Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 06 June 1927
• Citation: 138 A. 159,106 Conn. 178
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HARTFORD-CONNECTICUT TRUST CO. v. LAWRENCE ET AL.

138 A. 159

106 Conn. 178

HARTFORD-CONNECTICUT TRUST CO. v. LAWRENCE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 6, 1927

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Hartford County; Leonard J Nickerson, Judge.

Suit by the Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company, executor and trustee to determine the construction of the will of Adelaide S Farrington, deceased. Reserved on an agreed statement of facts for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. Questions answered.

WHEELER C.J., dissenting.

Howard W. Alcorn, of Suffield, for defendant Lawrence.

Albert C. Bill and Albert S. Bill, both of Hartford, and Cornelius A. Parker, of Boston, Mass., for defendant Chase.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

HAINES, J.

On the 18th day of March, 1918, Adelaide S. Farrington made and executed her will disposing of both real and personal property, naming the plaintiff as sole executor and trustee thereunder, with " full power and authority * * * to sell and convey any real estate which may form a portion of my estate or of the trust fund if such sale should be deemed to be for the best interest of the beneficiaries." The death of the testatrix occurred July 9, 1925, and the plaintiff duly qualified and proceeded with the settlement of the estate. After the payment of all lawful claims, there remains in the hands of the executor sufficient to pay all the legacies provided by the will, leaving a considerable residuary estate. The testatrix was survived by her husband, Martin L. Farrington, who died January 29, 1926. She had two nieces, Mrs. Grace A. Chase and Mrs. Florence W. Lawrence. The latter survives, but the former died October 5, 1918, leaving her husband. She left no parents and no children or representatives of children, and her only surviving next of kin is her sister, Mrs. Lawrence.

By the third paragraph of her will, the testatrix gave Mrs. Chase and Mrs. Lawrence $1,000 each, and added, " If either should die before me, the heirs of my niece so dying, shall receive the share to which such niece would be entitled if living."

In the fourth paragraph the testatrix provided that the residue of her estate should be held by her executor in trust with power to manage and invest it under the laws of this state, and directed that the net income thereof be paid over to her husband during his life. She then directed that upon the death of her husband sundry sums be paid from the fund to designated beneficiaries, and that the remainder " shall be equally divided between Mrs. Grace A. Chase aforesaid, and Mrs. Florence W. Lawrence aforesaid, to be theirs absolutely, and the heirs of either who may have died to receive the share to which such beneficiary would have been entitled if living."

Upon the foregoing facts, the controlling question presented to this court for determination is whether the word " heirs," as used in the Third and Fourth paragraphs of the will, includes Mr. Chase. Counsel for the husband claim that the word should not be interpreted in its technical sense of one entitled to inherit the real estate of a deceased person, unless the intent of the testatrix be found to so limit it, while counsel for the niece say it must be so interpreted, unless the contrary intent appears. We have held in effect that the technical meaning will be given to the word, if the intent of the testator to use it in a different sense does not appear; but it is a controlling and equally sound rule of construction that, where the intent can be found from the context and the circumstances, that intent shall govern. In other words, the dominant rule in the construction of this term, like all other terms of a will, is that the intent of the testator shall be made effectual, if possible. Hartford Trust Co. v. Purdue, 84 Conn. 256, 258, 79 A. 581; Ruggles v. Randall, 70 Conn. 44, 48, 38 A. 885; Nicoll v. Irby, 83 Conn. 530, 534, 77 A. 957; Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 508, 21 A. 1075.

The original and underlying reason for presuming that the word " heirs" referred to those who would inherit real estate was that that was the historical significance of the word, and it was more probable than otherwise that the testator understood it to have that meaning. Under the feudal conceptions of the early English law, the descent of real estate was of primary importance, while the descent of personal property was of little consequence. Not only as a word of art, but in common parlance, the word " heirs" thus signified those who inherited real estate. While the rule came to us from this source, the reason for it has never existed to any extent in this country. In the absence here of the historical feudal background, the sanction for the technical definition of the word seems to be largely lacking. On the contrary, our conception of property has never given predominant importance to real estate. The popular conception of inheritance in this country includes personal as well as real property, the historical distinction between the two has disappeared, and to-day personal property is of equal importance with real estate as the subject of inheritance. Indeed, we cannot reasonably assume that a testator to-day in the use of the word " heirs" intends to suggest only one who inherits real estate, but rather one who inherits property generally. As matter of fact, there are probably few testators who ever heard of the historical meaning of the word. It has acquired a broader meaning, and is defined in dictionaries as those who inherit property generally. Its original or historical meaning is given secondary place only, and may fairly be said not to exist at all in the popular mind. Since the intent of the testator is always the controlling purpose of the construction of wills, this modern conception of the word in the popular mind cannot rightly be ignored. Usage makes language, and, the historical significance of this word being largely lost, the intent of those who make wills will obviously best be found by giving it the popular and generally understood meaning. To adhere to the historical meaning under such circumstances would more often than otherwise defeat the real intent of the testator. The will before us illustrates the force of these observations. Four gifts of corporate stock are made to named beneficiaries, and in each case the testatrix uses the phrase " to be hers and her heirs forever."

A surviving husband or wife could not fairly be said to be an " heir," when the word was restricted to those who inherit real estate, and when the only rights they had by our law were estate for life, by curtesy or dower, having their origin, not in succession at death, but in the pre-existing marital status. In Connecticut, since 1699, surviving wives have taken a share in a husband's property by virtue of the law for the distribution of intestate estates. 4 Colonial Records, 306. In 1877 dower and curtesy rights as regards any marriage thereafter contracted were abolished, and a surviving spouse was put on the same plane in the right to inherit, and, in the event of intestacy, took a certain share by absolute title. Public Acts of 1877, c. 114. We pointed out in Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 63 A. 285, 5 L.R.A. (N. S.) 611, 6 Ann.Cas. 1027, that a radical change of policy was adopted by this act, and that all existing statutes giving to either husband or wife any right to, or interest in, the property of the other either during marriage or after death--other than those under the new status--were repealed. In Beard's Appeal, 78 Conn. 481, 484, 62 A. 704, we pointed out that, as to any share in the husband's estate the wife might have beyond that secured to her against any testamentary disposition he might attempt, she stood on the same footing as any other distributees. In Harris v. Spencer, 71 Conn. 233, 237, 41 A. 773, we showed that either husband or wife may during life dispose of his or her property in any lawful way he or she pleases. It thus appears from these decisions that the title of a surviving spouse married after 1877 is one derived at death and by virtue of succession, the same process through which any person acquires title by distribution from the estate of a deceased person. Indeed, the statutes provide that the share of the surviving spouse shall be set out before that of those who are to share the remainder, and this share includes both real and personal property. The surviving spouse thus " inherits by descent the real estate of the deceased," and is, since 1877, in fact an " heir," and within the primary, as well as the popular, meaning of the word " heir."

While we made reference in Ruggles v. Randall, and Hartford Trust Co. v. Purdue, to the historical meaning of the word, and excluded a surviving wife in one case and a surviving husband in the other, it will be seen that they were decided upon the particular facts of those cases. We recognized the same consideration in Morse v. Ward, 92 Conn. 408. 411, 103 A. 119, and in Beach v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 98 Conn. 821, 824, 120 A. 607, 608. In the latter we said:

" In fact, the word ‘ heirs' has been so often used and construed as including all who would inherit either real or personal estate, that there is no longer any good reason for insisting upon its technical significance, except where the intention to use it in that sense is apparent."

See, also, Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 391, 9 N.E. 747; Weston v. Weston, 38 Ohio.St. 473, 478; Turner v. Burr, 141 Mich. 106, 111, 104 N.W. 379; Anderson v. Groesbeck, 26 Colo. 3, 13, 55 P. 1086.

It follows that, even if we were to give the word " heirs" only its primary meaning, it would include Mr Chase; but we should go further and examine the circumstances surrounding the...