Beckham v. State

• Decision Date: 06 February 1894
• Citation: 14 So. 859,100 Ala. 15
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: BECKHAM v. STATE.

14 So. 859

100 Ala. 15

BECKHAM v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 6, 1894

Appeal from circuit court, Clarke county; James T. Jones, Judge.

Sandy Beckham was indicted, tried and convicted for the larceny of a hog. Reversed and remanded.

The testimony tended to show that the defendant, in company with one Bradford, went to a swamp in high water, and they together, found two or three hogs, which they carried to their homes; that at the time of taking said hogs, it was understood between the defendant and the said Bradford, that while the hogs did not belong to either of them, they would carry them home, and let it be known in the community that they had them; that this fact was told by said Bradford to one Molton, who had lost a hog, and upon inquiry it was found that the hog which the defendant had was said Molton's. The conversation had between Molton and the defendant is sufficiently stated in the opinion, as are also the rulings of the court which are considered on this appeal.

Wm. L Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARALSON J.

1. The defendant asked the court to charge that "unless the jury believe from the evidence that the felonious intent existed at the time of the taking (of the hog alleged to have been stolen) they must find the defendant not guilty." The charge asked was a proper one in any indictment of the kind, and as applicable to this case, was of especial importance to the prisoner, since there was evidence tending to show, that if he had any intention to steal the hog, such intent was formed after the caption and asportation. 1 Whart Cr. Law, § 883; Spivey v. State, 26 Ala. 90; Rountree v. State, 58 Ala. 381; Grigg v. State Id. 425; Weaver v. State, 77 Ala. 26; Crocheron v. State, 86 Ala. 65, 5 So. 649.

2. The owner of the hog alleged to have been stolen, in his examination as a witness for the state, stated that he asked the defendant about having the hog or shoat and that defendant stated, that he did have an unmarked shoat at his house, but that it did not belong to the witness, but belonged to defendant; that witness then stated to defendant, in the presence of one Cobb, "that it was no use to deny having the shoat; that he had stolen the same, and that he, witness, intended to have said shoat, and also intended to put him, defendant, where the dogs would not bother him;" that witness and said Cobb then took defendant and started to defendant's house, about a mile distant, in search of the hog, and defendant, when about two hundred yards of his house, stated that said hog did belong to the witness, Molton, and that he wanted to buy the same from the witness. This alleged confession, the defendant moved to exclude, upon the ground, that the same was not voluntary, and was made by defendant because of the threat made by the owner of the hog, Molton, that he intended to have said hog, and intended to put defendant "where the dogs would not bother him," and because the said Molton and Cobb had defendant in their possession and custody, since the making of the threat.

3. It would serve no good purpose to here discuss the admissibility of confessions, for we can add nothing which would not be a reiteration of what has, many times, before now been decided. We refer only, to such principles as are applicable to this case. In cases of alleged confession under threat, the controlling inquiry is, whether there had been any threat of such a nature as that from fear of it the prisoner was likely to have told an untruth. If so, the confession should not be admitted. Its exclusion rests on its connection with the inducement; they stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. If it is apparent that no such connection exists, there is no reason for the exclusion of the evidence. Whart. Cr. Ev. § 672; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 219; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 472; Brister v. State, 26...