Beck v. State

Decision Date27 June 1962
Docket NumberNo. 34668,34668
Citation360 S.W.2d 410,172 Tex.Crim. 534
PartiesWilliam Henry BECK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Brown & Shuman, by Clifford W. Brown, Lubbock, for appellant.

Alton R. Griffin, Dist. Atty., by George H. Nelson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lubbock, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

Pandering is the offense; the punishment, enhanced by reason of two prior convictions for felonies less than capital, life imprisonment.

The conviction is under that portion of the pandering statute, Art. 519, Vernon's Ann.P.C., which reads:

'Any person who shall procure or attempt to procure or be concerned in procuring with or without her consent a female for prostitution * * * shall be confined in the penitentiary for any term of years not less than two.'

Count #1 of the indictment under which appellant was convicted alleged that on or about the 6th day of February, 1961, he did unlawfully 'by means of offering her money, attempt to procure, without her consent, Opal Wilhite, a female, for prostitution.'

By motion to quash, which was by the court overruled, appellant challenged the sufficiency of the indictment to charge an offense. In the motion, he urged that the allegation in the indictment that he did attempt to procure the female for prostitution by 'means of offering her money' was insufficient because it did not allege what the offer of money was for or the manner or the means by which the offer was made and was nothing more than a legal conclusion of the pleader.

In support of his contention, appellant relies upon Monroe v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 120, 157 S.W.2d 648, where it was held that the allegation in an indictment that the accused did unlawfully procure the female 'by means of threats, force and fraud' was insufficient to charge an offense of pandering, under the statute.

In the case cited, the court stated the rule that in prosecutions under the phase of the pandering statute here presented, an indictment which merely follows the language of the statute is insufficient and in order to be sufficient to meet the requirements of definiteness the indictment must aver not only the acts or omissions on the part of the accused showing that he did in fact procure the female to become an inmate of a house of prostitution, but how the same was accomplished.

The indictment in the instant case clearly alleges that appellant attempted to procure the female by 'means of offering her money.' Such allegation was sufficiently definite as to how he attempted to procure her. We find the allegations of the indictment sufficient to charge an offense under the statute.

The state's testimony shows that the prosecuting witness, Mrs. Opal Wilhite, lived with her husband and three children in the city of Lubbock. The eldest daughter, Glenda, seventeen years of age, had been having difficulties with her father and on two occasions had run away from home.

On Saturday, February 4, 1961, appellant called Glenda at her home on the telephone and solicited her assistance in recovering his automobile from a girl whom she knew. As a result of the conversation, Glenda went to a drugstore and met the appellant, whom she had never seen before. In their conversation, appellant asked Glenda to marry him, talked about prostitution, told her 'you make good money at it' and that 'he was a hustler of women.' Glenda told appellant she would go to Oklahoma with him and agreed to meet him at the drugstore that night at 1:00 a. m. She then returned to her home and, later in the night after appellant failed to keep his appointment, went with a boy to Amarillo, where she secured work and stayed for some three weeks before returning home.

Shortly after midnight, appellant called the Wilhite home, asking for Glenda, and it was then discovered that she was missing. During the night and following day, Sunday, he continued to call and talked to Mrs. Wilhite about her daughter, who was still missing. in the conversations, appellant told Mrs. Wilhite that he loved Glenda and wanted to marry her. Appellant also stated that he was a private detective and would do all he could to find her.

Mrs. Wilhite testified that on one occasion appellant asked her to have a coke with him and that she began to act 'fresh' with him because she thought he knew where the daughter was and she wanted to get him to tell her. She stated that in a telephone conversation with appellant on Monday morning appellant asked her if she would like to work 'out here' and start selling herself and suggested that she divorce her husband and prostitute in her own house, saying: 'We could make a lot of money.' She stated that in a conversation with appellant on Monday morning appellant invited her out to dinner and she refused; that when he called back later she suggested that he come to her house; that appellant came around 1:45 p. m.; that when he arrived she told appellant she was about out of 'her mind' over the disappearance of her daughter and appellant handed her two capsules, told her to take them, and she then took one of the capsules and kept the other.

The testimony reflects that prior to appellant's coming to the home, Mrs. Wilhite had notified the police and that after he left the home he was taken into custody upon a charge of possession of barbiturates and carried to the police station.

Later on Monday evening, appellant called Mrs. Wilhite, inferred that she had turned him in, and asked her to start working as a prostitute and make money to repay him for the money he had been out in making bail.

The following Tuesday morning, appellant again called Mrs. Wilhite and again talked to her about her prostituting to make money and pay him back for the money he had been out in making bail. In the conversation, Mrs. Wilhite informed appellant that she did not want to have anything more to do with him and for him not to call her anymore.

Officer Bill Bessent testified that he was in the Wilhite home on Tuesday and listened over an extension...

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12 cases
  • State v. Sandoval
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 17 Noviembre 1992
    ...S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex.Crim.App.1962) (discussing former Penal Code article 1191 regarding procuring an abortion); Beck v. State, 172 Tex.Crim. 534, 360 S.W.2d 410, 411 (App.1962) (discussing procuring prostitutes); Norman v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 25, 338 S.W.2d 714, 714-15 (App.1960) (discuss......
  • Ellard v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 6 Marzo 1974
    ...it was not necessary that the court charge upon, or the jury find, malice. For cases involving analogous situations see Beck v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 534, 360 S.W.2d 410; Malazzo v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 441, 308 S.W.2d 29; and Kelley v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 647, 137 S.W.2d Ground of error No......
  • Lopez v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 20 Diciembre 1978
    ...is required. Bonsal v. State, 502 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Garcia v. State, 473 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Beck v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 534, 360 S.W.2d 410 (1962). That was the situation here. Appellant did not testify, the arresting officer's testimony did not raise the issue of en......
  • Scullock v. State, 55739
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 21 Noviembre 1979
    ...Mo. 391, 408-09, 81 S.W. 857, 861-62 (1904); State v. Miller, 182 Mo. 370, 383-86, 81 S.W. 867, 871-72 (1904); Beck v. State, 172 Tex.Crim. 534, 538, 360 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1962). ...
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