Beck v. Winters

• Decision Date: 16 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 19278.,19278.
• Citation: 407 F.2d 125
• Parties: Captain Henry BECK, Superintendent of the Pulaski County Penal Farm; and Clint Cavin, Surety, Appellants, v. Robert WINTERS, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

407 F.2d 125 (1969) Captain Henry BECK, Superintendent of the Pulaski County Penal Farm; and Clint Cavin, Surety, Appellants, v. Robert WINTERS, Appellee.

No. 19278.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

February 25, 1969.

Certiorari Denied June 16, 1969.

H. Clay Robinson, Deputy Pros. Atty., and Don Langston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellants, Joe Purcell, Atty. Gen., and Richard B. Atkisson, Pros. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., on the brief.

Michael Meltsner, New York City, for appellee, Jack Greenberg, New York City, John W. Walker and Norman Chachkin, Little Rock, Ark., and Anthony G. Amsterdam, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief.

Before MATTHES, GIBSON and LAY, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied June 16, 1969. See 89 S.Ct. 2104.

MATTHES, Circuit Judge.

Captain Henry Beck, Superintendent of the Pulaski County Penal Farm and Clint Cavin, surety,¹ have appealed from the order of the United States district court granting Robert Winters relief in this habeas corpus proceeding. The history of the litigation giving rise to this appeal is fully and accurately reported in the district court's opinion in Winters v. Beck, 281 F.Supp. 793 (E.D.Ark. 1968). A brief resume of the relevant facts will suffice for the purpose of this opinion.

Winters, appellee, was tried and convicted without the assistance of counsel in the Municipal Court of Little Rock, Arkansas, for obscene and lascivious conduct proscribed by Little Rock City Ordinance No. 25-121. He received the maximum punishment of 30 days in jail and a fine of $250, to which was added $4 costs. Being an indigent and unable to pay the fine, he was sentenced to the Pulaski County Penal Farm for a total of 284 days as provided by Ark.Stat.Ann. § 19-2416 (1968 Repl. Vol.).²

After appellee had exhausted his state remedies through habeas corpus proceedings, Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907, 87 S.Ct. 207, 17 L.Ed.2d 137 (1966) (Mr. Justice Stewart dissenting), he filed a petition for habeas relief in the United States district court on November 8, 1966. Judge Young initially dismissed appellee's petition on the ground that petitioner was at liberty on bail and not under such restraint as was necessary to require consideration of the petition. On appeal we remanded for a rehearing on the merits in conformity with the teachings of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). On remand, Judge Young held a hearing and in a soundly-reasoned opinion found that "the interaction of the `dollar-a-day' statute of Arkansas with a $254 fine plus a 30-day jail sentence constituted a `serious offense,' and the failure of the trial court to notify petitioner of his right to the assistance of counsel and offer him counsel if he was unable financially to retain counsel rendered the judgment of conviction and sentence constitutionally invalid." 281 F.Supp. at 801-802.

On this appeal, appellants in their brief again questioned appellee's standing to seek habeas relief, their position being that since he was at liberty on bond when he filed his petition in the United States district court, he was not in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and consequently the writ was not available to him. Our remand of the district court's first order, motivated by Jones v. Cunningham, supra, disposed of this issue. In oral argument the Assistant Attorney General of Akansas with candor conceded there was no merit to the lack of standing issue and expressly abandoned this contention.

The clear-cut question we must decide is whether the district court was correct in holding that appellee was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We subscribe to Judge Young's conclusion and affirm.

The Attorney General of Arkansas argues for a reversal on the premise that the question of whether an indigent state defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel is one "which traditionally in the American system of government belongs to the Legislatures, not to the courts." We are reminded that Arkansas has recognized its responsibility by enacting legislation providing "free counsel" for indigent defendants in felony cases,³ Ark. Stat.Ann. § 43-1203 (1964 Repl. Vol.); that the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held not only that appellee Winters was not entitled to counsel, but has expressly rejected the concept that an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor should have the assistance of counsel. Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W. 2d 534 (1967). The Cableton Court was obviously influenced by practical considerations, stating in part: "There are more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident practicing lawyers and that there are counties in which there are no practicing lawyers. The impact of such a rule would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession." Id. at 538-539.

We are fully cognizant of and appreciate appellants' concern over the federal government intruding into problems which are primarily relegated to the states for resolution. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of comity between the federal and state courts in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1629, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963):

"Mapp sounded no death knell for our federalism; rather, it echoed the sentiment of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1961) that `a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts\' by itself urging that `federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches.\'"

Accord, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).

The sum of appellants' argument is predicated on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Arkansas that "any change in the law of Arkansas, after certiorari was denied in the Winters case should either come through legislative enactment or by an express decision of the United States Supreme Court." 420 S.W.2d at 537-538.⁴

Appellants are correct in suggesting that the Supreme Court of the United States has not expressly extended the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel to misdemeanor cases. We are firmly convinced, however, from the rationale of the decisions of the Supreme Court that the fundamental right to counsel extends to a situation where, as here, the accused has been found guilty of an offense, which has resulted in imprisonment for approximately nine and one-half months.

The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), in holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, proclaimed: "In our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344, 83 S.Ct. at 796.⁵

Appellants seem to regard the Gideon opinion as limiting the application of the Sixth Amendment to offenses which are characterized as felonies. We are not persuaded that the Gideon Court intended to circumscribe the application of its decision to such narrow confines. The Court did not draw a line between felonies and any and all misdemeanors. Indeed, consideration of the opinion in context leads us to conclude that the right to counsel must be recognized regardless of the label of the offense if, as here, the accused may be or is subjected to deprivation of his liberty for a substantial period of time.⁶

It should be remembered that the Sixth Amendment makes no differentiation between misdemeanors and felonies. The right to counsel is not contingent upon the length of the sentence or the gravity of the punishment. Rather, it provides that the guarantee extends to "all criminal prosecutions." Furthermore, we note that the phrase "all criminal prosecutions" applies not only to the right to counsel but also to the right to a jury trial. Logically the phrase should be accorded the same meaning as applied to both protections. Thus we believe significant the Supreme Court's pronouncements in cases involving the jury trial guarantee.

In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed. 491 (1968), the Supreme Court held that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal cases "which — were they tried in a federal court — would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." The Court concluded that a jury trial is guaranteed in all "serious offenses" but does not extend to "petty crimes." The Duncan Court, however, declined to settle the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes. It did hold that on the facts before it, where appellant had been sentenced to 60 days in jail and fined $300 for commission of simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable up to two years, he was entitled to a jury trial.

In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed. 522 (1968), the Court reiterated its holding in Duncan and held that the right to jury trial extends to serious criminal contempts and that denial of a jury trial to appellant, who was sentenced to imprisonment for two years, was constitutional error. Conversely, in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968), the Court did not extend the right to an offense it found petty. Dyke involved contemnors who were sentenced under a Tennessee criminal contempt statute that provided for a maximum penalty of 10 days in...