Becker v. Harris
Decision Date | 17 July 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. S-79-248 LKK. |
Parties | Gertrude (Bissonette) BECKER, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Harry M. Marsh, Maureen C. Whelan, Marsh & Marsh, Chico, Cal., for plaintiff.
Herman Sillas, U. S. Atty., Evelyn M. Matteucci, Chief Asst. U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for defendant.
This action to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying a claim for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act was initially referred to Magistrate Esther Mix pursuant to our Local Rules 302 and 305 (See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C)). In due course the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and Magistrate Mix issued proposed findings and recommendations.
Central to the Magistrate's proposed findings is the conclusion that section 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 411(a)(5)(A)) unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of gender. I adopt and affirm Magistrate Mix's proposed findings and recommendations, and reproduce them in Part I of this opinion.1 In Part II of this opinion I consider and reject the Secretary's argument that the constitutionality of section 211(a)(5)(A) should not be reached because an independent statutory ground exists which justifies the denial of benefits. Accordingly, I conclude that section 211(a)(5)(A) is unconstitutional, and remand the action to the Secretary solely for the purpose of determining the extent of plaintiff's entitlement to benefits, an issue not yet reached by the agency.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. She requests a declaration that the provisions of Section 211(a)(5)(A) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A)),2 relating to self-employment income in community property states be declared unconstitutional as creating gender-based discrimination in violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff, who is now almost 69 years of age, filed an application for disability benefits almost eight years ago, at the age of 61. Whether she was disabled has still not been determined, but the issue of her insured status was heard before an administrative law judge in May 1978. The decision of the administrative law judge finding that she lacked insured status became final on February 24, 1979. The administrative law judge found in pertinent part as follows:
Although it is provided by Section 211(a)(5)(A) that in community property states, all income from a business owned and operated by a married woman is deemed, for purposes of Social Security coverage, to belong to her husband unless the wife exercises substantially all management and control, the administrative law judge did not rely on this statute. Instead, he found that plaintiff had no standing to ask the Secretary to award disability benefits to her because she had made a gift to her husband of her self-employment income. The administrative law judge stated:
On February 24, 1979 the Appeals Council acknowledged as correct plaintiff's contention that it is impossible to make a gift of earnings for purposes of Social Security coverage, but nevertheless affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge on the ground that:
under the community property law of California, the income from the business was properly credited to your husband's earning record. For this reason you cannot be found to be self-employed in the years in question (Tr. 4).
The test, under Section 211(a)(5)(A) of the Act, for plaintiff's entitlement to earnings derived from a business in a community property state, is whether or not she exercised substantially all the management or control. Thus the Appeals Council found, at least by implication, that substantially all management and control of the beauty salon was not exercised by plaintiff.
In this action plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that Section 211(a)(5)(A) violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process, in that this section discriminates in the granting of Social Security coverage on the basis of sex. That section provides that in a community property state a wife's entitlement must rest on her exercise of substantially all of the management and control of a jointly operated business. Otherwise, all earnings are treated as belonging to the husband. This exclusion of a wife's community earnings from Social Security coverage is inexplicable on the basis of community property law. No legislative history has been found explaining the rationale of crediting the earnings account of a husband with income earned by his wife in a community property state. However, a bill entitled "Social Security Amendments of 1980," now pending in Congress, proposes abrogation of this section. (See Congressional Record for 2/27/80, H 1374 through 1379).
The Supreme Court held in the case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975), "Mother's insurance benefits" provided by the Social Security Act, which discriminated in the granting of coverage on the basis of sex, violated equal protection and due process rights. In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977), the Court held that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. In that case it was held that different treatment of men and women in the case of a widow and widower constituted invidious discrimination against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses. The Court observed that the only conceivable justification for the classification in that case was the assumption, based on archaic and overbroad generalizations, that it would save governmental time, money, and efforts simply to pay benefits to all widows, rather than to require both sexes to prove dependency. Such general assumptions were held insufficient to justify a gender-based discrimination in the distribution of employment-related benefits.3
The statute challenged herein, Section 211(a)(5)(A), creates a classification that discriminates on the basis of gender. Although it appears on the face of the statute that it was designed to accommodate a state's community property law, there is no contention made herein by the Secretary that any such objective is served. Therefore the question of whether there is a "substantial" or "important" objective is not raised. Even under a minimum rationality standard the statute cannot be upheld.
Counsel for the Secretary argues that Section 211(a)(5)(A) is merely an "eligibility requirement" rather than a classification based on sex, citing Carrasco v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 463 F.Supp. 1287 (D.C.Puerto Rico 1979), the only reported case dealing with this statute. This argument is not explained and seems to have no basis in logic. The Carrasco case was actually decided on the proposition that the plaintiff did not perform any work. In that case plaintiff had suffered from a mental disability during the period of claimed earnings. Apparently the court in that...
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Edwards v. Heckler
...Carrasco v. Secretary of HEW, 628 F.2d 624, 630 (1st Cir.1980); Hester v. Harris, 631 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir.1980); and Becker v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 991, 997 (E.D.Cal.1980). The constitutionality of the statute is no longer in issue because the Attorney General has decided not to seek furthe......
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Edwards v. Heckler
...Carrasco v. Secretary of HEW, 628 F.2d 624, 630 (1st Cir.1980); Hester v. Harris, 631 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir.1980); and Becker v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 991, 997 (E.D.Cal.1980). The constitutionality of the statute is no longer in issue because the Attorney General has decided not to seek furthe......
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Heckler v. Edwards
...Clause. Hester v. Harris, 631 F.2d 53, 55-56 (CA5 1980); Carrasco v. Secretary, 628 F.2d 624, 627-631 (CA1 1980); Becker v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 991, 994-996 (ED Cal.1980). These courts remanded to the Secretary to formulate new standards for crediting self-employment income in community pro......
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Hester v. Harris, 79-2592
...she does substantially all of the work in a community business. (Emphasis added.) A similar conclusion was reached in Becker v. Harris, E.D.Cal., 1980, 493 F.Supp. 991, which held § 411(a)(5)(A) unconstitutional and remanded the case to the Secretary "to determine plaintiff's entitlement to......