Beck v. Skon

• Decision Date: 16 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-2027,00-2027
• Citation: 253 F.3d 330
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2001) BECK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DAVID WAYNE VANDERBECK, APPELLANT, v. ERIC SKON; DAVID CRIST; CHRISTOPHER CEMAN, DR., APPELLEES. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 330

253 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 2001)

BECK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DAVID WAYNE VANDERBECK, APPELLANT, v. ERIC SKON; DAVID CRIST; CHRISTOPHER CEMAN, DR., APPELLEES.

No. 00-2027

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: February 16, 2001

Filed: June 7, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Before Richard Sheppard Arnold, Lay, and Hansen, Circuit Judges.

Hansen, Circuit Judge.

David Wayne Vanderbeck (Beck) is an inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater, Minnesota, where he is serving a 360-month sentence for committing second degree murder. Beck appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Supp. IV 1998) action against defendants. Beck contends that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to relocate him to a different cell, failing to provide him with a prescribed medical device, and conditioning his having needed surgery on his execution of a release of liability. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether the surgical consent forms were releases of prospective liability, as Beck contends, or merely forms authorizing treatment, we reverse the district court's order in part and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Beck suffered a gunshot wound on August 23, 1978, that left him with a bullet permanently lodged near his spine that affects his neural functioning. Beck began having pain, cramping, and numbness in his back and lower extremities in 1996. Beck's physicians determined that walking and climbing stairs were exacerbating his injury and recommended that prison officials relocate Beck to a cell that was closer to the cafeteria and infirmary to minimize further discomfort. Beck demanded that he be placed in cell hall D--the cell hall closest to the cafeteria--or be transferred to another penitentiary that housed a medical unit. The Stillwater nursing supervisor explained to Beck that the prison could not fulfill his specific relocation request because Beck did not meet the prison's criteria for cell hall D inmates; cell hall D was restricted to inmates with certain job assignments who comported with stringent behavioral standards. Furthermore, he was not diagnosed with an acute or terminal illness necessitating placement in a medical unit. Instead of relocation, prison officials offered to allow Beck to use a wheelchair or to have meals delivered to his cell. Beck refused both accommodations.

Beck also suffers from a right-sided hernia that was diagnosed when he was referred to Dr. Michael Tran in October 1997. Dr. Tran recommended that Beck undergo surgery to repair the hernia, but Beck refused to execute the requisite medical permit forms so the surgery was indefinitely postponed. As a temporary alternative to surgery, Dr. Tran recommended that Beck use a medical device known as a truss. A truss functions similarly to a girdle by holding a muscle wall firmly in place and stabilizing a hernia. Beck refused to be fitted for or to wear a truss.

Dr. Christopher Ceman began caring for Beck in January 1999. Dr. Ceman opined that Beck's hernia had appreciably worsened and that surgery was the desired course of treatment. Beck, however, still refused to sign the surgical permit forms, and his hernia remained unrepaired.

Beck filed his current action in May 1999 against Dr. Ceman; David Crist, warden at the Stillwater correctional facility; and Erik Skon, the assistant commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections. In recommending that defendants' motions for summary judgment be granted, the magistrate judge concluded that "[n]othing in the record demonstrates that any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. . . . [T]he record indicates that Plaintiff has refused to undergo proposed treatment which would be beneficial to his complaints." (Report & Recommendation at 17.) The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and granted summary judgment to defendants over Beck's objections. Beck appeals, asserting that because genuine issues of material fact are present, summary judgment was inappropriate.

II.

The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000). We reverse an award of summary judgment only if we find that a material issue of fact does exist or that the district court made an incorrect conclusion of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[W]e must take as true those facts asserted by the plaintiff that are properly supported in the record." Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2001). Beck contends that even if we fail to find a genuine issue of material fact, this case must be remanded regardless because the district court neglected to advise him as a pro se litigant how to properly respond to defendants' motions for summary judgment. We disagree. Although several of our sister circuits require a district court to provide particularized instructions to a pro se litigant at the summary judgment stage, we have not. Cf. Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d. 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that pro se representation does not excuse a party from complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Carman v. Treat, 7 F.3d 1379, 1381 (8th Cir. 1993) (failing to allow pro se prisoner to disregard Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Like any other civil litigant, Beck was required to respond to defendants' motions with specific factual support for his claims to avoid summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("[An] adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of . . . [his] pleading, but . . . [must], by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, . . . set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-52 (1986) (explaining that non-movant must offer controverting affidavits or evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor). Moreover, Beck is a frequent litigator in our court and understands the jurisprudential process.

"We look to the substantive law to determine whether an element is essential to a case, and '[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A claim under the Eighth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, must show both that the state action has denied the prisoner "'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" and that the state actors have shown deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,...