Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center

• Decision Date: 01 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20030148.,20030148.
• Parties: Michael BEAUDOIN, Plaintiff and Appellant v. SOUTH TEXAS BLOOD & TISSUE CENTER, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

676 N.W.2d 103

2004 ND 49

Michael BEAUDOIN, Plaintiff and Appellant v. SOUTH TEXAS BLOOD & TISSUE CENTER, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20030148.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

March 1, 2004.

Kay Nord Hunt (argued), Robert J. King, Jr., and Diane M. Odeen, Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, and Orell D. Schmitz, Schmitz & Schmidt, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Michael T. Andrews (argued) and H. Patrick Weir, Vogel Law Firm, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellee.

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Michael Beaudoin appealed from a judgment dismissing without prejudice his action against South Texas Blood & Tissue Center ("South Texas"). We conclude South Texas was properly served with process, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[¶ 2] Beaudoin had his right patellar tendon surgically replaced on August 23, 2000, in Dickinson, North Dakota, with a tendon removed from a cadaver in Texas. At the request of a Connecticut corporation, South Texas shipped the tendon to Dickinson. Beaudoin sued South Texas, alleging the tendon was not sterile, and that, as a result, he contracted an infection in his right knee. A professional process server delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to Betty Nickerson, South Texas's Executive Office Manager, on August 19, 2002. South Texas did not answer or appear, and a default judgment was entered against it. Relying on N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b), and N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(i), (iv) South Texas moved to vacate the default judgment and to dismiss the complaint "on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant."

[¶ 3] South Texas submitted an affidavit of Nickerson stating, in part:

1. I am the Executive Office Manager for the South Texas Blood and Tissue Center (Blood and Tissue Center). I have been employed by the Blood and Tissue Center for 21 years. As the Executive Office Manager, I am responsible for providing administrative support for the Vice Presidents, and for Dr. Norman D. Kalmin, M.D., President/CEO and Medical Director of the Blood and Tissue Center.

I am not an officer, director, superintendent, managing or general agent, partner, or associate of the South Texas Blood and Tissue Center.

I am not an agent authorized to receive service of process on behalf of the South Texas Blood and Tissue Center.

On August 19, 2002, I received a telephone call from the company receptionist, who asked me to sign for a document. As it turned out, this document was the Summons and Complaint in the matter of Michael Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood and Tissue Center. The document was not addressed to any particular person, but was simply directed to the South Texas Blood and Tissue Center.

I delivered the document to Dr. Kalmin, who then delivered it to Mary Beth Fisk, Vice President of Tissue Services. Ms. Fisk sent a copy of the document to Donna Respondek, Vice President of Financial Services, requesting that Ms. Respondek file a claim with the insurance company.

Ms. Respondek was on vacation at the time, and the copy of the Summons and Complaint sent to her was thereafter accidentally misfiled in the Financial Services Department, without any action taken. This was discovered on January 8, 2003, when a call was received from Mr. Beaudoin's attorney informing us of the default judgment.

[¶ 4] Charles N. Lambrecht, a professional process server engaged to serve South Texas, stated, in part, in his affidavit:

I was contacted by the law firm of Schmitz and Schmidt to serve a Summons and Complaint on the South Texas Blood & Tissue Center. After receipt of those papers, I proceeded to South Texas Blood & Tissue Center and upon entry, requested of the receptionist a Managing Agent or Director of the corporation. After waiting for a period of time, Betty Nickerson was brought to me and identified as the Executive Office Manager and authorized to accept the papers. I told her I was delivering legal papers on her and she certainly seemed to understand what was happening.

[¶ 5] The trial court ruled South Texas was not properly served and the court, therefore, did not acquire personal jurisdiction over South Texas. The court ordered the default judgment vacated, and it dismissed the action without prejudice. A judgment of dismissal without prejudice was entered on March 31, 2003.

[¶ 6] On appeal, Beaudoin contends (1) the judgment is appealable because the claim is for malpractice and the statute of limitations has run; (2) South Texas was properly served under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d); (3) South Texas had sufficient relationships or contacts with North Dakota to subject it to the jurisdiction of North Dakota courts; and (4) the default judgment was valid and should not have been vacated.

I

[¶ 7] While ordinarily not appealable, "a dismissal without prejudice may be final and appealable if it has the practical effect of terminating the litigation in the plaintiff's chosen forum." Winer v. Penny Enterprises, Inc., 2004 ND 21, ¶ 6, 674 N.W.2d 9. A judgment of dismissal without prejudice is appealable if the plaintiff will be barred by the statute of limitations from bringing another action. Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 2002 ND 1, ¶ 8, 638 N.W.2d 1.

[¶ 8] Section 28-01-18(3), N.D.C.C., provides a two-year statute of limitations for "[a]n action for the recovery of damages resulting from malpractice." Malpractice is the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise the degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession, which results in injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services or to those entitled to rely upon them. Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 538 (N.D.1981). See also Jilek v. Berger Elec., Inc., 441 N.W.2d 660, 661 (N.D.1989)

(stating "malpractice is a professional's failure to exercise the requisite degree of skill and learning in providing services," or, more simply, "professional negligence").

[¶ 9] While "any alleged professional malpractice may be framed generally in either tort or contract theory," Johnson, 303 N.W.2d at 539 n. 4, "[i]n a malpractice case, the malpractice statute of limitations controls over statutes of limitations applicable to contract or other tort actions," Jilek, 441 N.W.2d at 661. "The distinction between ordinary negligence and malpractice turns on whether the acts or omissions complained of involve a matter of ... science or art requiring special skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons or whether the conduct complained of can instead be assessed on the basis of common everyday experience." Sime v. Tvenge Assocs. Architects and Planners, P.C., 488 N.W.2d 606, 609 (N.D.1992) (citations omitted).

[¶ 10] We are satisfied that the harvesting, preservation, and delivery of body parts involves "science or art requiring special skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons," Sime, 488 N.W.2d at 609, and we, therefore, conclude that this case is governed by the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice prescribed by N.D.C.C. § 28-01-18(3). Thus, "[i]f the dismissal stands, [Beaudoin] will be barred from bringing another action by N.D.C.C. § 28-01-18(3)." Jaskoviak, 2002 ND 1, ¶ 8, 638 N.W.2d 1. We conclude the dismissal without prejudice entered in this case is, therefore, appealable.

II

[¶ 11] "Valid service of process is necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Gessner v. City of Minot, 1998 ND 157, ¶ 5, 583 N.W.2d 90. Thus, we must determine if South Texas was properly served with process under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d), which provides, in part:

(2) How Service Made Within the State. Personal service of process within the state must be made as follows:

....

(D) upon a domestic or foreign corporation... by (i) delivering a copy of the summons to an officer, director, superintendent or managing or general agent,... or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process in its behalf....

(3) How Service Made Outside the State. Service upon any person subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of this state may be made outside the state:

(A) in the manner provided for service within this state, with the same force and effect as though service had been made within this state.

[¶ 12] When what is now N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(D) was adopted in 1957, it superseded N.D.R.C.1943, § 28-0606, which provided, in part: "If the defendant in a civil action is a domestic corporation, service of the summons shall be made upon the president, secretary, cashier, or treasurer, or upon a director or a managing or authorized agent thereof." The provision was drawn from C.L.1913, § 7426(4), R.C. 1899, § 5252(4), and R.C. 1895, § 5252(4), which was, in turn, drawn from Code of Civil Procedure § 102, Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota (1877). The provision was previously codified in Code of Civil Procedure § 86, Laws of Dakota 1867-8, which provided for service of a summons upon a corporation's "president or other head of the corporation, secretary, cashier, treasurer, a director, or managing agent thereof." Volume 1, Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota (1883), notes the source of § 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure was Wait's Code § 134. At page v of the Preface to the Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota (1877), the New York source of our provision is also noted:

The [1877 Code of Civil Procedure] originated also in New York, where it was enacted into law. In an abridged form it was enacted in Dakota in 1868, and took effect on the first day of June in that year.

The New York antecedent of our provision for service of process on corporations was enacted in 1848, as part of the Code of Procedure, "known as the `Field Code,'" after David Dudley Field, one of the commissioners on practice and pleadings proposing the code. Mildred V. Coe and Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27...