Beasley, In re

• Decision Date: 30 January 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 1
• Citation: 252 S.E.2d 615,243 Ga. 134
• Parties: In re BEASLEY. Admissions
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 615

252 S.E.2d 615

243 Ga. 134

In re BEASLEY.

Admissions Docket No. 1.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 30, 1979.

Al M. Horn, Atlanta, Bensonetta Tipton Lane, for applicant.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., L. Joseph Shaheen, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Bar Examiners.

PER CURIAM.

David Michael Beasley, III, has applied to this court for review of an adverse decision of the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. See, generally, Code Ann. Ch. 9-1 Appendix.

1. He first contends that the entire board and each of its members were disqualified from acting in the matter of his application because each of the members of the board and its chief administrative officer were named by him as defendants in the case of Beasley v. Estes et al., Civil Action No. C78-1092A, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

No legal authority bearing on this ground for review has been furnished. Neither has any such authority been located by this court. Acceptance of this contention would frustrate entirely the process by which applicants for admission to the bar are determined to possess the requisite character and moral fitness. This ground of review is without merit.

2. Applicant next contends that the board erred in putting upon him the burden of proving that he possesses the requisite character and moral fitness to be admitted to the bar. He cites and relies upon Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957), in support of this position. The Schware case does not preclude a state from placing upon bar applicants the burden of proving their character and fitness. The requirements of Schware are (1) that the qualification standard in issue have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness to practice law and (2) that there must be an adequate basis for the finding that the applicant fails to meet the standard. In other words, the right to practice law is not extended by the states as a matter of grace and favor. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963). In Schware, the conduct relied upon by the fitness board had happened some 15 years earlier, and the applicant had made a forceful showing before the board by his own testimony, as well as the testimony of others, of his present, good, moral character. Furthermore, the conduct was political in nature and federally protected or was for the purpose of interdicting ethnic discrimination being practiced against the applicant. The board's questionnaire did not request disclosure of one of the matters at issue.

We have before us today quite a different case. Representations made by Mr. Beasley on his application in response to questions asked of him in the application were shown to be at variance with the facts. The question became one of whether these errors and omissions were wilful in order to conceal the whole truth or merely were inadvertent. Mr. Beasley tendered with his application, as amended, an undated and untitled document bearing the purported signature and seal of a California notary public which recites that: "D. Michael Beasley III states under oath that the facts alleged in his answers and defenses in the matter of his application to take the Georgia bar examination are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief." He did not appear personally either before the hearing examiner or before the entire board in support of his application. He appeared by counsel and his attorneys relied upon his "verification" of his pleadings and upon their contentions that the burden of proof was upon the state. The hearing examiner heard witnesses in his behalf as well as in behalf of the state.

The board rejected his contention that the errors and omissions were inadvertent because of the nature of the omitted material and the substantial number of the omissions. Additionally, the board relied upon the fact that "the Applicant was afforded the opportunity to be heard in his own behalf but failed to appear at such hearing to explain why his application, as amended, contained so many 'inadvertencies' as they were characterized by him." The matters in issue included questions as to whether his reporting to the board of a marijuana conviction as a misdemeanor was an attempt to cover up the fact that it was a felony conviction later reduced to a misdemeanor, and the nature and dates of certain charges and convictions for drunkenness and drunk driving. The inquiry was directed not to the seriousness of these offenses themselves. Rather, it related to the inferences that could and should be drawn as to the applicant's candor and honesty because of the manner in which he had reported these matters to the board. Also involved was the question of whether he had intended by his responses to conceal the status of his child support payments under a divorce decree and two URESA orders. The board determined from the record of proceedings that in reporting these matters to the board, the applicant "displayed a lack of candor which indicates that the Applicant fails to possess the integrity and character requisite to be a member of the Bar of the State of Georgia."

In proceedings of this nature, the burden clearly rests...