Beasley v. Semitool, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-355,92-355 |
| Citation | 853 P.2d 84,258 Mont. 258 |
| Parties | , 128 Lab.Cas. P 57,694, 8 IER Cases 833 L. Michael BEASLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SEMITOOL, INC., Semitherm, Inc., and Raymon F. Thompson, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Jeffrey D. Ellingson, Ellingson Law Offices, Kalispell, for plaintiff and appellant.
Debra D. Parker, Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, for defendants and respondents.
L. Michael Beasley appeals an order of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granting summary judgment in favor of Semitool, Inc., Semitherm, Inc. and Raymon Thompson on his claim for wrongful discharge, breach of express and implied contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We reverse.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Wrongful Discharge Act barred Beasley's contract claims for breach of express and implied contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
While L. Michael Beasley (Beasley) was working as an electronics project engineer in Kentucky, an agent of Semitool, Inc. (Semitool) began employment negotiations with Beasley. Semitool, located in Kalispell, manufactures products in the electronics, memory disk and semiconductor industry. On June 3, 1986, Semitool offered Beasley the position of "Product Marketing Manager for Spray Acid Tool," which Beasley accepted eight days later. Beasley contends that Semitool's offer included oral promises of stock options, bonuses tied to sales increases and opportunities for advancement not specifically set forth in the letter offering him the position.
Beasley moved to Kalispell, began working for Semitool and received excellent job evaluations. In November of 1987, he was transferred to Semitherm, Inc. (Semitherm), a sister company of Semitool, to lead the development, marketing and production of a vertical diffusion furnace. He alleges that this transfer was accompanied by oral promises of raises, higher bonuses, and stock options. On January 28, 1989, Beasley resigned from Semitherm, citing the company's failure to keep its compensation-related promises.
On February 13, 1990, Beasley filed a complaint against Semitool, Semitherm and Raymon Thompson (collectively hereafter Semitool) for breach of express and implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful discharge. Semitool moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (Wrongful Discharge Act) provided Beasley's exclusive remedy and that he could prove no damages under the Wrongful Discharge Act. The District Court granted Semitool's motion, and entered judgment against Beasley. This appeal follows.
Initially, we note that Beasley was hired by a Texas firm at a significantly higher salary soon after his resignation from Semitherm. As a result, Beasley has abandoned his claim for wrongful discharge on appeal.
Did the District Court err in concluding that the Wrongful Discharge Act barred Beasley's contract claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
In its order, the District Court first stated that Beasley's three claims for damages were based on the same facts and that the acts complained of occurred during the employment relationship. The court focused on § 39-2-913, MCA, of the Wrongful Discharge Act, which reads:
Preemption of common-law remedies. Except as provided in this part, no claim for discharge may arise from tort or express or implied contract.
The District Court then determined that this provision of the Wrongful Discharge Act barred Beasley's contract claims. It concluded that Beasley would be unable to prevail on his complaint under any set of facts because his contract claims were barred as a matter of law and he could prove no damages under the Wrongful Discharge Act. Therefore, the District Court granted summary judgment for Semitool.
Our standard in reviewing a grant of summary judgment is the same as that initially utilized by the trial court. McCracken v. City of Chinook (1990), 242 Mont. 21, 24, 788 P.2d 892, 894. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and other documents on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. In its order, the District Court assumed the facts alleged by Beasley to be true and concluded, as a matter of law, that the Wrongful Discharge Act barred Beasley's contract claims. Therefore, we focus our initial inquiry on this legal conclusion. Our review of legal questions is plenary. See Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603.
Beasley agrees that the Wrongful Discharge Act is the exclusive remedy for claims arising from an employee's discharge and that no discharge claim thereunder can arise from tort or express or implied contract. He argues, however, that his contract claims arise from Semitool's failure to abide by its representations during his employment and, therefore, that his breach of contract and covenant claims occurred both prior to, and independent of, his resignation. On that basis, Beasley argues that his independent contract-based claims for damages are not affected or barred by the Wrongful Discharge Act.
In interpreting statutes, including the Wrongful Discharge Act, we first look to the plain meaning of the words used. Allison v. Jumping Horse Ranch, Inc. (Mont.1992), 255 Mont. 410, ---, 843 P.2d 753, 755. To interpret a phrase within the plain meaning rule, the language used must be reasonably and logically interpreted, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning. Allison, 843 P.2d at 755. Furthermore, it is the function of the courts to ascertain and declare what in terms or substance is contained in a statute; it is not our function to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA; City of Bozeman v. Racicot (1992), 253 Mont. 204, 208, 832 P.2d 767, 769.
Turning to § 39-2-913, MCA, we must give effect to the entirety of the statute, which reads: "[e]xcept as provided in this part, no claim for discharge may arise from tort or express or implied contract." The usual and ordinary meaning of "claim for discharge" does not encompass any and all claims an employee may have against the employer, but only those claims for damages caused by an asserted wrongful...
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