Beavers v. State

• Decision Date: 05 January 1895
• Citation: 29 S.W. 144,60 Ark. 124
• Parties: BEAVERS v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

29 S.W. 144

60 Ark. 124

BEAVERS v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

January 5, 1895

Appeal from Scott Circuit Court EDGAR E. BRYANT, Judge.

Reversed.

S. R Cockrill and Ashley Cockrill for appellants.

The cardinal question in this case is, could the town of Waldron organize itself into a single school district without giving the voters of the old district who resided outside of the corporate limits, a voice in the election? The provisions of our statute governing the question are Sand. & H. Dig., secs 7088, 7089, 7090, 7106, 7113. That meaning should be given to a statute which is most in consonance with other provisions on the same subject. 56 Ark. 133; 16 Kas. 587; 4 Ark. 410; 23 id. 308; 47 id. 388; 40 id. 452; 45 id. 391. The appellee depends upon the phrase, "including the territory annexed thereto for school purposes," and claims that the adjacent territory previously annexed cannot be left out in the formation of a single district. But all the other provisions of the act are inconsistent with the meaning attempted to be placed on this provision. Cases supra. The question has been determined adversely to appellee's contention in Missouri under a statute almost identical (and from which ours was doubtless taken) with ours. Wagn. St 1262, sec. 1; 50 Mo. 268; 74 Mo. 443. It has also been held in Missouri that territory annexed to a town for school purposes may be organized with the town into a special school district. 53 Mo. 127; 64 id. 53; 60 id. 540; 74 Mo. 443. The Missouri statute is almost identical with Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 7088. It follows then that the special school district was legally organized, and the directors legally chosen, and that the outlying territory is no part of the district.

2. The election was legally Ordered, and the result is contested only upon the ground that legal voters were excluded from participating in it. But the county court alone has jurisdiction over contested elections. Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 2697; 50 Ark. 266; Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 2728. It is not the office of quo warranto to determine which set of directors was entitled to administer the affairs of the district. 27 Ark. 12; Ib. 176; 50 id. 266; 38 Mich. 405; 12 Lea, 30; 7 Cold. 59; 52 Tex. 336.

James P. Clarke, Attorney-General, and Winchester & Martin for appellee.

1. The suit was properly brought, and against the proper parties. 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 294; 129 Ill. 169; 24 Tex. 80; Sand. & H. Dig., secs. 7364-5, 7368; 28 Ark. 455; 4 A. & E. Enc. Law, 198, and note 4.

2. The outlying territory was a part of the school district for the purposes of the act of 1868, and any organization under that act, which did not include it, was unauthorized. Sand. & H. Dig., secs. 7088-9-90. Construing the whole law, it is manifest that the old district cannot be dismembered, and its territory, taken to form a special district, without the voice of all the electors of all the territory to be affected. Sand. & H. Dig., secs. 6986, 9984, 6987, 6992; 54 Ark. 134. The question is, what did the legislature intend; and this must be gathered from the whole act and other acts in pari materia. 25 Ark. 56. The statute of Missouri is essentially different from ours, and 50 Mo. 268 does not apply. 54 Pa.St. 89; 59 Ala. 235. The twelfth section of the act (Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 7108) is conclusive evidence that the first section was intended to make the territory annexed a part of the town district. The construction contended for appellants would leave a remnant of the old district without any organization, without any school house or school facilities, and rob it of its proportion of school funds, and of all school advantages. No such injustice was intended. 144 U.S. 47; 11 Ark. 44.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

This action was brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the State, in lieu of quo warranto. Its object is to test the legality of the organization of the town of Waldron in Scott county into a single school district. The directors of the district, whose existence is being questioned, were made defendants.

No valid objection can be urged either to the form of the action or the parties litigant. Sand. & H. Dig., sees. 7364-68; State v. Cin. Gas Light & Coke. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; State v. Com. Bank, 33 Miss. 474; 4 A. & E. Enc. 294-303; People v. Spring Valley, 129 Ill. 169, 21 N.E. 843; State v. So. Pac. R. Co. 24 Tex. 80.

The facts are well pleaded. The real question, therefore, presented by the demurrer to the complaint is: Can an incorporated town establish itself into a single school district, excluding all territory beyond the corporate limits, which, together with the town, had before constituted the common school district?

1. The action involves a construction of the following sections: Sand. & H. Digest, Sec. 7088: Any incorporated city or town in this State, including the territory annexed thereto for school purposes, may be organized into and established as a single school district in the manner and with the powers hereinafter specified."

"Sec. 7089. Upon the written petition of twenty voters of such city or town, praying that the sense of the legal voters of said city or town may be taken on the adoption of this act for the regulation and government of the public schools therein, it shall be the duty of the mayor of such city or town, within five days after the presentation of such petition, to designate and fix a day, not less than seven nor more than fifteen days distant, for holding an election in said city or town for that purpose, and also for the election by ballot, at the same time, of a board of six school directors for said city or town."

"Sec. 7090. The mayor shall cause notice of said election to be given by posting notices in at least five public places in said city or town, and by one insertion in such newspapers as may be published in said city or town. The electors at said election shall have written or printed on their ballots, 'For the school law,' and those opposed thereto shall have written or printed on their ballot, 'Against the school law,' and, if a majority of said ballots east at said election shall be 'For school law,' then, and in that case only, shall such city or town be deemed and held to be a single school district under and in pursuance of this act." * *

"Sec. 7106. The title of all real estate and other property belonging, for school purposes, to any city or town organized into a separate school district under this act shall vest, and hereby is vested, in said city or town, as a school district, and shall be under the management and control of the board of school directors for said district as fully and completely as other school property belonging to said district."

"Sec. 7107. All school districts formed under and governed by this act shall be known by the name of the city or town constituting the district, with the words 'School District of' prefixed thereto (as, for example, School District of Little Rock')." * *

"Sec. 7108. The board of school directors of any district organized under this act shall pay and discharge all debts and liabilities lawfully incurred by the several school districts existing under previous law and embraced in the district organized under this act."

"See. 7113. * * The county court shall annex contiguous territory to single school districts, under the provisions of this act, where a majority of the legal voters of said territory and the board of directors of said single district shall ask, by petition, that the same shall be done."

What is the meaning of the phrase, "including the territory annexed thereto for school purposes," in the first section of the act of February 4, 1868? Prior to this act there was no law for the annexation of territory to cities and towns for school purposes. The legislature therefore used the phrase in a prospective, not retrospective, sense. It would have been an incongruous use of words to speak of "including territory thereto annexed for school purposes," when none in fact had been annexed. Common school districts were not formed by first designating some incorporated city or town, and then joining to it rural territory, nor vice versa. It could not be said that the country was annexed to the city or town for school purposes, any more than that the city or town was annexed to the country for such purposes. Both were components of the district. Reference was had to territory to be annexed under the act the legislature was then passing. The meaning was, when incorporated cities or towns were organized into single school districts under the act, such territory as should thereafter be annexed to them under the act was to be included in the districts so organized.

It is the duty of courts, where words of doubtful import are used in an act, or where there are seemingly repugnant provisions, to so construe, them that, when considered in connection with all other acts in pari materia, they shall together constitute a consistent and harmonious whole. Every word and every phrase must be retained, and given its true meaning and proper weight, where it is possible to do so, and ascertain and carry out the purpose of the legislature. Reynolds v. Holland, 35 Ark. 56; State v. Sewell, 45 Ark. 387; McFarland v. State Bank, 4 Ark. 410; Sedg. on Stat. & Con. Law, 19b et seq.; State v. Watts, 23 Ark. 304.

When the act is viewed as a whole, the purpose of the legislature to allow cities and towns to establish themselves into single school districts, independent of the rural territory which had also...