Beauregard v. Gouin

• Decision Date: 28 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2010–434–Appeal.,2010–434–Appeal.
• Citation: 66 A.3d 489
• Parties: Arthur W. BEAUREGARD v. Charles E. (Rex) GOUIN et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

66 A.3d 489

Arthur W. BEAUREGARD

v.Charles E. (Rex) GOUIN et al.

No. 2010–434–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 28, 2013.

Michael A. Kelly, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Brian C. Newberry, Esq., for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the record, the memoranda submitted to this Court on behalf of the parties, and the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

IFacts and Travel

The underlying litigation ¹ arose from a real estate dispute between plaintiff Arthur W. Beauregard and defendants Charles E. (Rex) Gouin, John Somyk, Gerald Plante, Jr., and Carmen Plante (collectively, the codefendants). Mr. Beauregard owns an undeveloped parcel of land on Umbrella Way in the Town of Lincoln. The codefendants, who are neighbors of Mr. Beauregard, own a total of three separate parcels of land located on Umbrella Way; they also collectively own Umbrella Way, which is a private right of way.

At a deposition taken in connection with the underlying litigation, Mr. Beauregard acknowledged that he met with some of the codefendants in late 2002 to discuss his plans to develop his lot on Umbrella Way. At his own deposition in the underlying litigation, Mr. Somyk testified that he recalled Mr. Beauregard mentioning at that meeting that he would “need some of [Mr. Somyk's] property” in order to build a house on his own lot. Mr. Somyk said that Mr. Beauregard made this statement without making an offer to purchase any portion of the property. Mr. Somyk further testified that, when he and Mr. Gouin expressed concerns to Mr. Beauregard about the proposed development, Mr. Beauregard “brushed [them] off” and “acted like a typical * * * developer dealing with somebody that's an adverse possess[or] rather than a neighbor trying to work with somebody.” Mr. Somyk also stated that the codefendants were concerned about a water line that Mr. Beauregard had installed and that may have gone through Umbrella Way.

It is undisputed that the codefendants eventually retained Attorney Paul A. Brule and the law firm of Walsh, Brule & Nault, P.C. (collectively, the attorney defendants) to represent them in connection with the property dispute involving Mr. Beauregard. Attorney Brule's sworn affidavit (submitted in connection with his motion for summary judgment) states that, at his first meeting with the codefendants, he learned that they “were concerned that various neighbors of theirs on Umbrella Way might attempt to claim access rights to Umbrella Way via adverse possession.” Attorney Brule's affidavit further indicates that, after he presented the codefendants with three options ² that could alleviate their concerns, they decided that the best option was to have him “prepare[ ] and record[ ][a] Notice of Intent in the Land Evidence Records for the Town of Lincoln pursuant to the applicable statute, Rhode Island General Laws § 34–7–6.” ³

On July 29, 2004, Attorney Brule filed the notice of intent on behalf of the codefendants in the land evidence records for the Town of Lincoln. That document states, inter alia, that it is “From” the codefendants and “To” Mr. Beauregard. Additionally, there are handwritten notations near the “From” and “To” references in the document; those notations indicate that the codefendants are “Grantee” and that Mr. Beauregard is “Grantor.” In his affidavit, Attorney Brule states that the notations “were included solely for purposes of aiding the town clerk, who has to alphabetically index these various documents.” The body of the notice of intent reads in its entirety as follows:

“Please take notice that the undersigned hereby intends to dispute any right arising from your use of any part of the land which is of record owned by us and especially but without limitation, those lands immediately adjacent to our mutual boundaries.”

The document is signed by Attorney Brule on behalf of the codefendants.

On July 12, 2005, Mr. Beauregard filed a complaint against the codefendants alleging various causes of action which are not relevant to this appeal. Later, Mr. Beauregard amended his complaint, adding the attorney defendants as parties and setting forth claims against the attorney defendants for slander of title and intentional interference with prospective advantage. Mr. Beauregard alleged that the codefendants and the attorney defendants “willfully and maliciously acted to delay, frustrate and interfere with” Mr. Beauregard's title to his property on Umbrella Way. Specifically, the slander of title claim alleged that the attorney defendants' “recording of the Notice of Intent on Plaintiff's Property constitute[d] a slander of title on the Plaintiff's Property.” In the count alleging intentional interference with prospective advantage, Mr. Beauregard alleged that the notice of intent had “been a cloud on the title to Plaintiff's Property since the date of recording,” which had “prevented Plaintiff from developing the Property.” ⁴

On September 24, 2009, the attorney defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and an accompanying memorandum of law. They argued that Mr. Beauregard's claims failed because there was nothing actionable about the recording of the notice of intent, which they pointed out was not recorded “on” Mr. Beauregard's property. On January 8, 2010, Mr. Beauregard filed an objection to the attorney defendants' motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion was held on February 26, 2010. After supplemental briefing by both parties, the motion justice held a second hearing on May 13, 2010.

On May 26, 2010, the motion justice issued a written order granting the attorney defendants' motion for summary judgment. In his order, the motion justice found that Attorney Brule had “established that he acted without malice or specific intent.” The motion justice held that Mr. Beauregard's claim of slander of title—which requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant uttered or published a false statement that was malicious—therefore failed. The motion justice also recognized that Attorney Brule's recording of the notice of intent under § 34–7–6 “did not slander the title of Mr. Beauregard's property” because “it concerned and protected the title to the property owned by those who recorded the notice”— viz., the codefendants. Finally, the motion justice held that the claim of intentional interference failed because “there was no intentional act or intentional interference.”

The attorney defendants thereafter moved for entry of separate and final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 6, 2010, the court granted that motion and entered final judgment in favor of the attorney defendants. Mr. Beauregard filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Mr. Beauregard argues that the motion justice erred when he found (1) that “there [was] no dispute concerning the lack of [Attorney Brule's] malice” and (2) that “the title to [Mr. Beauregard's] land was never harmed.”

IIStandard of Review

This Court recognizes that “[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Takian v. Rafaelian, 53 A.3d 964, 970 (R.I.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I.2008). We review a motion justice's decision to grant summary judgment in a de novo manner. DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 129 (R.I.2013). We apply the same standards and rules as did the motion justice. Generation Realty, LLC v. Catanzaro, 21 A.3d 253, 258 (R.I.2011). In that regard, we adhere to the principle that summary judgment is appropriate only if “we conclude, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law * * *.” In re Estate of Dermanouelian, 51 A.3d 327, 331 (R.I.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 791 (R.I.2005).

It is also axiomatic, however, that we will not hesitate to affirm a grant of summary judgment if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case * * *.” Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tanner, 880 A.2d at 791. Accordingly, a “[c]omplete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Lavoie, 918 A.2d at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).

IIIAnalysis

This is a straightforward case. Simply put, it is our view that Mr. Beauregard may not recover on his claims for slander of title and intentional interference because the notice of intent had nothing to do with the property that Mr. Beauregard wished to develop.

AAdverse Possession

We begin with a brief review of some basic principles of our adverse possession law. In Rhode Island, a claimant may obtain title to property upon a showing that his use of the property was “actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive for at least ten years.” Corrigan v. Nanian, 950 A.2d 1179, 1179 (R.I.2008) (mem.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 88 (R.I.2011). Much of this state's adverse possession law has been codified in chapter 7 of title 34 of the General Laws. Within that...