Beaver v. Rayonier Inc., 98-8457

• Decision Date: 13 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-8457,98-8457
• Citation: 200 F.3d 723
• Parties: (11th Cir. 1999) J.A. BEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYONIER, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 723

200 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1999)

J.A. BEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYONIER, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-8457.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 13, 1999.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. (No. 2:97-CV-47-AAA), Anthony A. Alaimo, Judge.

Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOEVELER^*, Senior District Judge.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff J.A. Beaver prevailed before a jury on his ADEA claim against his former employer Rayonier, Inc. ("Rayonier"). Rayonier now appeals the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for an amended judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FACTS

Rayonier, a North Carolina corporation which manufactures dissolving cellulose and fluff pulp, operates one of its two mills in Jesup, Georgia. Rayonier employs both hourly and salaried employees at the Jesup mill. Hourly employees are represented by one of four unions at the mill and their working conditions are determined through collective bargaining. Salaried employees are not represented by a union and their working conditions are set by Rayonier officials. In general, hourly employees do hands-on work while salaried employees do supervisory work.

The plaintiff J.A. Beaver began working as an hourly employee in the maintenance department of the Jesup mill in 1974. In 1980, Rayonier promoted him to the salaried position of shift maintenance foreman. In that position, Beaver trained hourly employees to work as instrument people, electricians, millwrights, pipefitters, welders, and machinists, and he supervised their work throughout the mill. In 1991, Rayonier transferred Beaver to the finishing room, where he supervised all maintenance work. In 1994, Rayonier again transferred Beaver, this time to the maintenance support unit-2 (MSU-2), where he supervised operation of the mill's rolling equipment. Beaver supervised the MSU-2 until he was terminated.

During the first quarter of 1996, the Jesup mill lost approximately $50 million in sales due to a decline in the price of pulp. According to Rayonier, that loss led the company to implement cost reductions at the mill. As part of that cost reduction, the company offered a voluntary early retirement program. Although 24 salaried employees retired as part of that program, that did not achieve as much savings as Rayonier wanted. As a result, Rayonier decided to terminate 10 salaried employees in a September 9, 1996 reduction in force (RIF). Beaver, who was 54 years old at the time, was one of two salaried employees terminated in the maintenance department. His position was eliminated as a result of Rayonier's decision to consolidate his MSU-2 supervisor position with the MSU-1 supervisor position. Rayonier assigned Silas Moxley, who was older than Beaver, to the new, consolidated position.

When Beaver was terminated, he told Rayonier he would take any available position with the company. Even though seven vacant supervisor positions were available at the time of Beaver's termination, Rayonier did not select him for another position. Instead, Rayonier chose employees who were younger than Beaver to fill six of those seven positions.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After his termination, Beaver filed a notice of charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Following the EEOC's issuance of a right to sue letter, Beaver filed this lawsuit alleging he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and in order to deprive him of pension benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq. The district court subsequently granted Rayonier's motion for summary judgment with respect to the ERISA claim, but denied it with respect to the ADEA claim.

The ADEA claim was then tried before a jury. At the close of all the evidence, the district court denied Rayonier's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict in Beaver's favor and awarded him $80,242 in backpay salary and benefits. In addition, the jury found Rayonier had wilfully discriminated against Beaver. Accordingly, the district court doubled the amount of Beaver's damages and, on February 17, 1998, entered judgment in favor of Beaver in the amount of $160,484.00.

Rayonier subsequently renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved in the alternative for an amended verdict. The district court denied those motions on April 6. Rayonier appealed.¹

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Rayonier's appeal requires us to address two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in denying Rayonier judgment as a matter of law on Beaver's ADEA claim; and (2) whether the district court erred in refusing to amend the judgment in regard to the amount of damages.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"We review de novo a denial of judgment as a matter of law." See Clover v. Total System Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1999). We review only for an abuse of discretion a district court's refusal to amend a judgment. See Day v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir.1997) cert. denied Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Day, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1797, 140 L.Ed.2d 938 (1998).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING RAYONIER JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

As an initial matter, Rayonier argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Beaver failed to establish a prima facie case. That argument, however, comes too late. Because Rayonier failed to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case and proceeded to put on evidence of a non-discriminatory reason--i.e., an economically induced RIF--for terminating Beaver, Rayonier's attempt to persuade us to revisit whether Beaver established a prima facie case is foreclosed by binding precedent. " 'When the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection the factfinder must then decide whether the rejection was discriminatory' and the question of whether the plaintiff properly made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant." Tidwell v. Carter Products, 135 F.3d 1422, 1426 n. 1 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481-82, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) and Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1539 n. 11 (11th Cir.1997)).

Rayonier also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Beaver did not produce sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination. Although neither the district court nor the court of appeals may revisit the existence of a prima facie case, the Supreme Court has emphasized that " '[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion [of showing intentional discrimination]. [H]e may succeed in this either directly by persuading the [factfinder] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716, 103 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).

In this case, Beaver makes two arguments in support of his position that the district court properly denied Rayonier judgment as a matter of law. First, he argues Rayonier's claim that it needed to conduct an economically induced RIF at the Jesup mill was merely a pretext for age discrimination. Second, Beaver argues that even assuming Rayonier did conduct a legitimate RIF in response to a loss of sales, Rayonier discriminated against him by intentionally choosing younger employees to fill vacant positions which existed at the time of the RIF. We address each argument in turn.

1. Whether Rayonier's Non-Discriminatory Reason for Terminating Beaver Was Pretextual

Beaver argues he presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Rayonier's claim it needed to conduct a RIF for economic reasons was merely a pretext for age discrimination. He relies primarily on two types of evidence. First, Beaver points to evidence designed to show that, despite the $50 million drop in sales at the Jesup mill in 1996, economic conditions were not so bad that a RIF was necessary. Specifically, Beaver points to the following:

i) overall sales from all Rayonier facilities were still $1.2 billion in 1996;

ii) Rayonier wrote off $78 million in 1996 for closing its Port Angeles mill and $98 million for an accounting charge;

iii) Rayonier spent $150 million on new construction at its various facilities in 1996;

iv) Rayonier increased its repurchase of company stock from $16 million to $50 million v) Rayonier increased dividends in 1996 by 16% for the third straight year;

vi) several executives at the Jesup mill received large bonuses in 1996;

vii) the vast majority of supervisors at the Jesup mill received raises in 1996.

According to Beaver, this evidence shows that economic conditions were actually good for Rayonier in 1996 and that Rayonier, by focusing on the $50 million loss in sales, has misrepresented its financial condition in order to show the RIF was economically induced. In support of his argument, Beaver cites Eskra v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir.1997). In that case, the employer terminated the plaintiff because his office, according to the report of the employer's actuary, was unprofitable. We held that the plaintiff's evidence showing that the employer's actuary had biased the report in favor of unprofitability was sufficient to show the employer's reason was pretextual. See id. at 1412-13.

We...