Beaver v. Clingman, No. 03-6058.
| Decision Date | 06 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-6058. |
| Citation | 363 F.3d 1048 |
| Parties | Andrea L. BEAVER; Floyd Turner; Minelle L. Batson; Mary Y. Burnett; Michael L. Seymour; Terry L. Beaver; Robert T. Murphy; Sharon Lynn Atherton; Roger Bloxham; Steve Galpin; Richard P. Prawdzienski; Michael A. Clem; Whitney L. Boutin, Jr.; Christopher S. Powell; Charles A. Burris; and the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma a/k/a/ Libertarian Political Organization, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael CLINGMAN, Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board; Glo Henley, Chairman of the Oklahoma State Election Board; Kenneth Monroe, Vice Chairman of the Oklahoma State Election Board; Thomas E. Prince, Member of the Oklahoma State Election Board; and the Oklahoma State Election Board, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
James C. Linger, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Wellon B. Poe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
This case presents issues at the intersection of two Supreme Court cases concerning the associational rights of political parties in the context of primary elections. Oklahoma's election statutes currently provide for a semi-closed primary system, in which a party may invite only its own party members and registered voters designated as Independents to vote in its primary. Along with registered voters of the Republican and Democratic parties, the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma (the "LPO") filed a § 1983 action, alleging that the Oklahoma election statutes regulating primaries violate their rights to freedom of political association and free speech by preventing the LPO from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections.
The district court found the Oklahoma statutes to be constitutional. Because we conclude that the election laws impermissibly violate the LPO's associational rights, we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and REVERSE.
Several types of primary systems exist in the United States.1 Oklahoma's statute regarding primaries provides that:
A. No registered voter shall be permitted to vote in any Primary Election or Runoff Primary Election of any political party except the political party of which his registration form shows him to be a member, except as otherwise provided by this section.
B.
1. A recognized political party may permit registered voters designated as Independents ... to vote in a Primary Election or Runoff Primary Election of the party.
Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-104. By the statute's terms, a political party in Oklahoma may allow Independents to vote in its primary and runoff elections, but a party may not invite voters registered with other parties to vote in its primary.
Having exercised its statutory option to allow Independents to vote in its primaries, the LPO would also like to invite all registered Oklahoma voters, regardless of their political affiliations, to participate. The LPO has decided that such an action would help it reach out to Libertarian-oriented voters of other political affiliations, thereby producing a more viable Libertarian candidate. The LPO initially asked the Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board for permission to invite all registered voters to participate in its primaries for the 2000 election cycle, and the Secretary denied the request. After announcing the same intention for the 2004 election cycle and being denied again, the LPO filed suit in federal district court. It claimed that the First Amendment's guarantee of free association gave it the right to invite all registered voters, regardless of political affiliation, to vote in its primaries; it sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the Oklahoma State Election Board from enforcing the state election statutes. If granted such an injunction, the LPO suggested that Oklahoma would become a party-option open primary state, allowing each party the option of opening its primary to registered voters of other parties.
Finding that the LPO had standing to bring the suit, the district court proceeded to weigh the character and magnitude of the burden imposed on the LPO's rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the interests set forth as justifications by the state. It concluded that the burden of the statute on the LPO was not a severe one and accordingly analyzed whether any of Oklahoma's proffered interests were sufficiently important to justify the burden. Though it found unavailing Oklahoma's interests in avoiding voter confusion, administrative difficulties, "swamping," and "raiding,"2 the district court concluded that the state's interest in "preserving the political parties as viable and identifiable interest groups, insuring that the results of a primary election ... accurately reflect the voting of the party members" (R. at 68-69) was sufficiently important for the state to prevail.
We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Fed. R.Civ.P. 52(a). "A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (citation omitted). Our review of questions of law, on the other hand, is de novo. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). "[T]he difference between a de novo review of a record and a review under the clearly erroneous standard is significant," Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir.1988); in de novo review, "no form of appellate deference is acceptable," Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).
Because Oklahoma statutes currently recognize the LPO as a political organization rather than a political party, we must first determine whether the LPO has standing to bring a suit to enjoin laws that restrict political parties. In Oklahoma, party status depends on statutory requirements; specifically, a group may attain party status during even-numbered years by getting a petition signed by five percent of the number of people who voted in the last general election. Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-108. Having regularly completed these requirements in even-numbered years, the LPO has consistently and cyclically achieved party status. In order to maintain party status until the following election cycle, however, the party must achieve ten percent of the total votes cast for certain offices. Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 1-109. If a party fails to achieve the required ten percent, it loses its status as a party and becomes a "political organization" until it is able to regain party status through the mechanisms described in § 1-108. Because the LPO has never achieved the required ten percent, it consistently has lost its party status in years following elections. Therefore, over the last two decades, the LPO has managed to temporarily attain party status in the few months surrounding the elections but has not maintained it during the off years.
Our Article III standing jurisprudence requires that an actual controversy exist at all stages of litigation, and that the parties to the litigation all have a personal stake in its outcome. Because the LPO's status was that of a political organization rather than a political party when it brought the instant suit, there exists some doubt as to the LPO's standing to challenge a law that regulates political parties. As to the injury requirement, the LPO must demonstrate that the Oklahoma primary election statutes injure or threaten to injure the LPO. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The district court found that "[t]he LPO is an active organization with political plans for the 2004 election cycle." (R. at 23.) In addition, the LPO has been on the Oklahoma ballot in every presidential election from 1980 to 2000 and had primary elections in 1980, 1996, and 2000.
Moreover, we allow claims when plaintiffs contest "wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review." See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973); see also Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S 498, 514-515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). One area in which the Supreme Court has applied this exception frequently is election law. In Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), for example, the Court allowed plaintiffs to challenge a state law that required a certain number of signatures to place an independent candidate's name on the ballot. There, the Court concluded that the case was not moot because plaintiffs might be expected to seek similar access to the ballot in the future, and thus the wrong was capable of repetition yet evading review.
Similarly, in Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992), the Court allowed a plaintiff to challenge a ballot-access law. Explaining why it allowed the challenge despite the fact that the elections had already taken place, the Court stated that "[t]here would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar, future controversy subject to identical time constraints if we should fail to resolve the constitutional issues that arose in 1990." Id.; see also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) ().
The injury of which the LPO complains is similarly capable of repetition yet evading review. Both of the necessary elements are present. With respect to the injury's tendency to evade review, as explained above, it has been...
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