendants Cornelia E. Johnson and others.

Sanford Stoddard, of Bridgeport, for defendants Caroline French and others.

Harold E. Drew, of Derby, for defendants Hattie E. Haugh and others.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and CURTIS, MALTBIE, HAINES, and HINMAN, JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The questions of law concerning the will we are asked to give our advice upon arise under article III and codicil B (quoted in footnote), ^[1] being a substitute for article V of the will as first written. They all relate to the identical words, " lawful heirs," found in this article and codicil. " Heirs" or " lawful heirs" as used in a will may have several meanings. In the connection " lawful heirs" are here used, the parties concede they must mean either those who inherit--that is, descendants of any degree--or children. If they mean the former, they are within the statute of perpetuities, repealed in 1895, but in existence at the date of this will, and in consequence of their conflict with the provisions of this statute, the article and codicil are invalid. If they mean the latter--children--they do not offend against the statute, and both article and codicil are valid. Numerous other questions of construction arise on the face of this will which we are not asked to advise upon. Some of these we are obliged to consider and determine since they are involved in the questions we are asked to decide.

" Lawful heirs" or " heirs," used in wills, in its primary meaning " designates those who in the absence of a will are by law entitled to inherit the real estate of a deceased person." Nicoll v. Irby, 83 Conn. 530, 534, 77 A. 957, 958; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 522, 89 A. 205, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 112. This is their meaning unless the will, read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator, clearly indicates that he used the words in a different meaning. Hartford Trust Co. v. Purdue, 84 Conn. 256, 258, 79 A. 581; Harris v. Weed, 89 Conn. 214, 219, 93 A. 232. Applying this test, we have held " lawful heirs" or " heirs" meant: Children, in Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 A. 205, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 112, Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 277, 93 A. 535, Russell v. Hartley, 83 Conn. 654, 664, 78 A. 320, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 73 Conn. 303, 47 A. 325; those entitled by the statute of distribution to succeed beneficially to the personal property of another, in Beach v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 98 Conn. 821, 824, 120 A. 607, Morse v. Ward, 92 Conn. 408, 103 A. 119, Ruggles v. Randall, 70 Conn. 44, 48, 38 A. 885; and next of kin in Miller, Ex'r, v. Metcalf et al., 77 Conn. 176, 58 A. 743.

The solution of this question is primarily the ascertainment of the intention of the testator. This requires an analysis of the will in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator when he drafted and executed it; these include the natural objects of his bounty, the affection he entertained for and the intimacy of his contact with them, and what the will would give to each, if " lawful heirs" be construed to mean those who would inherit from, or to mean the children of, the objects of his bounty to whom he had devised a life use.

The heirs at law of the testator were his three nieces, Jane C. Johnson, Catherine Burton, and Caroline French, children of his sister Mrs. Briscoe, and two grandnieces, Catherine E. Powell and Caroline A. Terrill, children of Amanda B. Vredenberg, a daughter of Mrs. Briscoe. Mrs. Johnson was taken into the home of the testator and brought up as a member of his immediate family until her marriage, he having no children of his own. She was always known as Jane Clark until her marriage, and was married under that name; after her marriage she was known as Jane Clark Johnson. None of the other heirs at law of the testator were taken into the home of the testator or brought up as members of his immediate family. After the decease of the testator's wife in 1886, Mrs. Johnson again became a member of the testator's household and lived with him until his death about two years later, caring for him during this time as a daughter.

The heirs at law of Mrs. Johnson were her children, Hattie E. Haugh, Frank C. Johnson, and Gertrude A. Johnson, later Osborne, who later resided in Virginia until her death in 1898. The testator in letters referred to two of these children, Mrs. Haugh and Frank C. Johnson, who were his grandniece and grandnephew, as his grandchildren. These facts are quite sufficient to show that the testator regarded Mrs. Johnson as a loving and dutiful daughter, and that he did not entertain the same affection towards his other heirs, nor have the same intimacy with them as he had with Mrs. Johnson and her children. They also furnish a basis for the inference that his regard for Mrs. Johnson was a very natural outgrowth of their relationship. A relationship of this nature between a testator and one of the objects of his bounty furnishes a reasonable basis for expecting that the testator would, in his will, give to her who stood in the relationship of daughter, or to her and her children, generously, and in preference to the other objects of his bounty towards whom his relations were apparently not of close intimacy or affection. This relationship is a significant circumstance in the light of which the will must be construed.

Let us examine the will to find out which of the objects of his bounty--his heirs--he did give his estate, and whether his gifts indicate a preference on the part of the testator for any of these. He gave his household furniture and certain classes of personal belongings to his wife for life, and at her decease he gave the life use of these to Jane C. Johnson. He also gave to her (1) in article IV a lot with the buildings thereon for life, remainder to her lawful heirs; (2) in trust the life use of $2,000, which upon her decease he bequeathed to her lawful heirs; (3) in codicil C, to her absolutely $5,000 to equal advances made to Frank C. Johnson, her son; and (4) in article VIII, section 9, he gave the residue of his estate real and personal to " Jane C. Johnson, Frank C. Johnson, Hattie E. Haugh, and Gertrude A. Johnson, to be divided equally between them, and their legal representatives share and share alike. But in case either die and leave no lineal descendants surviving him or her, then the same shall go to the survivors, or survivor, of them and their heirs forever."

He gave to Frank C. Johnson, son of Jane C. Johnson, (1) his gold watch and chain, (2) in article III, a lot with buildings thereon for life and subject to this life use and to certain specified rights of his mother therein " to his lawful heirs forever," and (3) one-fourth of the residue as above described in article VIII, section 9. The testator also gave in a codicil, Exhibit C, $2,000 absolutely to Frank C. Johnson's wife, Cornelia Johnson.

He gave to Hattie E. Haugh, daughter of Jane C. Johnson, (1) in codicil B, in substitution of article V of the will, a lot with buildings thereon to be erected by the testator at a cost of $5,000, or by advances by my executor or legal representatives; (2) in trust the use for life of $2,000, " and upon her decease I give and devise the said lot and buildings and money to her lawful heirs forever; " (3) in codicil C, $5,000 absolutely; and (4) one-fourth of the residue, as above described in article VIII, section 9.

He gave in article VI to Gertrude Johnson (later Osborne), (1) in trust the life use of $10,000, " and upon her death I give and devise the same to her lawful heirs forever," and (2) one-fourth of the residue as above described in article VIII, section 9.

He gave to his other heirs at law legacies aggregating in value very much less than the property given Jane C. Johnson and her children, as follows: To Catherine Burton, a niece, $1,000; and to Nathaniel Burton and Eugene Burton, children of Catherine Burton, and grandnephews of the testator, $500, " to be equally divided between them, or the survivor of them, in case either of them should die before it comes into their possession, to be theirs absolutely" ; to Kate Powell and Carrie Terrell, grandnieces, and children of Amanda B. Vredenberg, a niece, in trust to each the life use of $1,000, with power in the trustee to use the principal for their support, and at the death of each the testator directs the trustee to pay over " the principal or what remains thereof, to her lawful heirs to be theirs forever" ; to Caroline French, a niece, $1,000. All of the other legacies aggregated $1,700.

If " lawful heirs," as used in the provisions of the will containing these devises and bequests to Jane C. Johnson and her children, means children, and not those who inherit from her, it is evident that he has given the great bulk of his estate to his niece Mrs. Johnson and her children, for whom he entertained a far deeper affection than he had for any other heirs at law, and to this niece to whom he was under the greatest of obligation for the care and service of a daughter. If " lawful heirs," as used in articles III, IV, and VI, be construed to mean those who inherit and not children, the devises of the lot...