Becker v. Church

• Decision Date: 08 October 1889
• Citation: 115 N.Y. 562,22 N.E. 748
• Parties: BECKER et al. v. CHURCH. CHURCH v. BECKER et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

115 N.Y. 562

22 N.E. 748

BECKER et al.

v.CHURCH.¹

CHURCH

v.BECKER et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 8, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.

George L. Stedman, for appellant.

William Youmans, for respondents.

GRAY, J.

In these two actions, which were argued as one, the facts are alike; but, in each, certain equitable relief is sought, the claim to which is based by the plaintiffs upon a different conclusion drawn from those facts.

In Becker's action against Church, he seeks to enjoin certain summary proceedings before the county judge, which Church had instituted for the removal of Becker and others, as tenants of certain premises, on the ground of an expiration of their terms of tenancy. The plaintiffs, however, say that the defendant is not the owner of the premises, and that a writing purporting to constitute a tenancy at will in the premises between him and the plaintiff Becker was of no effect, and void, because procured through fraud and deception. The referee before whom the issues came on for trial sustained the plaintiffs in their contention, and awarded them judgment perpetually enjoining the summary proceedings under which defendant sought to recover possession of the premises. The judgment was affirmed at the general term by a divided court. The division was not upon the conclusion of the referee as to the invalidity of the lease. The finding in that respect was concurred in by all of the judges; and, as it was sustained by the evidence in the case, the judgment in that respect will not be disturbed here. Three opinions were written. Two of the learned judges differed upon the right to maintain this action; placing their difference upon the question of the power of the county judge to try the question of the alleged fraud in the procurement of the lease, in the proceedings before him. But the third judge, while agreeing in the view that the county judge had the power to try the question, was of the opinion that this action was nevertheless maintainable, and concurred in affirming the judgment herein, by which the pretended lease was canceled.

There cannot be any doubt as to the jurisdiction of courts of equity over actions to cancel and set aside instruments on the ground of fraud in their procurement. Such actions are in the nature of preventive remedies. The existence of the instruments may be a well-founded source of anticipated danger by the party whom they do, or whom they are designed to, affect. The reason for the maintenance of the action for their avoidance is to be found in the reasonable apprehension that the evidence of the fraud may not be always attainable, or that the defense of fraud may not always be available at law. If the fraudulent instrument affects the title to land, equity entertains the action for its cancellation, in order to remove the cloud thrown upon the plaintiffs' titles. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 694, 695, 700; Hamilton v. Cummings, 1 Johns. Ch. 520, 524;Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 493. Of course, in all such cases, the propriety of granting equitable relief rests in the sound discretion of the court, and it is not controlled by any general rules. It is but a natural consequence of this equitable jurisdiction to decree the cancellation of a fraudulent instrument that the court should inhibit the defendant from continuing any legal proceedings through which he is attempting to assert a right based on the existence of that instrument. The power to control and to restrain the proceedings in pending actions, in such a case, is a necessary part of the remedy which a court of equity is supposed to be capable of completely administering. Eden, Inj. c. 2, p. 4. In the present case the plaintiffs have chosen to bring their action for the cancellation of the pretended lease, upon the existence of which the defendant bases his right to remove them. Whatever the county judge's jurisdictional powers may have been with respect to the investigation of the facts surrounding the making of this lease, and as to the application of the law to the same, in disposing of the case it is quite unnecessary to pass upon the question. No objection was made by the answer to the litigation of the questions between the parties in a court of equity, and the defendant must be deemed to have consented to such a disposition of the matters in issue between him and the plaintiffs. The action was affirmative on the plaintiffs' part, and was taken as a means of obtaining a complete remedy for the fraud upon his rights. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled, under all the circumstances proved, to be relieved from the obligation of the writing, was certainly a matter peculiarly within the cognizance of a court of equitable jurisdiction. When they brought the matter into the supreme court, that court at once acquired jurisdiction to investigate the question. The equitable jurisdiction attaches when it is duly invoked, and continues until the proceedings have ripened into a decree.

The second entitled action was brought by Church to enjoin Becker...