Beaver v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1938 |
| Citation | 299 Mass. 218,12 N.E.2d 807 |
| Parties | RUDOLPH BEAVER v. RAYTHEON MANUFACTURING COMPANY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
November 5, 1936.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., FIELD, DONAHUE & QUA, JJ.
Frauds, Statute of. Time. Contract, Of employment. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof.
After a defendant in an action of contract has pleaded the statute of frauds the plaintiff has the burden of proving a sufficient memorandum or a contract not within the statute.
The statute of frauds, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 259, Section 1, Fifth, barred an action for salary alleged to be due under an oral contract for employment of the plaintiff for a year, where the evidence would not warrant a finding that the employment was to begin earlier than several days after the agreement was made.
CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated December 1, 1930. A verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,891.13 was recorded with leave reserved by Collins, J., who thereafter ordered entered a verdict for the defendant and reported the case to this court for determination.
A. V. A.
Thomason, (C. S Hartwell with him,) for the plaintiff.
E. C. Thayer, for the defendant.
The plaintiff seeks to recover wages alleged to be due him under an oral contract of employment. The defendant's answer among other things pleaded the statute of frauds. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Under leave reserved the trial judge entered a verdict for the defendant and reported the case on a stipulation which contained a provision that if the verdict was rightly entered judgment is to be entered for the defendant.
The parties agree that the plaintiff was employed by the treasurer, a duly authorized officer of the defendant corporation; that the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant from January 2 1929, to July 18, 1929; that he was paid by the defendant at the rate of $6,000 a year from January 2, 1929, to August 18, 1929; and that he was discharged on July 18, 1929.
The only witnesses testifying at the trial were the plaintiff and the defendant's treasurer. The latter testified in effect that the defendant employed the plaintiff not for a year but on a month-to-month basis.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, after several prior interviews the treasurer of the defendant on December 13, 1928, made the following offer: "If I would go to work for them they will pay me for the year $6,000 a year, as much as . . . [their superintendent] got, and when . . . [he] got an increase during the year that they will pay me at the rate of $7,200 per year for the balance of the year, and that in a year we would get together again." The plaintiff took the offer under consideration and on December 17 told the treasurer that he would accept the proposition. No definite date was set for the plaintiff to go to work. The treasurer said they wanted the plaintiff to go to work as soon as possible.
The plaintiff was, at the time the agreement was made, in the employ of another corporation at a salary of $5,000 a year and so told the treasurer. That corporation paid the plaintiff for services rendered it for the period between December 17, 1928, and the end of the year. The defendant made no payment to him for services during that period. The plaintiff went to work for the defendant on January 2, 1929.
As the statute of frauds was pleaded by the defendant the burden was on the plaintiff either to prove a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the statute or to prove a contract to which the statute did not apply. Kalker v. Bailen, 290 Mass. 202 , 205. Weiner v. Slovin, 270 Mass. 392 , 394.
There was no memorandum of the oral agreement. The plaintiff in order to recover was therefore obliged to prove an...
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