Becker v. Oregon

Decision Date26 July 2001
Docket NumberNo. 97CV919.,97CV919.
Citation170 F.Supp.2d 1061
PartiesDennis W. BECKER, Plaintiff, v. State of OREGON, ODOC, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Dennis W. Becker, Beaverton, OR, Pro se.

Jan Peter Londahl, Department of Justice Administration, Salem, OR, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER

HOGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff is a former inmate at the Oregon State Correctional Institution (OSCI). Following several amended complaints and dispositive motions, the following claims remain: Eighth Amendment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983, and Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) claims, based on defendants' alleged failure to provide accessible showers to plaintiff, a below-the-knee amputee, while he was housed in the disciplinary segregation unit (DSU) at OSCI. See third amended complaint, # 89; order limiting claims, # 95; order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment, # 142.

Now before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss (# 190).

I. Summary of Arguments

Defendants argue that: (1) the state entity defendants are immune from suit under the ADA and RA; (2) the individual defendants are not subject to suit under the RA or Title II of the ADA; (3) defendants may not be sued as individuals in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the section 1983 claims alleged against the specifically named individual defendants should be dismissed for failure to state a claim; (5) the section 1983 claims alleged against the Doe defendants should be dismissed; and (6) the section 1983 claims are precluded by the ADA or RA.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) will only be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir.1995). The review is based on the contents of the complaint and all allegations of material fact are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.1992).

A pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.1980). Pro se plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaints to overcome any deficiencies, unless it clearly appears that the deficiencies cannot be overcome by amendment. Id.

III. Discussion
A. Whether defendants State of Oregon, Oregon Department of Corrections, and Oregon State Correctional Institution are immune from suit brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act

The issue before the court is whether states are immune from suits brought under Title II of the ADA and RA. As an initial matter, the court notes that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001), is not controlling here. Although the Supreme Court determined in Garrett that Congress did not validly abrogate immunity under Title I (employment) of the ADA, it expressly refrained from deciding the issue under Title II (public services). Id. 121 S.Ct. at 960 n. 1 ("We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Indeed, although not relied upon for precedential value, in an unpublished opinion, Wroncy v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., 2001 WL 474550, 9 Fed.Appx. 604 (9th Cir.2001) (unpubl.), the Ninth Circuit held that Garrett "does not compel us to reconsider" Title II's abrogation of states' immunity, noting that "Garrett addressed only whether state employees are prohibited from collecting money damages against state employers for violations of Title I of the ADA. The Court, in fact, expressly declined to reach the constitutionality of ADA's Title II." Id. (citing Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir.1999) and Clark v. California 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir.1997)). Accordingly, this court is bound to follow the guidance in Dare, supra, and Clark, supra, holding that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates states' immunity.1

As will be explained below, the court finds that the state defendants are not immune to suits brought under Title II of the ADA and the RA because Congress effectively abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Dare, supra; and Clark, supra.

Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits in federal court if: (1) Congress states unequivocally that it intends to abrogate the states' immunity, and (2) abrogation is pursuant to a valid exercise of Congress's power. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)).

When enacting the ADA, Congress unequivocally stated its intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. "A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution on the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12202.

Likewise, when enacting the RA, Congress unequivocally stated its intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. "A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1).

Congress exercised its power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. "It is the purpose of this chapter to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). Because Congress may not use its Commerce Clause powers to abrogate a states' immunity from suit, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, the court must determine whether the other Constitutional authority cited for the ADA, the Fourteenth Amendment, validly abrogates immunity.

To abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the ADA and the RA must satisfy the "congruence and proportionality" test. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). To satisfy congruence, an act must be passed with the intention of remedying an evil or wrong, using historical experience as a reference point. Id. at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157. To satisfy proportionality, the act must be proportional to the remedial or preventative goal. Id.

With regard to the ADA, Congress expressly found:

[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).

Similarly, with regard to the RA, Congress found that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and public services." 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(5).

Thus, Congress passed the ADA and the RA with the intention of remedying an evil or wrong. See Dare 191 F.3d at 1174; Clark 123 F.3d at 1267. Based on this intention, Title II of the ADA and the RA are congruent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dare, supra; Clark, supra.

To make an act proportional to the remedial or preventative goal, Congress "must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct." Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 666, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999). "Congress's findings were sufficiently extensive and related to the ADA's provisions that the provisions can be understood as responsive to or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Dare, 191 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646, 119 S.Ct. 2199). Further, the Ninth Circuit has determined that "neither [the ADA or RA] provides remedies so sweeping that they exceed the harms that they are designed to redress." Clark, 123 F.3d at 1270. Remedies for Title II of the ADA and the RA are in proportion to, and responsive to prevent unconstitutional behavior and, therefore, a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Congress met the requirements of the congruence and proportionality test. The state defendants are, therefore, not immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The motion to dismiss on this basis is denied.

B. Whether individual defendants are subject to suit under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the RA

Defendants move to dismiss the ADA and RA claims as against the individual defendants, arguing that neither the ADA nor RA provide a cause of action against individual defendants.

1. Individual liability under the ADA

Title II (Public Services) of the ADA provides that "[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation or be denied the benefits of the services,...

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