Beaulieu v. NewQuest Mgmt. of Ill.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: 17-cv-05672
• Parties: TANIKA BEAULIEU, Plaintiff, v. NEWQUEST MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

TANIKA BEAULIEU, Plaintiff,
v.
NEWQUEST MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS, LLC, Defendant.

No. 17-cv-05672

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Martha M. Pacold, Judge

Plaintiff Tanika Beaulieu sued her employer, NewQuest Management of Illinois, LLC (“NewQuest”), bringing claims for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Before the court is NewQuest's motion for summary judgment [70]. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

Background

In deciding NewQuest's motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Beaulieu. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court liberally construes Beaulieu's pro se filings and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor.

Much of Beaulieu's response does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), because it includes a number of unsupported factual assertions and argumentative responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (requiring any party asserting or disputing a fact to cite “particular parts of materials in the record” or “show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact”); Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) (requiring any party opposing a motion for summary judgment to support any asserted factual disagreements with “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon”). (L.R. 56.1 was amended on February 18, 2021; the court applies the version in effect when the current motion was briefed.)

1

The Seventh Circuit “has repeatedly recognized that district courts may require exact compliance with their local rules, ” including “local rules governing summary judgment.” Allen-Noll v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 969 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2020). Even pro se litigants must comply with Local Rule 56.1. See Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (“even pro se litigants must follow procedural rules”). Beaulieu's generalized denials and assertions do not create disputed questions of fact to the extent they lack evidentiary support or citations to the record.

However, “a nonmovant's failure . . . to comply with Local Rule 56.1 does not automatically result in judgment for the movant.” Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). As the moving party, NewQuest bears the burden of showing it is entitled to summary judgment. With this in mind, the court turns to the parties' submissions. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

NewQuest is a healthcare management company. DSOF, [71] ¶ 2.^[1] Plaintiff Tanika Beaulieu, who is African American, began working for NewQuest in Chicago as a Customer Service Representative (“CSR”) in August 2014. [71] ¶¶ 1, 5; [12] at 4-5. This job involved assisting NewQuest's members, providers, and vendors over the phone. [71] ¶ 6. After completing training, Beaulieu reported to Juan Salas. [71] ¶ 8. In 2015, Beaulieu lodged a complaint generally about Salas's managerial style being condescending with Salas's supervisor, Claudia Vasquez. PSOF, [78] ¶ 4; [74] at 3-4 (sealed).^[2] On April 13, 2015, Vasquez switched Beaulieu to a different supervisor, Francine Dower, and instructed Salas to communicate with Beaulieu only through Vasquez. [78] ¶ 7; Pl.'s Resp. DSOF, [76] ¶ 8; [74] at 4 (sealed).

By late 2015, NewQuest had three different queues for CSR calls: member calls, provider calls, and Spanish-speaking calls. [71] ¶ 14; [76] ¶ 14. Beaulieu was assigned to the provider queue. [71] ¶ 15. Beaulieu testified that provider calls took longer than member calls. [73-1] at 26-29.

2

In September, Beaulieu unsuccessfully interviewed with Salas and Dower for a new position as a Senior Analyst. [71] ¶ 27; [76] ¶ 27. That position was given instead to Denise Webb-Williams, who is also African American. [71] ¶ 30; [73-1] at 31.

According to Salas, NewQuest sometimes used a lottery system the day before a holiday to determine which employees could leave early while enough other employees remained to meet contractual needs. [71] ¶¶ 17-20. Between Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve 2015, ^[3] Luis Portela informed the NewQuest staff that management would monitor phone volume and communicate the potential for early departures accordingly. [76], Pl.'s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 18-20. Beaulieu testified that subsequently, Dower sent an instant message informing the staff that they would send people home from the members queue based on call volume. [73-1] at 10. According to Beaulieu, most of the Hispanic CSRs were allowed to leave. Of the five remaining employees, four (including Beaulieu) were African American. [73-1] at 8, 10.

In February 2016, Beaulieu stayed home from work one day because of inclement weather conditions. NewQuest allowed the employees that did come to work that day to leave early. Beaulieu received an attendance “occurrence” (a type of write-up) for her absence. Portela refused to waive this occurrence, stating that employees were authorized only to leave early, not to stay home entirely. [73-1] at 10-11.

In March, NewQuest approved Beaulieu's request to take a day off for a medical appointment. When Beaulieu came to work the following day, Dower mistakenly told her she was being let go because she was a “no show.” That same day, when Beaulieu told NewQuest's Human Resources office that Dower was mistaken, NewQuest immediately corrected Dower's mistake and reassured Beaulieu that she would not be let go. [73-1] at 36-37. Beaulieu nonetheless resigned from her position. [73-1] at 37.

In August 2017, Beaulieu brought this action against NewQuest. Her amended complaint alleges employment discrimination based on her age, race, national origin, and sex. NewQuest moved to dismiss, and the court granted that motion, dismissing all claims except Beaulieu's race discrimination and retaliation claims. [45]. NewQuest filed the present motion for summary judgment. [70]. The case was reassigned to this judge. [83].

3

Discussion

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id.

The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (1986). After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quotation and footnote omitted). Construing the evidence and facts supported by the record in favor of the non-moving party, the court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [the non-moving party's] favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

I. Race Discrimination

NewQuest first moves for summary judgment on Beaulieu's race discrimination claim. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail, Beaulieu must prove three elements: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she “has been the subject of some form of adverse employment action (or that [she] has been subjected to a hostile work environment)”; and (3) NewQuest took this adverse action on account of Beaulieu's membership in the protected class. Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2013)). To survive summary judgment, she must present evidence that collectively “would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [her] race . . . caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Abrego, 907 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)).^[4]

4

NewQuest argues that Beaulieu's claim fails at the outset because Beaulieu did not suffer an adverse employment action. For purposes of her discrimination claim, a materially adverse employment action is an action that involves “a significant change in employment status, ” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 2014)), and is “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities, ” Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004)). “Such changes can involve the employee's current wealth, his career prospects, or changes to work conditions that include humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise significant negative alteration in the workplace.” Boss, 816 F.3d at 917. Adverse employment actions “generally fall...