Beaudoin v. Toia

• Citation: 45 N.Y.2d 343,408 N.Y.S.2d 417,380 N.E.2d 246
• Parties: , 380 N.E.2d 246 In the Matter of John R. BEAUDOIN, as Commissioner of the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Philip L. TOIA, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Respondent, and Shirley D. Jorczak et al., Appellants.
• Decision Date: 13 July 1978
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 417

408 N.Y.S.2d 417

45 N.Y.2d 343, 380 N.E.2d 246

In the Matter of John R. BEAUDOIN, as Commissioner of the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Philip L. TOIA, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Respondent and Shirley D. Jorczak et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 13, 1978.

Joel F. Spitzer, Albany, and Edward V. Loughlin, Greenbush, for Shirley D. Jorczak, appellant

C. Michael Reger, Troy, for John R. Beaudoin, respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, Judge.

We hold that a local County Department of Social Services has no standing in a proceeding under CPLR article 78 to seek judicial review of a determination made by the State Commissioner of Social Services following a fair hearing held at the request of a welfare recipient.

Shirley D. Jorczak, a resident of Rensselaer County in New York State, brought her nine-year-old stepniece from Massachusetts to live with her in this State. The child's natural mother and stepfather were on public assistance in Massachusetts and gave custody of their daughter to Mrs. Jorczak at the behest of the Massachusetts Department of Social Welfare because the child was alleged to have suffered sexual abuse by her stepfather. The young girl came to the Jorczak home without any resources or income for her support and the income and resources of Mrs. Jorczak and her husband were not available for her support. When the Jorczaks accepted the child into their home it was expected that she would continue to be entitled to public assistance, but from the County of Rensselaer instead of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Mrs. Jorczak's application on behalf of her stepniece for public assistance was denied by the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services. A fair hearing was held at her request, and the State commissioner, overruling the county department, determined that the child was entitled to public assistance and directed the County Department of Social Services to provide such assistance in accordance with his decision. When the county department failed to do so Mrs. Jorczak instituted the present article 78 proceeding to compel the local agency to comply with the fair hearing determination. The local agency then commenced a parallel article 78 proceeding to annul the State commissioner's fair hearing decision. The two proceedings were consolidated in Supreme Court and that court then decided the case on the merits in favor of Mrs. Jorczak, thus upholding the fair hearing determination. On appeal the Appellate Division reversed, also on the merits, and annulled the State commissioner's determination.

From the start, Mrs. Jorczak has contended that the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services has no standing to challenge the fair hearing decision of the State commissioner. Both courts below have rejected this contention. We now reverse, hold that the local agency has no standing to challenge the State commissioner's ruling, and reinstate his determination, without reaching the merits.

In New York State, the social services program is a State program, administered through the 58 local social services districts under the general supervision of the State Department of Social Services and the State Commissioner of Social Services. (N.Y.Const. art. XVII, § 1; Social Services Law, §§ 17, 20, 34.) The county commissioners are denominated by statute "agents" of the State department (Social Services Law, § 65, subd. 3). In the administration of public assistance funds, whether they come from Federal, State or local sources, the authority and responsibility is that of the county commissioners of social services, not the counties; the local commissioners act on behalf of and as agents for the State. Each is a part of and the local arm of the single State administrative agency. Determinative of the present question is the status and function of the local commissioners as agents of the State and not of their respective counties.

Inasmuch as the local commissioners are agents of the State department they may not substitute their interpretations of the regulations of the State department for those of the State department or the State commissioner (Matter of Samuels v. Berger, 55 A.D.2d 913, 390 N.Y.S.2d 445; Matter of Bonfanti v. Kirby, 54 A.D.2d 714, 387 N.Y.S.2d 461; Matter of Barbaro v. Wyman, 32 A.D.2d 647, 300 N.Y.S.2d 856). To recognize any such right would be to undermine the supervisory authority of the State commissioner and to invite administrative chaos. By like token, the local commissioners have no standing to seek a judicial review of the fair hearing determinations of the State commissioner that interpret or apply such regulations (Matter of Bates v. Berger, 55 A.D.2d 950, 391 N.Y.S.2d 147; Matter of Reed v. New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 78 Misc.2d 266, 354 N.Y.S.2d 389; Matter of Smythe v. Lavine, 76 Misc.2d 751, 351 N.Y.S.2d 568). In a familiar form of expression, the local commissioner as agent of the State department is not, and cannot be, an "aggrieved party". Indeed section 353 of the Social Services Law explicitly provides with respect to fair hearing determinations made by the State commissioner "All such decisions of the department shall be binding upon the social service official involved and shall be complied with by him." (Cf. Social Services Law, § 135-c.) The statutory provision is implemented by an explicit provision of 18 NYCRR 358.18(a) "The decision shall be binding upon the social services official" and that official is required to comply promptly (18 NYCRR 358.22).

Even if considerations of State law did not dictate this result and preclude such challenges by a local commissioner the mandate of Federal law would do so in this instance. Inasmuch as New York State has elected to participate in the Federal aid to families with dependent children program (the program under which Mrs. Jorczak sought the public assistance grant for her stepniece), the State is required to comply with the applicable Federal statute and regulations (Matter of Dunbar v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 764, 766, 408 N.Y.S.2d 495, ---, --- N.E.2d ----, ---- (decided herewith)). Central to the Federal program, and directly relevant here, is the Congressional requirement that any State plan under the AFDC program be administered or supervised by "a single State agency". Section 602 of the Social Security Act provides explicitly: "(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must (1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, If administered by them, be mandatory upon them * * * (3) either provide for the establishment or designation of a Single State agency to administer the plan, or provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to supervise the administration of the plan ". (Emphasis added; U.S.Code tit. 42, § 602; cf. 45 CFR 205.100(a)(1)(i).) The associated Federal regulations preserve to the single State agency the conclusiveness of its rule-making authority even where, as in New York State, the social services program is administered through a network of subdesignated local agencies: "In the event that any services are performed for the single State agency...