Beauregard v. Dailey

• Decision Date: 18 April 1936
• Citation: 1 N.E.2d 481,294 Mass. 315
• Parties: BEAUREGARD et al. v. DAILEY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

294 Mass. 315

1 N.E.2d 481

BEAUREGARD et al. v. DAILEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

April 18, 1936

Suit in equity in the superior court by Alfred A. Beauregard and others against Roy M. Dailey and others. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Decree reversed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hampden County; Williams, Judge.

D. H Keedy, of Springfield, and F. E. Tuit, II, of Northampton for appellants Dailey and others.

W. H. McCarthy and L. W. Doherty, both of Springfield, for appellees.

PIERCE, Justice.

This bill of complaint, by amendment now entitled Alfred A Beauregard and others v. Roy M. Dailey and others, is brought by ‘ owners of fleets of commercial trucks operating in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and in adjacent States,’ to obtain injunctive relief against the defendant truck drivers' union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America Local 404, a voluntary unincorporated association located in Springfield, Massachusetts (hereinafter called the union) and against John F. Gatelee alleged to be president of the Springfield Central Labor Union.

In substance the plaintiffs allege in said bill of complaint that on October 22, 1933, various members of the defendant union, employed by the plaintiffs, left their respective places of employment and went out on a strike because the employers refused to enter into an agreement whereby the employers should hire only union men; that on October 23, 1933, representatives of the plaintiffs and the defendant union, and a member of the N. R. A. state board of conciliation entered into an agreement of arbitration and the strike was declared off; that on October 26 and 27, 1933, the representatives of the plaintiffs met with the defendant Gatelee and the other representatives of the defendant union, in Boston, before the board of conciliation as provided in the agreement of arbitration; that at this meeting the representatives of the plaintiffs declined to agree to the provisions of section 6 of said working agreement, which reads: ‘ Relations. The Employer shall hire for work of this craft only members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chaufeurs, Stablemen and Helpers in good standing, and if none are available then only those who are to become members at the next meeting of the Local, and when hiring extra equipment shall hire it only from truckmen who have an agreement with a Local Union of this Brotherhood. This provision shall apply particularly to a driver or helper on a vehicle who is the owner or part owner thereof’ ; that thereupon the defendant union refused to negotiate any further unless the plaintiffs would accept section 6, or a substitute for it which reads as follows: ‘ When hiring labor the Employer shall have the right to decide upon the competency of the applicant and between applicants of equal competency will give preference to members of the local Union’ ; that it was then stated by the defendants' representatives that under the provisions of either section 6 or said substituted section the plaintiffs in the employment of truckmen should give preference to union men by notifying the union officials when additional truckmen were needed, and that in case the union could not furnish and supply competent help, the employer could secure the additional help from other sources; that the plaintiffs declined to accept such substitute section but wished to negotiate the questions of hours of labor, wages and working conditions; that the representatives of said union thereupon withdrew from further arbitration and refused to negotiate the remaining questions.

The bill further alleges, in substance, that on October 29, 1933, the defendant union, at a meeting held in Springfield, voted that the members leave their respective places with the plaintiffs and go out on strike, and that they went out on strike forthwith without notice to the plaintiffs; that they went out on strike for the purpose of enforcing acceptance by the plaintiffs of the provisions of section 6, above quoted, or of the substitute section, above quoted, and that a duly authorized representative of the defendant union so stated to the plaintiffs on October 29, 1933. The bill alleges that the strike is for the purpose of enforcing a closed shop upon the plaintiffs, and for that reason is illegal in its purpose. The bill in general terms charges that the defendants have indulged in conduct intended by threats, intimidation and force on their part to induce employees of the plaintiffs to cease such employment, and thereby have seriously interfered with the carrying on of the business of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought a restraining order and a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent further interference with the carrying on of this business.

To determine the questions argued by the parties it is necessary to examine somewhat closely the various precedent steps which were taken in the superior court, and which are shown by a copy of docket entries annexed to the bill of complaint. These entries disclose that on October 30, 1933, the bill of complaint was entered in the court, and that on the same day an order of notice to show cause, returnable November 2, 1933, and a subpoena, returnable December 4, 1933, issued and were served on certain of the defendants on October 30, and November 1, 1933. They were never served on certain other of the named defendants. On November 1, 1933, the case was removed to the United States District Court, on the ground that the bill showed a federal question under the National Industrial Recovery Act (48 Stat. 195), and it was remanded to the superior court for Hampden county on December 8, 1933. On November 1 and 2, 1933, three papers were filed in behalf of the defendants. These papers, each entitled ‘ Appearance,’ stated that the appearance was ‘ special’ ; two of them added that the sole purpose of the appearance was to attack the restraining order and to oppose the temporary injunction; while the third paper recited a specific denial of the court's jurisdiction. On November 2, 1933, a temporary injunction issued and also an interlocutory decree requiring that pleadings be completed by November 6, and that the suit proceed before a master, Edward Hutchings, under the usual rule of reference.

On November 6, 1933, all persons who were served with process appeared ‘ specially and for the sole and only purpose’ of taking exceptions (1) to the order of the court that the pleadings be completed by November 6, 1933, (2) to the order of the court referring the case to a master and (3) to the direction to the master that the hearings begin on November 8, 1933. On the same day the defendants served with process filed a paper entitled ‘ Defendants' Protest Against Proceeding Further’ on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction. By successive orders of the court, entered on November 6, November 8 and November 11, the time of the completion of the pleadings was extended, first to November 8, the to November 15, and finally to November 20. These orders were not excepted to by the defendants. On November 14, 1933, the defendants appeared ‘ specially * * * for the sole purpose’ of moving that the order requiring pleadings to be completed (1) by November 6, (2) by November 8 and (3) by November 15 be vacated as having been ‘ made unlawfully and without jurisdiction.’

On November 20, 1933, the defendants served, except Gatelee, appeared specially for the sole purpose of answering the bill of complaint, ‘ not waiving exceptions heretofore taken to orders of the court shortening defendants' time for answer and expressly relying thereon; and protesting against being required to answer plaintiffs' bill of complaint’ at that time. By their answer the defendants alleged, among other things, that the Motor Truck Association of Western Massachusetts, one of the named plaintiffs, was without legal entity and as such could not be made a party to the suit; and for the same reason that the union could not be made a party defendant. The answer denied that the strike was for an unlawful purpose, objected that some named defendants had not been served, and objected that the allegations of the bill relating to wrongful acts on the part of the defendants were too general. On November 21, 1933, the defendants appeared ‘ specially for the sole purpose’ of appealing ‘ from the Interlocutory Decree entered * * * on November 2, 1933,’ requiring pleadings to be completed by November 8, and ordering the suit to proceed before a master.

On November 23, 1933, on motion of the master the order of reference to the master was confirmed and hearings were ordered to begin on or before December 11, 1933. December 11 1933, the judge granted a motion by the master that the time for beginning hearings be extended to December 18, 1933. On December 15, 1933, the defendants appeared ‘ specially and for the sole purpose’ of moving ‘ that the time for commencing the hearings before the master be extended to and including January 8, 1934.’ The motion was denied, and the defendants then filed a paper entitled ‘ Defendants' Objection and Protest against Proceeding to Hearing before Master.’ The grounds of objection were (1) that ‘ the time for them [the defendants] to appear and answer and otherwise plead to the Bill of Complaint has not yet expired,’ since the subpoena ‘ commanded defendants to appear on the first Monday of December 1933 [December 4, 1933] * * * the return day of said subpoena * * * which * * * entitled the defendants to appear and answer or otherwise plead to the plaintiffs' Bill of Complaint at any time within twenty-one (21) days after said first Monday of December, which time...