Beck v. Haley
| Citation | 239 A.2d 699 |
| Parties | Grace A. BECK, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Russell J. HALEY, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 28 February 1968 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Houston Wilson, Georgetown, for defendant below, appellant.
Harold Schmittinger of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Dover, for plaintiff below, appellee.
This is an appeal from judgment for the plaintiff in an automobile negligence case. The determinative question is whether the jury instruction as to the law of contributory negligence was sufficiently related to the facts. We think not.
At the outset, it is important to note that the issue of contributory negligence is, as the Trial Judge stated, a 'close factual issue' in this case. That this is so appears from the following uncontroverted facts:
The accident occurred on Main Street in Clayton. The plaintiff Russell J. Haley was operating a taxicab in an easterly direction on Main Street. The speed limit along Main Street was 25 m.p.h. at the scene of the accident, but it became 40 m.p.h. just a few feet easterly, where the town limits ended. Main Street was a two-lane highway, marked by a broken center line indicating a passing zone. Directly behind the Haley vehicle, about one carlength distant, was an automobile operated by a Mrs. Pinder. It was dusk and headlights were on all vehicles involved. From the southerly lane, Haley began a left turn into a private driveway located on the northerly side of Main Street, to pick up a passenger. As he did so, an automobile operated by the defendant Mrs. Grace A. Beck passed the Pinder car in the northerly passing lane. As Haley's vehicle crossed the center line of the street, the Beck vehicle collided with it in the passing lane, the right front of the Beck car striking the left front door area of the Haley vehicle. After the collision, the two vehicles came to rest at the entrance of the driveway, both upright and still headed east, and about two car-lengths apart.
On his deposition, admitted in evidence, Haley conceded that he knew the Beck car was in the passing lane before he began the left turn into the driveway. Later, he contradicted himself in this connection. On his deposition, Haley also testified:
'Q The truth of the matter is, that was no safe time or place for anybody to make a left turn under those conditions, was it?
'A I guess not.
'Q Isn't it correct that that was no safe time or place to make a left turn, when she was right there in the act of passing?
'A Yes.'
And at the trial, Haley testified:
'Q Was it a safe time and place to make a left turn or not?
'A Was it safe? Is that what you mean?
'Q Was it a safe time and place for you to have made a left turn in front of Mrs. Beck's car? When she was one car-length in back of you in the passing lane with her headlights on in the act of passing the Pinder car, was it safe, or was it not?
'A (No response.)
Later in his testimony, Haley attempted to absolve himself of the damaging effects of the above statements.
The defendant requested particularized jury instructions upon the issue of contributory negligence, with specific application of the law to the facts. Specifically, the defendant requested that the jury be charged in detail relative to the facts and the common law duties of keeping a proper lookout and maintaining proper control, and the statutory duties imposed by 21 Del.C. §§ 4122, 4155--4157, and 4168. 1 Detailed drafts of particularized instructions applying the lookout duty and § 4122 to the facts of the case, as examples of the type of specific instructions being requested, were submitted by the defendant to the Trial Court. The Trial Court denied the requested instructions.
Under those circumstances, after the usual definitions of negligence and proximate cause, the Trial Court charged the jury substantially as follows upon the issue of contributory negligence: That Mrs. Beck claimed that Haley was guilty of contributory negligence; that she had the burden of proving such negligence and its proximate cause; that Haley must have been free of negligence, which proximately contributed to the accident, in order to be entitled to recover. As to Mrs. Beck's claim that Haley failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to keep his vehicle under proper control, the instructions to the jury were limited to the following:
'Now, first of all, Mrs. Beck charges that the plaintiff Mr. Haley failed to keep a proper lookout.
'So if you find that Mr. Haley failed to maintain proper control of his vehicle, and if such failure was a proximate cause of the accident, then he cannot recover.'
The charge then passes to Mrs. Beck's claim that Haley was guilty of contributory negligence in that he violated various motor vehicle statutes, 21 Del.C. §§ 4122, 4155--4157, and 4168. The charge on this phase of the case was limited to a reading of the text of each Statute, followed only by this summation:
The foregoing was the sum and substance of the jury charge as to contributory negligence. Timely and explicit exceptions to this treatment of that issue were made by the defendant.
We hold that the foregoing was an inadequate submission to the jury of the issue of contributory negligence, for the reason that the Trial Court failed to apply the law specifically to the facts of the case. The general charge on the law of contributory negligence in the abstract was insufficient. This Court has frequently held that the statement of the abstract rule of law is inadequate....
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Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo
...the relations of the particular evidence adduced to the particular issues involved" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Beck v. Haley , 239 A.2d 699, 702 (Del. 1968) (relied upon in American Casualty and holding that jury instructions should be based on the evidence presented at trial).Bas......
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American Cas. Co. v. Propane Sales & Service, Inc.
...if proper request for a specific instruction on some important point has been duly proffered to the court. 1 For example, in Beck v. Haley, 239 A.2d 699 (Del.1968), the Delaware Supreme Court held it reversible error to submit a rear-end accident case on general instructions concerning cont......
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Lutzkovitz v. Murray
...of law to the jury so as to clearly make them applicable to the specific facts of the case as shown by the evidence. Beck v. Haley, Del.Supr., 239 A.2d 699 (1968), is the most recent statement of that rule by this Here, the issue of foreseeability was crucial and the Court had the assistanc......