Beck v. Hy-Tech Performance, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA–CV 13–0723.,1 CA–CV 13–0723. |
| Citation | 236 Ariz. 354,703 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4,340 P.3d 433 |
| Parties | Martin BECK and Sherry Beck, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. HY–TECH PERFORMANCE, INC., an Arizona corporation, dba Loper's Service Center, Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Curtis Ensign, PLLC, By Curtis D. Ensign, Phoenix, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, PC, By Wesley S. Loy, Kevin R. Myer, Terrence P. Woods, Phoenix, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee.
OPINION
¶ 1 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Arizona's garage lien statute, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 33–1022 (A) (2014), creates a lien in favor of a garage proprietor when the owner of a motor vehicle agrees to the amount of some, but not all, of the charges for repairs.1 We hold that it does.
¶ 2 In February 2012, Plaintiff/Appellant Martin Beck dropped off a 1985 Jaguar he and his wife, Sherry, owned at a garage, Defendant/Appellee Hy–Tech Performance, Inc., with instructions to fix an idling problem so it would pass emissions testing. As explained in more detail below, during the next several weeks Hy–Tech performed multiple repairs to try and fix the problem. Beck agreed to most, but not all, of these repairs.
¶ 3 On March 6, 2012, Beck went to Hy–Tech to retrieve the Jaguar. A Hy–Tech employee presented Beck with a bill for $2,418.33. Beck refused to pay, stating he had not authorized the work performed. Because Beck refused to pay for the repair work, Hy–Tech kept the Jaguar. Hy–Tech's proprietor, Michael Kelly, offered to “work with [Beck]” on the bill, but Beck “wanted nothing to do with it.”
¶ 4 The Becks sued Hy–Tech for conversion and also sought an order of replevin. The superior court issued a provisional order of replevin the next day, and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office executed the order and took possession of the Jaguar on behalf of the Becks. Hy–Tech did not answer the complaint until after the Becks had recovered possession of the Jaguar. The parties stipulated to exonerate the Becks' replevin bond before trial, and Hy–Tech never made any claims to the Jaguar beyond its claim for payment of the repair charges.
¶ 5 The Becks then filed an amended certificate of compulsory arbitration stating that, because they had recovered the Jaguar, they were now only seeking money damages, and thus the case was subject to compulsory arbitration. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 72(b), (e)(4). Before arbitration, Hy–Tech counterclaimed seeking damages for breach of contract. The arbitrator found in favor of Hy–Tech on its counterclaim and against the Becks on their claims against Hy–Tech. The Becks appealed the arbitrator's ruling to the superior court.
¶ 6 After a bench trial, the superior court found in favor of Hy–Tech on the Becks' conversion claim and on its counterclaim for breach of contract and awarded it $1,907.71 in damages plus attorneys' fees and costs. The superior court “further f[ound] that [the Becks had] voluntarily relinquished the replevin claim in their Amended Certificate Regarding Compulsory Arbitration.”
¶ 7 On appeal, the Becks argue the superior court should not have ruled in favor of Hy–Tech on its breach of contract claim and against them on their conversion and replevin claims because Hy–Tech did not have a lien on nor the right to retain possession of the Jaguar.3 The Becks' arguments turn on whether A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) created a lien in favor of Hy–Tech when Beck agreed to the amount of some, but not all, of the charges for Hy–Tech's repairs. Because we agree with the superior court that A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) granted Hy–Tech a lien under these circumstances, we affirm.
¶ 8 By statute, “proprietors of garages” are entitled to a lien on a motor vehicle for the amount of agreed-upon charges “for labor, materials, supplies and storage.” A.R.S. § 33–1022(A). In full, A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) provides:
Proprietors of garages and repair and service stations shall have a lien upon motor vehicles of every kind and aircraft, and the parts and accessories placed thereon, for labor, materials, supplies and storage for the amount of the charges, when the amount of the charges is agreed to by the proprietor and the owner.
On its face, A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) does not indicate that a garage proprietor will lose an otherwise valid lien when the vehicle owner agrees to the amount of some but not all of the garage's charges. See Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 75, 77, ¶ 6, 219 P.3d 285, 287 (App.2009) () (citations omitted). In other words, if the owner of a vehicle agrees to certain charges for work performed by a garage, a lien securing the payment of those charges attaches, and it is not destroyed by a dispute between the parties regarding other charges.
¶ 9 Our construction of the statute is further supported by the common law antecedent of A.R.S. § 33–1022(A). See A.R.S. § 1–201 (2002); see also Pleak v. Entrada Property Owners' Ass'n, 207 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 12, 87 P.3d 831, 835 (2004) . At common law, a garage proprietor had a lien on a motor vehicle “when some value was imparted to the automobile by ‘performing work or furnishing material’ for the vehicle.” Capson v. Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., 139 Ariz. 113, 115, 677 P.2d 276, 278 (1984) (quoting Candler v. Ash, 53 Ohio App.2d 134, 372 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1976) ). A garage proprietor did not lose a common law possessory lien by charging more than the agreed amount absent bad faith or an intent to defraud. See, e.g., Orr v. Mallon, 190 Okla. 598, 126 P.2d 83, 85 (1942) (); Radley v. Raymond, 34 Wash.2d 475, 209 P.2d 305, 309 (1949) (); see also Macumber v. Detroit Cadillac Motor Car Co., 173 A.D. 724, 725, 159 N.Y.S. 890 (N.Y.App. Div. 2 1916) (). In other words, the common-law lien did not require agreement on every penny of the charges; a garage proprietor held a valid common-law lien even when there was a good-faith dispute as to the amount of some of the charges.4 The wording of A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) is, thus, consistent with the common law in this respect. See Pleak, 207 Ariz. at 422, 87 P.3d at 835.
¶ 10 The wording of A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) does not, however, mean a garage proprietor may recover charges the owner has not agreed to by foreclosing a lien on the vehicle. Section 33–1023 (2014), Arizona's lien foreclosure statute, uses the term “the charges” to refer to the amount a garage proprietor may collect from the public auction of a liened vehicle; the balance of the proceeds from the sale must be returned to the owner. This is the same term that defines the extent of the lien in A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) : “Proprietors of garages ... shall have a lien ... for the amount of the charges, when the amount of the charges is agreed to by the proprietor and the owner.” (Emphasis added). Cf. Obregon v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 217 Ariz. 612, 616, ¶ 21, 177 P.3d 873, 877 (App.2008) . Reading the two statutes together, a garage proprietor only has a right to apply the sale proceeds up to the amount of her or his lien on a vehicle, i.e., “the amount of the charges ... agreed to by the proprietor and the owner.” A.R.S. § 33–1022 (A). Thus, while a garage proprietor does not lose his or her right to a lien when the vehicle owner has agreed to the amount of some, but not all, of the charges, he or she may only retain from the sale proceeds the amount the owner agreed to pay.
¶ 11 In support of their position that A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) creates a lien—and the right to possess a vehicle—in favor of a garage proprietor only when the parties have agreed on the exact amount of the charges, the Becks rely on Fields v. Steyaert, 21 Ariz.App. 30, 515 P.2d 57 (1973). Steyaert is, however, distinguishable. There, the vehicle owner was unconscious at the time the garage proprietor towed, stored, and putatively liened the vehicle, and “[n]o one contend[ed] that there was ever an agreement between [the garage proprietor] and [the owner] ... as to what the proper amount of charges were to be.” Id. at 31, 515 P.2d at 58. The issue here is not whether a lien attaches in the absence of any agreement but whether a garage proprietor has a lien when there is agreement as to the amount of some, but not all, of the charges.
¶ 12 Accordingly, we hold A.R.S. § 33–1022(A) creates a lien in favor of a garage proprietor for the amount of the agreed charges, even when the parties failed to agree to other charges.
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