Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-852,96-852
• Citation: 570 N.W.2d 915
• Parties: 8 A.D. Cases 1841, 11 NDLR P 158 Carol BEARSHIELD, Appellant, v. JOHN MORRELL & CO., Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 915

570 N.W.2d 915

8 A.D. Cases 1841, 11 NDLR P 158

Carol BEARSHIELD, Appellant, v. JOHN MORRELL & CO., Appellee.

No. 96-852.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 26, 1997.

Dennis M. McElwain and Michael L. Smith of Smith & McElwain Law Office, Sioux City, for appellant.

Margaret M. Prahl and Sabra K. Craig of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Schatz & Plaza, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

TERNUS, Justice.

Appellant Carol Bearshield sued her employer, appellee John Morrell & Co., claiming disability discrimination. In granting John Morrell's motion for summary judgment, the district ruled, as a matter of law, that Bearshield was not disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12112(a) (1988); Iowa Code §§ 216.2(5), 216.6(1)(a) (1993). Bearshield appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Standard of Review.

We review a summary judgment ruling for correction of errors of law. See Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Iowa 1996). A summary judgment will be upheld "when the moving party shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Iowa 1995). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Gerst, 549 N.W.2d at 812.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Bearshield, reveals the following facts. John Morrell operates a meatpacking plant in Sioux City, Iowa. Since 1989, Bearshield has worked on the "final trim ham line" at the plant. She trims fat from small pieces of ham passing by on the assembly line, and then throws the pieces into a container.

Bearshield has suffered from degenerative arthritis in both knees for several years, but until 1994 her condition had not prevented her from performing her job. Between early January 1994, and February 3, 1994, Bearshield fell on or twisted her knees on three occasions: once inside the plant, once in the plant parking lot, and once at home. She reported these incidents to John Morrell, but continued to perform her regular job, sitting on a stool when necessary. (Other employees on the ham line were also allowed to use a stool as needed.)

When Bearshield's knee pain continued, she was referred to the company physician. On April 25, 1994, the company doctor advised Bearshield not to work and referred her to a specialist, Dr. Steven Meyer. Dr. Meyer's diagnosis was degenerative arthritis in both knees, aggravated by Bearshield's recent falls. After prescribing various treatment regimens, Dr. Meyer eventually released Bearshield to return to work on May 23, 1994, subject to the following permanent restrictions: Bearshield could not squat or twist, and could not stand for more than two hours at a time.

Bearshield presented herself to John Morrell for work the next day. She was told there was no work available because of the restrictions imposed by Dr. Meyer. These restrictions violated John Morrell's policy requiring a full release before an employee suffering from a nonwork-related injury would be permitted to return to work. (John Morrell claimed Bearshield's injury was not work-related.) Bearshield disagreed with her employer's decision and asserted she could do her regular job with the aid of a stool, just as she had between February 4 and April 25, 1994. When John Morrell persisted in its refusal to allow her to return to work, Bearshield filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging the company's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (hereinafter "ICRA").

Meanwhile, Bearshield's attorney continued to ask John Morrell to return Bearshield to the production line. In November 1994 John Morrell allowed Bearshield to return to her old job as a trimmer on the ham line. Bearshield was still subject to the restrictions imposed by Dr. Meyer, so she used a stool when needed to perform her duties. She continued on the ham line without incident for six months, when she then bid into another job. John Morrell refused to pay Bearshield for the time she was off work between May 23, 1994, and November 14, 1994.

Bearshield filed this action in March 1995, seeking back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. ¹ John Morrell filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Bearshield could not establish (1) that she was disabled under the ADA and ICRA, or (2) that she was terminated or replaced by John Morrell. ² The company also claimed that because Bearshield was not disabled, she had no standing to seek an injunction against John Morrell's use of its "100% healed" policy. The district court ruled John Morrell had shown as a matter of law that Bearshield was not disabled and, accordingly, dismissed her petition. Bearshield appeals.

III. General Legal Principles.

Proof of a disability is essential to recovery for disability discrimination under the ADA and the ICRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability ....") (emphasis added); Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (making it an unfair or discriminatory practice to "discriminate in employment against any ... employee because of the ... disability of such ... employee") (emphasis added); Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 1995). The issue of whether an individual has a disability is a factual question to be decided on a case-by-case basis. See Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir.1992); Smith v. Kitterman, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 423, 427 n. 3 (W.D.Mo.1995).

The ADA defines a "disability" as (1) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual"; (2) having "a record of such an impairment"; or (3) "being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The term "disability" is defined similarly under the ICRA. Iowa Code section 216.2(5) defines a "disability" as "the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap." The regulations promulgated pursuant to chapter 216 expand on this basic definition:

The term "substantially handicapped person" shall mean any person who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 161--8.26(1) (1993).

In Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Iowa 1994), this court looked to the federal cases interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in determining the appropriate analytical framework for state disability discrimination claims. The Rehabilitation Act now looks to the standards established by title I of the ADA and the regulations promulgated pursuant to that statute in determining whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1992). Given the common purposes of the ADA and the ICRA's prohibition of disability discrimination, as well as the similarity in the terminology of these statutes, we will look to the ADA and underlying federal regulations in developing standards under the ICRA for disability discrimination claims. See Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir.1997) (applying, in disability discrimination case brought under the ICRA, federal standards developed under the ADA); Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 420 N.W.2d 432, 435-36 (Iowa 1988) (noting similarity in federal and state statutes and regulations governing disability discrimination, and incorporating federal definitions of relevant terms into Iowa law); cf. King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1983) (applying by analogy the same burdens and order of presentation of proof in chapter 601A, now chapter 216, religious discrimination case as used in title VII cases). Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act remain instructive, however, since the ADA defines "disability" substantially the same as the Rehabilitation Act defines that term. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

Given the identity of the applicable legal principles and analytical framework with respect to the question of whether one has a disability under the ADA and the ICRA, our subsequent discussion of whether Bearshield is disabled applies equally to her claims under both statutes.

IV. Is There Evidence to Support a Factual Finding That Bearshield Has a Physical Impairment "That Substantially Limits One or More of [Her] Major Life Activities"?

A. Applicable analysis. John Morrell does not dispute that the evidence shows Bearshield suffers from a "physical impairment," namely, degenerative arthritis. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1997) (defining "physical impairment" to include conditions that affect the body's musculoskeletal system). The fighting issue is whether Bearshield's arthritis "substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Iowa Admin. Code r. 161--8.26(1). "Major life activities" are defined in federal and state regulations as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); accord Iowa Admin. Code r. 161--8.26(3). This list is not intended to be exhaustive; "major life activities" may also include sitting and standing. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).

One is "substantially limit[ed]" in performing these activities if one is

(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or

(ii)...