Beattie v. State
| Decision Date | 09 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A01-0805-CR-247.,82A01-0805-CR-247. |
| Parties | Shewanda B. BEATTIE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Matthew Jon McGovern, Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Shewanda Beattie was charged with dealing in cocaine, a Class B felony;1 possession of cocaine in a family housing complex, a Class B felony;2 and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor.3 The verdict forms provided to the jury included simple possession of cocaine as a lesser-included offense. The jury found Beattie not guilty of dealing in cocaine and possession of cocaine, but found her guilty of possessing cocaine in a family housing complex and possession of marijuana. Because the jury's verdicts are inconsistent, we reverse her conviction of possession of cocaine in a family housing complex. However, the evidence seized from her apartment was properly admitted, and there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of possession of cocaine in a family housing complex. Therefore, we remand for a new trial on that charge.
Evansville Police Officer Todd Seibert sometimes worked off-duty for the Evansville Housing Authority. Officer Seibert acted as "security" and investigated complaints. (Tr. at 123.) On May 3, 2007, he was assigned to Caldwell Homes, a public housing complex bordered by Cross Street and Sweetser Avenue. On that day, Officer Seibert investigated a complaint of narcotics dealing in 669 Sweetser. Officer Seibert obtained Beattie's name from the lease.
Officer Seibert saw Beattie approaching 669 Sweetser, and he asked her if they could go inside and discuss the complaint he had received. Beattie agreed. When Beattie opened the door, Officer Seibert could smell burnt marijuana. Officer Seibert said he had received a tip that narcotics were being dealt from the apartment. Officer Seibert read Beattie her Miranda rights and asked for consent to search her apartment. Beattie signed a consent to search form, on which Officer Seibert had erroneously listed the address as 669 Cross.
With the help of other officers, Officer Seibert began searching Beattie's apartment. In a nightstand drawer, they found a bag of marijuana. Under a mattress, they found a coin purse that contained three individually-packaged cocaine rocks.
Once drugs were located, Officer Seibert called a narcotics investigator, Detective Brock Hensley. Detective Hensley advised Beattie of her Miranda rights and asked if she was willing to make a statement. Beattie agreed to make a statement, and she told Detective Hensley her supplier was a man named Dee Dee.
Beattie raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the search; and (2) whether the jury's verdicts are inconsistent.
In reviewing the validity of a search, we consider the evidence most favorable to the ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
"When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search." Id. at 374. Consent to search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Id. When an individual gives the State permission to search her property, the governmental intrusion is presumably reasonable. Id.
"The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, in other words, `what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?'" Pinkney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 956, 960 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)), trans. denied 753 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. 2001). Beattie argues a reasonable person would not construe the scope of her consent to include 669 Sweetser because the form she signed stated she was consenting to a search of 669 Cross.
Officer Siebert asked Beattie if he could talk to her in her apartment. After they entered her apartment, Officer Siebert explained he had received a complaint about narcotics dealing in her apartment. He testified he asked Beattie "for consent to search her apartment," (Tr. at 11), "the apartment we were in." (Id. at 152.) She responded by signing the consent to search form. She said nothing to the police that would indicate she was denying consent to search 669 Sweetser, and there is no evidence she objected or interfered when they began searching 669 Sweetser.
Beattie asks us to conclude that the only reasonable understanding of her exchange with the police is that she consented to a search of some other apartment; however, that is a request to reweigh the evidence. It is clear from the context of their conversation that Officer Siebert was interested in searching Beattie's apartment, 669 Sweetser. Beattie did not deny the police consent to search her apartment, but instead signed a consent to search form that contained a scrivener's error. A reasonable person could conclude Beattie had given consent to search her apartment, and the search does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
Beattie also argues the search violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Under that provision, the burden is on the State to show the intrusion was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Primus, 813 N.E.2d at 373. Beattie again emphasizes the mistake in the consent to search form, but the facts do not compel a different outcome under Article 1, Section 11. Officer Siebert was clearly interested in searching Beattie's apartment—not some other apartment unrelated to the complaint he was investigating—and Beattie's actions were consistent with giving consent. The scrivener's error does not make the search unreasonable.
The State devotes several pages of its brief to an argument that inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewed at all. The State argues in part that Indiana case law supporting review of inconsistent verdicts is based on federal case law that has since been undermined. In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), the Supreme Court held consistent verdicts were not necessary. Over time, the federal circuit courts adopted exceptions to that rule. The United States Supreme Court later rejected those exceptions, holding consistency of verdicts was not reviewable on any ground. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984).
Some Indiana decisions have relied on federal case law; however, we conclude Indiana has an independent tradition of reviewing inconsistent verdicts. In Marsh v. State, 271 Ind. 454, 393 N.E.2d 757 (1979), our Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the different interpretations of Dunn by the federal circuit courts. The Court then noted it "has consistently evinced concern over the possibility of inconsistent verdicts," and concluded Id. at 761. As Marsh did not rely solely on federal case law, but looked to the Indiana Supreme Court's own history of reviewing verdicts, we are unconvinced that Powell mandates a change in policy.
We acknowledge our Indiana Supreme Court has not consistently followed Marsh, but has sometimes followed earlier decisions that were never explicitly overruled. See Williams v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1146, 1147-48 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (). The most recent decision in which our Indiana Supreme Court declined to review verdicts for consistency is Dorsey v. State, 490 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ind.1986). Since 1986, our Indiana Supreme Court has reviewed the consistency of verdicts on several occasions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1239-41 (Ind.2000) (). We will continue to follow this trend of over twenty years until directed otherwise.
Beattie argues her conviction of possession of cocaine in a family housing complex should be reversed because the jury acquitted her of the lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine. We agree.
"When this Court reviews a claim of inconsistent jury verdicts, we will take corrective action only when the verdicts are `extremely contradictory and irreconcilable.'" Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1239 (Ind.2000) (quoting Jones v. State, 689 N.E.2d 722, 724 (Ind. 1997)), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783 (Ind.2004). Perfect logical consistency is not required. Id. Jury verdicts are
inconsistent only where they cannot be explained by weight and credibility assigned to the evidence. Thus, an acquittal on one count normally will not result in reversal of a conviction on a similar or related count, because the former will generally have at least one element (legal or factual) not required for the latter. In such an instance, the finder of fact will be presumed to have doubted the weight or credibility of the evidence presented in support of this distinguishing element.
Neuhausel v. State, 530 N.E.2d 121, 123 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988).
Beattie's case is similar to Owsley v. State, 769 N.E.2d 181 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied 783 N.E.2d 700 (Ind.2002). An undercover detective asked Stallworth for twenty dollars worth of cocaine....
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