Primus v. State

• Decision Date: 11 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0310-CR-907.,49A02-0310-CR-907.
• Citation: 813 N.E.2d 370
• Parties: Lawrence PRIMUS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

813 N.E.2d 370

Lawrence PRIMUS, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

No. 49A02-0310-CR-907.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

August 11, 2004.

813 N.E.2d 372

Kendra L. Koski, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Chief Judge.

Lawrence Primus brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, raising the following issue for review: whether the trial court erred in determining that the drug evidence was admissible because it was the result of a consensual search where his roommate, who was at a different location, gave consent for the search but he did not.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 24, 2003, Detective Brady Ball of the Indianapolis Police Department was called to the scene of a traffic stop of a

813 N.E.2d 373

vehicle that contained cocaine. The driver, Lena Labroi, advised Detective Ball that the cocaine belonged to Primus, with whom she and their child lived, and that there was more cocaine at their home. Ball asked Labroi some questions and gained her consent to search her residence. Officers went to the residence and located Primus outside, a few houses down the street. Detective Ball advised Primus of his Miranda rights, and Primus told Detective Ball that he and Labroi lived together. Detective Ball did not request Primus's permission to search the home

Based on Labroi's consent, officers searched the home and found cocaine. Primus was arrested and charged with dealing in cocaine and possession of cocaine. He moved to suppress the cocaine as the product of an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion, and Primus asked the trial court to certify its decision for interlocutory appeal. The trial court did so, and this court accepted jurisdiction of the case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Primus argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision. Clark v. State, 804 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Crabtree, 762 N.E.2d at 219. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Clark, 804 N.E.2d at 198. Rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the ruling together with any adverse evidence that is uncontradicted. Id.

Primus contends that the cocaine evidence should have been suppressed because the search violated his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section 11 of the Indiana constitution because Labroi did not have the authority to consent to the search and reasonable officers would not have believed that she did.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits police from conducting warrantless searches and seizures except under limited circumstances. Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ind.1999). The language of the Indiana Constitution, Article One, Section 11, mirrors the federal protection. Id. Although Section 11 appears to have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and shares the same language, we interpret and apply it independently from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind.2004); Trowbridge, 717 N.E.2d at 143. Rather than looking to federal requirements such as warrants and probable cause when evaluating Section 11 claims, we place the burden on the State to show that its intrusion was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d at 438; Clark, 804 N.E.2d at 198. Section 11 should receive a liberal construction in its application to guarantee that people are free from unreasonable search and seizure. Clark, 804 N.E.2d at 199.

Here, we find the search reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Officers stopped a car driven by Labroi that contained cocaine. Labroi stated that there was more cocaine at her residence in the cupboard in a tin can and gave the officers her consent to search her residence. Labroi informed the officers that the cocaine in her car and home belonged to Primus, with whom she and their child

813 N.E.2d 374

lived. Labroi gave the address to the residence, described it, stated that she had lived there for the past several months and that she paid the bills for it and received mail there. She then gave the officers a key. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to search Labroi's house based on her consent to the search

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution also protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind.2001); Creekmore v. State, 800 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Buckley v. State, 797 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The Fourteenth Amendment extended to state governments the Fourth Amendment's requirements for constitutionally valid searches and seizures. Sanchez v. State, 803 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied; Creekmore, 800 N.E.2d at 233; Buckley, 797 N.E.2d at 848.

...