Beaudrot v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1904
• Citation: 48 S.E. 106,69 S.C. 160
• Parties: BEAUDROT v. SOUTHERN RY. CO
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

48 S.E. 106

69 S.C. 160

BEAUDROT v. SOUTHERN RY. CO

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 11, 1904

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenwood County; J. A McCullough, Special Judge.

Action by M. A. Beaudrot against the Southern Railway Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

T. P Cothran, for appellant. Sheppards & Grier, for respondent.

WOODS J.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the court of common pleas for $1,016.66, on account of the alleged willful tort of the defendant in tearing down a fence on the plaintiff's land at Greenwood against her protest. It appears from the testimony that one Murphy bought a lot of land from the plaintiff, adjoining her place of residence, and he and his family for some years after the purchase were allowed the privilege of passing over plaintiff's adjoining land in order to reach the railroad crossing. On account of some dispute between the children of the two families, the plaintiff built the fence to her line, thus preventing Murphy from passing over her land to the crossing at that point. Murphy then undertook to acquire a right of way under section 1175 of the Revised Statutes of 1893, but his proceeding was enjoined by a judgment of the circuit court, affirmed by this court August 6, 1898. The defendant, on July 17, 1899, wrote the husband of the plaintiff that the fence stood on its right of way, requesting its removal, in order that Murphy might use the crossing, and expressing its purpose to remove the fence at Beaudrot's expense, unless he removed it himself within 10 days. Mrs. Beaudrot answered the letter, asserting that the fence was on her own land, and forbidding the defendant to enter her land or interfere with the fence. The defendant's section master nevertheless entered and tore down about six panels of the fence, but upon plaintiff's husband coming up and protesting, he desisted. The section master came again on the following morning to complete his work, but was prevented from carrying out his purpose by the attitude of Mrs. Beaudrot. The actual damage was about $2.50. Thereafter, in 1899, the defendant the Southern Railway Company, brought its action against the plaintiff to require her to remove her fence, alleging it was located on its right of way. It failed to establish this allegation, and lost the case. A few months after the entry of the judgment establishing the right of the plaintiff, Mrs. Beaudrot, to the land on which the fence stood, this action was instituted to recover damages for the trespass; the allegation being that the entry on plaintiff's land and tearing down her fence was a wanton, willful, malicious, and high-handed invasion of her rights.

1. In the first ground of appeal the defendant assigns error in the exclusion of the question, asked Mrs. Beaudrot on cross-examination: "How long had Mr. Murphy been using that as a way for getting to town?" While nothing is more important to the discovery of truth in the trial of a cause than the right of cross-examination, its limits must be left largely to the discretion of the presiding judge. The defendant suffered no injury from excluding the question, because, even if her answer had been material, the witness had just before admitted that she had allowed Murphy to cross for some years previous to the building of the fence. If the answer to the question would have tended to show, as defendant insists, that the fence was put up for the purpose of preventing Murphy from crossing the land, we think the other evidence could not have failed to convince the jury that this was plaintiff's purpose.

2. The presiding judge also excluded the question: "At the time you sold to Mr. Murphy, did you not declare to him that he should have the right to go through there?" and this ruling is made the subject of the second exception. If the suit had been against Murphy for removing the fence, the question would have been relevant; but we fail to see how it would avail the defendant as a defense to its trespass. It was not charged with the enforcement of Murphy's rights, and could not defend on the ground that it was acting for his protection.

3. The defendant next takes the position that punitive damages in all cases may be allowed, or not, in the discretion of the jury, but can never be claimed as a matter of right; and that therefore the presiding judge erred in charging the jury that if they found the trespass had been committed, and "that it was willful, wanton, malicious, and in a high-handed manner, then you are entitled and it will be your duty to assess such damage in addition to the actual damage as would punish it for such conduct." There are a great number of cases in other jurisdictions, which lay down the rule stated by defendant. In some of these cases will be found much looseness of expression on the subject, and in very few of them is there anything more than a statement of the rule, with no attempt to support it by reason. In some instances, the rule seems to be placed on the ground that punitive damages really originated with the jury when they undertook to render verdicts beyond the actual damage in cases of malice or oppression, which the judge, regarding just, refused to disturb, though the instructions to the jury did not warrant such damages. This seems at best entitled to little consideration; and whatever force it had was lost when later the instructions to the jury expressly authorized as a matter of law the assessment of such damages.

It has been said in other cases that allowing or refusing any damages of a punitive character must rest in the discretion of the jury entirely, because the judge could...