Lee v. Driscoll
| Decision Date | 13 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIV 14-4146 |
| Parties | ROGER and MARY LEE, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM DRISCOLL, GREG ALBRECHT, WILLIAM ALBRECHT and MATHEWS TOWNSHIP, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Plaintiffs in this section 1983 action are a husband and wife who challenge the actions of their township's board of supervisors on multiple state and constitutional grounds. Currently pending before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
All of the claims in this case arise out of repairs that were made on 219th Street, a township road that crosses Rock Creek near the intersection of 428th Avenue in Mathews Township. Rock Creek runs across a corner of the Lees' property though a natural waterway before it meets 219th Street. In the 1980's a bridge crossing Rock Creek on 219th Street was replaced with an 8-foot culvert. A 3-foot culvert was added in 2010.
Both culverts washed out in the 2011 floods. The Township applied for and was awarded FEMA funds to repair the washout. Meetings were held. There was discussion about installing 9-foot culverts, 8-foot culverts, and of restoring the road to the way it was before with an 8-foot culvert and a 3-foot culvert. The public was excluded from some of the meetings, and one meeting was adjourned. Mary Lee was the elected Township Clerk during this time period. She also was excluded from meetings when the general public was excluded. The Township eventually chose to install an 8-foot culvert and later a 3-foot culvert. The cost of the entire project was covered by FEMA funds.
Roger and Mary Lee (the Lees) own land next to the roadway where the repairs were made. They agreed to allow the contractor to use dirt and rocks from their property for the construction project because they believed at least one 9-foot culvert would be installed. The Lees contend that the Township unlawfully accepted the federal funds to simply install the same inadequate drainage structure at a lower cost and planned to use the remaining funds for repairs on other roads. The Lees allege that when they raised concerns about this plan, Defendants retaliated against them by withholding information and violating their constitutional rights.
No flooding has occurred on the Lees' land since the repairs were made, so they are not claiming any damages for flooding that has occurred, but they are claiming damages for future flooding that might occur.
In their complaint, the Lees assert the following claims against the defendants Mathews Township and the members of the Township Board of Supervisors (Defendants) for alleged violations of their federal constitutional rights: (1) the right to due process (count 1); (2) the right to equal protection of the laws (count 2); (3) first amendment free speech, retaliation and associational rights (count 3); and (4) taking without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment (count 4). The Lees also assert a taking without just compensation under the South Dakota Constitution (count 5), conversion (count 6), and deceit (count 7). In count 8 of the Complaint, the Lees seek declaratory and injunctive relief to end the alleged violations of their constitutional rights and to prevent future infringement of those rights. They also appear to ask the court to order the Township to provide better drainage at 219th Street.
Defendants assert that the Lees lack Article III standing to pursue their claims for damages that they would incur if flooding occurs in the future. They also argue that the Lees' claims for futuredamages are not ripe.1 With respect to count 4 alleging a Fifth Amendment Takings claim, Defendants contend that the Lees failed to seek compensation through available state remedies, and thus that claim is not ripe. Defendants move for dismissal of the Lees' Takings claims and their claim for future flooding damages based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
In addition, Defendants move for summary judgment as to all other counts in the Lees' complaint pursuant to Rule 56(c), arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations of its pleadings but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988). All facts presented to the district court by the non-moving party are accepted as true if properly supported by the record. See Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 332-33 (8th Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
Before addressing the motion for summary judgment, the Court will address Defendants' argument that the Lees' future damages claim is not ripe and that they lack standing to raise it. The Eighth Circuit has explained a court's duty to determine whether a case is justiciable:
"Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). "The limitations imposed by Article III are usually referred to as the requirement." Schanou v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist. No. 160, 62 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1435 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc)); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (). This court defines "case or controversy" to require "a definite and concrete controversy involving adverse legal interests at every stage in the litigation." McFarlin v. Newport Special Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1992). "Federal courts must always satisfy themselves that this requirement has been met before reaching the merits of a case...."
Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit also explained that "[c]ourts employ a number of doctrines to determine judiciability such as standing, ripeness, and mootness." Id. at 983.
Missouri Roundtable for Life v. Carnahan, 676 F.3d 665, 674 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 2011). One crucial difference between ripeness and standing is that "the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed." Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (citations omitted). While standing "asks whether these persons are the proper parties to bring the suit," ripeness "asks whether this is the correct time forthe complainant to bring the action." See Wilderness Soc. v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996)(emphasis in original).
The issue whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Lees' claim for future flooding damages is one of ripeness rather than standing. For the following reasons, the future damages claim is not ripe for review.
The Eighth Circuit has stated the basic rationale behind the ripeness doctrine "'is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.'" Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of Peculiar, Mo., 345 F.3d 570, 572-73 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148(1967)). "The ripeness inquiry requires examination of both fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). "The fitness prong 'safeguards against judicial review of hypothetical or speculative disagreements.'" Id. (quoting MidAmerican Energy, 234 F.3d at 1038). The hardship inquiry focuses on "whether delayed review 'inflicts significant practical harm' on the plaintiffs." Id. (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)). A claim is unripe "'if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.'" Id. at 875-76 (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)) (internal citations omitted). It is sufficient for ripeness purposes, however, that injury is "certainly impending." Id. at 876 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442...
To continue reading
Request your trial