Beaty v. Massey-Hite Grocery Co.

• Decision Date: 16 October 1947
• Docket Number: 15998.
• Citation: 44 S.E.2d 535,211 S.C. 242
• Parties: BEATY v. MASSEY-HITE GROCERY CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

44 S.E.2d 535

211 S.C. 242

BEATY v. MASSEY-HITE GROCERY CO.

No. 15998.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 16, 1947

McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, for appellant.

Willcox Hardee, Houck & Palmer, of Florence, for respondent.

STUKES Justice.

Respondent brought this action against appellant upon a complaint in which he alleged that he was employed by appellant continuously from July 22, 1942, until June 12 1946, and from the former date to September 7, 1945, received a weekly wage ranging from $25 to approximately $46 and worked from about forty-five hours to fifty-six hours per week; that under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., a work week is forty hours and appellant was required by law to pay time and a half for the hours employed in excess of forty hours; but such was not done, through the failure and neglect of appellant, whereby the latter is indebted to respondent in the approximate sum of $756.86, and an additional equal sum for liquidated damages and penalty, together with a reasonable fee for respondent's attorneys for their services; further that the books and records of appellant will show the number of hours which respondent worked, his hourly base pay and the amount of overtime, and that such books and records should be procued for inspection by the court and by respondent and his attorneys, so that the amount of the indebtedness may be accurately ascertained. Prayer was for such production of the books and records, ascertainment of the amount due respondent and judgment therefor, including the penalty or liquidated damages and a reasonable fee for plaintiff's attorneys.

The answer admits the corporate existence of appellant and that respondent was employed by it for the approximate period of time stated in the complaint, and denies the other allegations. The answer contains a further defense to the effect that appellant had paid respondent in full for his services under the contract of employment and in addition he was paid a yearly bonus of ten per cent., a week's wages in advance upon the termination of the relation; and on occasions respondent was also given time-off without deduction from his wages.

Respondent plaintiff below, moved for an order adjudging that the action is in equity and as such is referable; application was further made to the court to set a date for trial without a jury. At the hearing of the motions affidavits were submitted by the parties, respectively, the one contending that trial would entail a long, detailed and tedious accounting involving examination of appellant's books and records over a period of 162 seeks; and the other (appellant's) was to the contrary effect that the account would not be too complicated for a jury to understand, and that the calculation necessary is a matter of simple arithmetic, etc. (The following appears in appellant's brief: 'No opposition has been made by the appellant to the production of its books showing the hours and wages of the respondent.')

The court concluded that the action is one at law but that the accounting would involve so many simple calculations that its extraordinary length would complicate it to the extent that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, for an ordinary jury to reach the correct conclusion. Thereupon it was decided that there is present of feature of equitable jurisdiction which devolved upon the court the discretion to order a compulsory reference. Sumter Hardwood Company v. Fitchette, 133 S.C. 149, 130 S.E. 881, was cited as authority for the conclusion. However, in lieu of reference, trial was ordered to proceed before the court without a jury.

The appeal is from the refusal of trial by jury and the issue will be decided without reference in detail to the questions stated by appellant which respondent has also argued in...