Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center
Decision Date | 24 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 20040356.,20040356. |
Citation | 2005 ND 120,699 N.W.2d 421 |
Parties | Michael BEAUDOIN, Plaintiff and Appellee v. SOUTH TEXAS BLOOD & TISSUE CENTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Kay Nord Hunt (argued) and Robert J. King, Jr. (on brief), Lommen Nelson Law Firm, Minneapolis, MN, and Orell D. Schmitz (appeared), Schmitz & Schmidt, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Michael T. Andrews (argued) and H. Patrick Weir (on brief), Vogel Law Firm, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant. VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] South Texas Blood & Tissue Center ("South Texas") appealed a memorandum opinion and order denying its motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to vacate a default judgment. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the default judgment and remand the case to the trial court.
[¶ 2] Michael Beaudoin had his right patella tendon surgically replaced in Dickinson, North Dakota, with a tendon removed from a cadaver in Texas. At the request of a Connecticut corporation, Allograft.com, South Texas shipped the tendon to Dickinson. Beaudoin sued South Texas, alleging the tendon was not sterile, and that, as a result, he contracted an infection in his right knee. South Texas initially failed to respond to the suit, and the district court issued a default judgment for Beaudoin. A dispute regarding service of process arose, and we resolved that matter in Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, 2004 ND 49, 676 N.W.2d 103. Specifically, we held the professional process server's delivery of the summons and complaint to South Texas's Executive Office Manager, who had been identified as one authorized to accept such documents and appeared to be of sufficient character and rank to make it reasonably certain that South Texas would be apprised of the service, constituted valid service of process under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d). Id. at ¶ 18. After remand, the district court denied South Texas's motion to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court also denied South Texas's motion to vacate the default judgment and to allow South Texas to respond to Beaudoin's substantive allegations. The two questions raised in the present appeal are whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over South Texas and whether the district court erred in refusing to vacate the default judgment.
[¶ 3] South Texas argues the district court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. South Texas asserts its constitutional, due-process rights would be violated by requiring it to defend against this suit in North Dakota. South Texas contends it does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State and that, as a result, maintenance of this suit would be inconsistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
[¶ 4] South Texas highlights many facts militating against its amenability to suit in North Dakota. South Texas points out it has never maintained a place of business in North Dakota, it has never maintained offices in North Dakota, it has never stored inventory in North Dakota, it has never held bank accounts in North Dakota, it has never owned real estate in North Dakota, it has never kept personal property in North Dakota, it has never had employees in North Dakota, its employees do not travel to North Dakota, it has never acquired tissue within North Dakota, it has never processed tissue within North Dakota, it has never solicited business in North Dakota, it has never advertised in North Dakota, and it has never sent promotional materials to North Dakota.
[¶ 5] What South Texas does do, however, is to ship tissue components to places outside Texas. Prior to the shipment of Beaudoin's order of two patella tendons on July 3, 2000, South Texas shipped patella tendons to both St. Joseph's Hospital, the North Dakota hospital at which Beaudoin's surgery occurred, and the Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota. St. Joseph's Hospital placed orders on May 30, 2000, and June 19, 2000, and obtained five patella tendons. The Minot Air Force Base placed 19 orders from June 2, 1998, to June 12, 2000, and obtained 23 patella tendons. South Texas continued to ship patella tendons to both of these entities after Beaudoin's surgery.
[¶ 6] When South Texas sends components out of state, it does so with the assistance of third-party distributors. South Texas does not directly contract with, or sell blood and tissue components to, medical facilities, physicians, or patients. Rather, South Texas is contacted by distributors who field requests from medical facilities and physicians. The distributors proceed to act as intermediaries between the requesting party and South Texas. South Texas frequently ships its components directly to the end user for logistical and health reasons, and these shipments are received by representatives of the distributing intermediaries. When preparing an order for packing and shipping, South Texas generates a Tissue Order form that contains South Texas's contact information. South Texas further includes a Patient Usage Feedback Request form for tracking purposes, and this form also contains South Texas's contact information.
[¶ 7] South Texas is entirely independent of the Connecticut-based intermediary at issue in this matter, Allograft.com. South Texas does not control Allograft.com's distribution system. Further, South Texas was not aware the harvested tendon was to be sent to North Dakota until the day it received the shipment directive from Allograft.com. South Texas was not paid by St. Joseph's Hospital, but by Allograft.com. South Texas had no contractual relationship with St. Joseph's Hospital, any North Dakota physicians, or Beaudoin.
[¶ 8] South Texas believes its contacts with North Dakota were random and fortuitous and the result of the unilateral activity of Allograft.com and St. Joseph's Hospital.
[¶ 9] In the recent case of Ensign v. Bank of Baker, 2004 ND 56, 676 N.W.2d 786, we discussed the requirements for personal jurisdiction:
[¶ 10] North Dakota's long-arm provision is N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(b), which provides:
North Dakota's long-arm provision is "designed to permit the state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by due process." Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234 N.W.2d 250, 255 (N.D.1975).
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Gibbs
...together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination.'" Overboe, at ¶ 7 (quoting Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood and Tissue Ctr., 2005 ND 120, ¶ 33, 699 N.W.2d [¶ 33] Whether we review this issue under the rule of completeness or under N.D.R.Ev. 403, we conclude the d......
-
Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Servs., LLC
...at ¶ 11. “A defendant's own errors will not always constitute proper grounds for relief from a default judgment.” Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, 2005 ND 120, ¶ 40, 699 N.W.2d 421. Rather, the applicable standard under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(i) to relieve a party from a judgment ......
-
Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Servs., LLC
...at ¶ 11. "A defendant's own errors will not always constitute proper grounds for relief from a default judgment." Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, 2005 ND 120, ¶ 40, 699 N.W.2d 421. Rather, the applicable standard under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(i) to relieve a party from a judgment ......
-
State v. $33,000.00 U.S. Currency
...cause of the entry of default judgment, which may have provided Tran relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b). See Beaudoin v. So. Texas Blood & Tissue Ctr., 2005 ND 120, ¶ 36, 699 N.W.2d 421 ("Although the district court is correct in noting we are reluctant to attribute a third-party's e......