Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz

• Citation: 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 165,68 Cal.App.4th 1450
• Decision Date: 09 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. H016845,H016845
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 237, 99 Daily Journal D.A.R. 273 Rosemary BECERRA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 165

81 Cal.Rptr.2d 165

68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 237,

99 Daily Journal D.A.R. 273

Rosemary BECERRA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, Defendant and Respondent.

No. H016845.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Dec. 9, 1998.

[68 Cal.App.4th 1454] Marcie D. Hansen, Santa Cruz, for Plaintiff and Appellant Becerra

Office of Santa Cruz County Counsel, Jane M. Scott, Santa Cruz, Attorney for Defendant and Respondent County of Santa Cruz

Ruth Sorensen, Sacramento, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent County of Santa Cruz

COTTLE, P.J.

Plaintiffs, the mother and siblings of a child who was murdered on the grounds of an elementary school, brought suit against defendant County of Santa Cruz (County), alleging negligence and breach of mandatory duties. Plaintiffs claimed that the County acted improperly in its placement of the child in a foster home, and in its subsequent supervision of the child's situation. The trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the child's mother appeals from the resulting judgment. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, taken from the factual showings made by the parties during the summary judgment proceedings, are essentially undisputed.

Mariana Zavala, who was born in April 1977, was the daughter of appellant Rosemary Becerra, and the sister of Carlos, Juanito and Anthony Becerra. In December 1991, Rosemary Becerra went to Mexico and left Mariana with a neighbor. On January 14, 1992, the neighbor contacted the County of Santa Cruz Child Protective Services (CPS), stated that she was no longer prepared to care for the child, and asked CPS to take custody of Mariana. On January 14, 1992, Mariana was placed in the protective custody of CPS. After an initial emergency placement, on January 16, 1992, CPS placed Mariana with Chris Gonzales, who is licensed to provide foster care in Santa Cruz County.

On January 16, 1992, CPS social worker Linda Hogan made an assessment after consultation with Mariana's mental health care provider, and a review of Mariana's CPS case history. Hogan assessed Mariana's overall risk as low. Hogan recommended placement with Chris Gonzales until the court decided disposition. In choosing the Gonzales foster home, Hogan considered the following factors:

Mariana's ability to continue attending [68 Cal.App.4th 1455] special education classes at her high school, Mrs. Gonzales's commitment to facilitate Mariana's continued treatment with her mental health counselor, the foster family's prior success with teens, and the proximity of the Gonzales home to Mariana's mother's residence to facilitate family reunification. ¹

Hogan contacted Gonzales to discuss placing Mariana with her. Hogan also met with Gonzales and Mariana at the time of placement. At that time, she discussed the circumstances existing between Mariana and her mother, and discussed with Gonzales her need to facilitate Mariana's attendance at counseling and special education classes.

On January 21, 1992, the juvenile court ordered Mariana detained pursuant to section 315 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. A service plan agreement submitted to the court on January 21, 1992 (covering the period from January 21 to February 28, 1992), detailed CPS's plan to reunify Mariana with her mother. ²

Mariana's placement at the Gonzales home was reviewed and approved by the CPS program manager on February 5, 1992. On February 6, 1992, a hearing was held to determine whether the court would take jurisdiction over Mariana. At the hearing, CPS requested a continuance until April 9, 1992, so that Mariana and her mother, Rosemary Becerra, could begin counseling. The mother, represented by counsel, agreed to this continuance. Mariana's counsel agreed to the continuance on the condition that Mariana remain at the Gonzales foster home, a licensed foster home where the child was happy.

At this same hearing, the mother told the court that she believed that her daughter was not receiving adequate supervision in the Gonzales foster home. Counsel for Mariana stated that she had inquired into the mother's allegations of inadequate supervision, and had discussed the issue with Mariana and the foster mother, and was convinced that the Gonzales foster home was providing adequate supervision. The court declined to make any change in Mariana's placement, and continued the hearing until April 9, 1992.

On or about the morning of February 10, 1992, Mariana was found murdered at Freedom Elementary School.

During the 26 days Mariana was in the protective custody of CPS, CPS social workers had numerous contacts, mostly by telephone, with various persons regarding Mariana. After Mariana's murder, an investigation was conducted of the Gonzales foster family by various state and local licensing agencies. The State Department of Social Services found no evidence that Mariana's death was due to any act or omission by the Gonzales foster parents.

Matias Soto was convicted of murder in the first degree for killing Mariana. Soto's conviction was affirmed by this court on July 30, 1997.

On or about December 29, 1992, Mariana's mother and siblings filed this suit. Plaintiffs initially named as defendants the foster parents (Christina and Richard Gonzales), Green Valley Apartments, its security company, the Pajaro Valley Unified School District, the State of California, and the County of Santa Cruz. Plaintiffs' complaint against the Gonzales foster family for negligent supervision was dismissed after hearing a demurrer on procedural grounds, and the dismissal was affirmed by this court on appeal. (Becerra v. Gonzales (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 584, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 248.) Other defendants have also been dismissed by demurrer or on motion for summary judgment, and are not involved in this appeal.

Against the County, plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleged two causes of action: breach of mandatory duty and negligence. Essentially, plaintiffs claimed that the County On or about January 29, 1997, the County moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) that plaintiffs could recover against the County only under a statutory cause of action; (2) that plaintiffs could not show the elements of a prima facie case under Government Code section 815.6; and (3) that the County was immune from liability on the basis of Government Code section 820.2. After considering extensive briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court granted the County's motion at a hearing on March 20, 1997. The court's written order granting summary judgment was filed on April 4, 1997, and the resulting judgment was filed on May 15, 1997. The mother, Rosemary Becerra, appeals from the judgment. ³

                breached a mandatory duty because it "failed to adequately investigate the special needs of decedent for supervision, failed to assess the effect of placement of decedent within one mile of the Green Valley Apartments, failed to adequately supervise ... the Gonzales[es], and failed to remove decedent from the care of the Gonzales[es] when they were informed that the foster parents were not adequately supervising decedent."   Plaintiffs also alleged that the County was negligent in "neglecting to investigate [Mariana's] special needs, by failing to place her in a foster home selected in accordance with those needs and once decedent was placed, by failing to monitor, supervise and control the foster parents in order to protect decedent from harm."
                

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because a summary judgment motion raises only questions of law, we review the supporting and opposing papers independently to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c); AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.) In doing so, we apply the same analysis required of the trial court. "First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings.... [p] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor.... [p] ... [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citations omitted.]" (Id. at pp. 1064-1065, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.) Where there is sufficient legal ground to support the granting of the motion, the order will be upheld regardless of the grounds relied upon by the trial court. (Troche v. Daley (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 403, 407, 266 Cal.Rptr. 34.) We evaluate the summary judgment granted here as to each of appellant's claims in light of these principles.

B. Liability of Public Entities

In California, all government tort liability must be based on statute. Government Code section 815 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute: [p](a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." (Gov.Code, § 815, subd. (a).) As the court noted in Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1335, 243 Cal.Rptr. 463, this section "abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable." (Id. at p. 1339, 243 Cal.Rptr. 463; see Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409, 205 Cal.Rptr. 1.)

In this case, appellant attempts to impose liability on the County pursuant to two different statutes: (1) Government Code section 815.6, which generally provides for direct liability of a government entity for failure to discharge a mandatory duty, and (2) Government Code section 815. 2, subdivision (a), which provides, under certain circumstances,...