Beaumaster v. Crandall

• Decision Date: 31 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 2845,2845
• Citation: 576 P.2d 988
• Parties: Francis J. BEAUMASTER, Opal L. Beaumaster and Mark Beaumaster, Appellants, v. Fay CRANDALL and Central Alaska Missions, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 988

576 P.2d 988

Francis J. BEAUMASTER, Opal L. Beaumaster and Mark

Beaumaster, Appellants, v. Fay CRANDALL and Central Alaska Missions, Inc., Appellees.

No. 2845.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

March 31, 1978.

L. Ames Luce, Kelly & Luce, Anchorage, for appellants.

Marcus R. Clapp, Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, Anchorage, for appellees.

Before BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice, and RABINOWITZ and CONNOR, Justices.

OPINION

CONNOR, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile collision. Trial was by jury.

The accident occurred at approximately Mile 112 on the Glenn Highway on January 21, 1973, in the early afternoon. Plaintiffs-appellants Francis, Opal and Mark Beaumaster are the father, mother and brother, respectively, of Michael Beaumaster. Francis and Mark Beaumaster were passengers, along with Michael's wife, in Michael's automobile. Opal Beaumaster was not at the accident scene. Her claim is for the loss of consortium of her husband, Francis.

On the day in question, the Beaumaster automobile was proceeding southward on the Glenn Highway, when Michael noticed an overturned automobile off the roadway. He stopped his car approximately 670 feet south of the crest of a hill, turned on his hazard lights, and went to see if he could render assistance. The exact location of the parked Beaumaster vehicle was greatly disputed, but viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants-appellees, the automobile was partially or totally obstructing the southbound lane. ¹

The day was cold, so Michael's passengers remained in the parked vehicle while he went to the disabled vehicle. A witness testified that the driving conditions were typical for winter, with patches of ice and packed snow on the road. Visibility was clear.

At this point, a northbound automobile stopped approximately 900 feet south of the Beaumaster car and pulled slightly over to the east side of the road. The driver, Mr. Majerle, testified that the Beaumaster vehicle was parked "on the backside of a blind hill" and it appeared too dangerous to pass.

Appellee Crandall approached this scene from the north, the same direction in which the Beaumaster vehicle had been traveling. Crandall testified that she frequently drove this highway, and was very familiar with it. She described the events leading up to her collision with the Beaumaster vehicle as follows:

"As I crested the hill that early afternoon, I saw immediately in front of me a car parked in my lane on the highway and I immediately shifted from drive into second to begin the slow down so that I could pass him. And in the next brief seconds, I can't give the exact order of what happened. I can only tell you what happened without necessarily the correct sequence, but there was a car coming up the left-hand (northbound) lane, that I thought was moving toward me, and I realized that that car in the left-hand lane was also parked, and that the roadway in front of me was completely blocked. At the same time I thought that I knew that there was a car over the side on the right-hand (southbound) side and I knew that I would have to stop. I was not sure that I could, but it was the alternative of two that I had and I tried to brake. And as soon as I braked, I went into a skid. I tried to bring the rear of my stationwagon around and I could not do it and I lost control of the car."

Appellants do not dispute this account of the accident, but allege that Crandall was negligent in operating her vehicle as she crested the hill, and that her erroneous perception of the Majerle automobile as blocking her clearance is not a defense.

Where necessary, we will develop the facts more fully as they relate to the particular issues on appeal.

The issues presented on appeal are:

1. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine?

2. Was it an abuse of discretion, invading the province of the jury, for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the basic speed law (13 AAC 02.275) and to find that, as a matter of law, the Beaumaster vehicle was illegally parked?

3. Did the trial court err in not directing a verdict on the question of defendant Crandall's negligence?

4. Did the defendants make a "golden rule" argument to the jury, and if so, was it prejudicial error for the court to have failed to sustain an objection to that argument?

5. Did the court err in ordering plaintiffs to produce a motion picture for defendants' use, and in permitting the introduction of the film into evidence?

I

The first issue on appeal concerns the trial court's instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. The court instructed the jury as follows:

"A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence of, or the appearance of, imminent danger to himself or to others, is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of him in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate moments. His duty is to exercise only the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the same situation. If at that moment he does what appears to him to be the best thing to do, and if his choice and manner of action are the same as might have been followed by any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, he does all the law requires of him, although in the light of after-events, it should appear that a different course would have been better and safer." ²

The propriety of the sudden emergency instruction in certain negligence cases was recognized in Wilson v. Sibert, 535 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Alaska 1975). ³ See also Snipes v. March, 378 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1963). The decision whether to give a sudden emergency instruction is ordinarily " committed to the trial court's discretion, and one which we will not disturb in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion." Wilson, supra, at 1039. However, emergency instructions will be struck down "where there is insufficient evidence to support an inference of an emergency situation . . . ." Wilson, supra, at 1040. ⁴

In Wilson, the defendant was stopped in his automobile in line at a drive-in window of a bank. The car in front of him suddenly started to back up. Without waiting to see if, in fact, the car would back up far enough to strike his automobile, the defendant "immediately shifted his car into reverse and backed up, colliding with the front of (the plaintiff's) car . . . ." Wilson, supra, at 1035. Although the plaintiff protested that the defendant should have at least glanced behind him or honked his horn before backing up, the emergency instruction was upheld.

Appellants first contend that there was no emergency because the Majerle vehicle was not in fact blocking the northbound lane as Crandall perceived it. The evidentiary predicate for the giving of a sudden emergency instruction, as set forth in Wilson, requires three elements. First, one sees something. Second, one interprets what one sees as requiring immediate action in order to avoid or reduce injury. Third, one reacts.

In the case at bar, appellee Crandall first saw the Beaumaster automobile from 600 feet away. The Majerle vehicle was approximately 900 feet beyond that. There is no question that Crandall misperceived the situation. However, she believed there was imminent peril when she decided to apply her brakes. This differs from the situation presented in Wilson. In Wilson the driver saw what was there the car in front of his did begin to back up. In the instant case, Crandall saw what was not there there was not in fact a blockade. While some courts have upheld a sudden emergency instruction where there is apparent, rather than real peril, ⁵ such an instruction was improper here because, as a matter of law, appellee's misperception was unreasonable.

The issue for the court in evaluating the propriety of the sudden emergency instruction in Wilson was whether the trier of fact could properly conclude that the situation actually occurring constituted "an inference of an emergency situation." Wilson, supra, at 1040. "Inference" does not refer to the defendant driver's capacity to view what was there, but rather to the possibility that the actual situation indeed constituted an emergency. Only once it is determined that the jury could conclude that an emergency existed, can the sudden emergency instruction be proper. The jury would then use that instruction in determining whether the defendant's reaction was reasonable.

Appellee Crandall, on a clear day, saw as equally distant from her, one vehicle which was in fact five football fields away from her, and one vehicle which was in fact, only two football fields distant. Given the extent of appellee's misperception, we have concluded that the facts disclose no emergency as a matter of law. The trial court abused its discretion in giving the sudden emergency instruction. ⁶ We must reverse the judgment.

II

Appellants' next two contentions may be treated together. Appellants claim that the court committed prejudicial error in refusing their proposed instruction on 13 AAC 02.275, which is known as the basic speed law. ⁷ Appellants further claim that the judge invaded the province of the jury by deciding that the Beaumaster vehicle was illegally parked as a matter of law, and in not submitting the question of defendant's negligence in cresting the hill at an excessive speed to the jury.

The trial court found that the Beaumaster car, which had been stopped either partially or totally on the highway lane, was parked illegally in violation of 13 AAC 02.340 ⁸ and AS 28.35.140. ⁹ 13 AAC 02.275(a) cautions prudence in controlling speed "so as to avoid colliding with a . . . vehicle . . . operated in compliance with a legal requirement " (emphasis added). Since the Beaumaster vehicle was not in compliance with a...