Beatle v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 15 October 1912
• Citation: 137 N.W. 1006,156 Iowa 575
• Parties: C. A. BEATLE, Appellant, v. T. P. ROBERTS, et al
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

137 N.W. 1006

156 Iowa 575

C. A. BEATLE, Appellant, v. T. P. ROBERTS, et al

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 15, 1912

Appeal from Union District Court.--HON. THOS. L. MAXWELL, JUDGE.

THE district court approved of the finding that the statement of consent to the sale of intoxicating liquors in the city of Creston was sufficient. The plaintiff, who objected to such statement, appeals.

Affirmed.

Carl Stanley, and H. H. Sawyer, for appellant.

D. W Higbee and S. R. Allen, for appellees.

OPINION

LADD, J.

A statement of consent to the sale of intoxicating liquors in the city of Creston was filed with the county auditor in February, 1911, and canvassed by the board of supervisors of Union county, March 20th and 21st following. An objection that the supervisors were not in regular session was interposed, but overruled, and the statement found sufficient. On appeal the district court approved this ruling.

I. Section 2448 of the Code requires such canvass to be made at a regular session of the board of supervisors and this would be at a time fixed by statute for the convening of that body, or at a fixed future date to which such a meeting is adjourned. Butterfield v. Treichler, 113 Iowa 328, 85 N.W. 19.

The time for the first session of the year is designated by section 412 of the Code Supplement as the second secular day of January, which in 1911 was January 3d, and the supervisors met on that day. There were five members, two of whom had been reelected, and they proceeded to transact the unfinished business of the previous year. Later they adjourned until the next day, the record of the proceedings during which contains the following: "And now, the hour of 1:30 o'clock p. m. having arrived, it was moved by Sullivan and seconded by Davale that the board do now adjourn sine die. Motion carried and adjournment declared. Board adjourned sine die." Immediately following that quoted, and on the same day, this appears of record: "And now, the board of supervisors were called to order by the auditor and the new members-elect, White and Roberts, were sworn. Roll call showed all members present. . . . On motion of Wallace seconded by Roberts, Mr. Sullivan was elected chairman for the ensuing year." The evidence discloses that there was no change in the personnel of the board, that the members did not leave their seats between the adoption of the first motion and the so-called reorganization, and that one followed immediately upon the other. The transaction of business was uninterrupted, save by the performance described, and adjournments were taken from day to day until January 6th, when there was an adjournment which will be considered hereafter. While the motion was sufficient in form to evidence an adjournment, the record as a whole affirmatively shows that no adjournment was in fact taken. An adjournment is an act, not a declaration. It is an act of separation and departure, and, until this takes place, the adjournment is not complete. So it has been held that, although an adjournment of court had been announced and the judges had risen to go, court was still in session and might receive a verdict. Person v. Neigh, 52 Pa. 199. To adjourn means the same thing as to postpone, and, while more frequently used to indicate the putting over to another day, it has acquired the meaning of suspending what is being done for a period which may be less. La Farge v. Van Wagenen, 14 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 54. In People v. Martin, 5 N.Y. 22, 26, adjournment is defined as putting off until another time or place. In French v. Higgins, 77 Wis. 121 (45 N.W. 817), the court, after mentioning that Webster says the word "adjourn," both in England and this country, is applied to all cases in which public bodies separate for a brief period with a view to meeting again, said: "As applied to a justice's court, it signifies, we think, not only that the justice ceases to exercise his functions in the particular case for the time being, but that he and the parties, witnesses, jurors, and officers in attendance, separate from the place of trial, so that there remains no court at such place. If that result is accomplished, it is an adjournment, no matter by what name the justice designates the proceeding in his docket. If that result is not accomplished, it is not an adjournment, but a mere suspension of the proceedings in the cause for a time." See, also, Bisham v. Tucker, 2 N.J.L. 253; People v. Draper, 1 N.Y. Cr. R. 138. "An adjournment is suspension of a judicial tribunal or other official body until a time certain, or definitely where the adjournment is without day." 1 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 238.

An adjournment, then, may mean merely a temporary suspension of business or the postponement thereof until some future date.

All members of the board of supervisors were present the day on which they were required by law to convene, and, even though some of them may have imagined that the session was merely the continuance of the November session, this was not so. The law in fixing the time for the first session of the year necessarily defined the limit beyond which the session previous might not extend. In other words, each session of the board necessarily terminates prior to the day fixed by the statute for another meeting.

The two members who had been re-elected should have qualified immediately, but even without them there was a quorum for the transaction of business. Moreover, though their terms had expired on the first Monday in January, they were authorized to serve until their successors had qualified. Section 411, Code Supplement.

Section 415 of the Code requires the board of supervisors, at its first meeting in the year, to "organize...