Nickels v. State
| Decision Date | 01 December 1925 |
| Citation | 90 Fla. 659,106 So. 479 |
| Parties | NICKELS v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Error to Circuit Court, Volusia County; J. J. Dickinson, Judge.
Aubrey Lee Nickels was convicted of rape, and he brings error.
Reversed and a new trial granted.
Syllabus by the Court
An extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence when it is freely and voluntarily made by the accused and is uninfluenced by any threat, promise, fear, hope, or other illegal inducement, even though the accused be under arrest and in prison at the time and such confession be made to the officer having the accused in custody.
Before an extrajudicial confession is admitted in evidence, it should appear prima facie that the confession was uninfluenced by any illegal inducement and was in fact freely and voluntarily made.
The admissibility of an extrajudicial confession is to be determined solely by the trial judge, in the absence of the jury, as a mixed question of law and fact, from a preliminary consideration of the evidence offered by either party bearing upon the circumstances under which the confession was made.
When admitted in evidence, the credibility of a confession is for the jury to determine, but all confessions should be acted upon by both court and jury with great caution.
While the circumstances which constitute improper influences, such as will exclude confessions, create questions of law which may be reviewed by an appellate court, the credibility of the testimony to prove the circumstances, including conflicting testimony, is primarily a question for the trial court, and not reviewable by an appellate court unless the court below has transcended its discretion and a wrong may have been done thereby.
It is not essential to the admissibility in evidence of an extrajudicial confession that it be the spontaneous utterance of the accused. The fact that such confession was obtained by questioning the accused will not alone exclude it, even though some of the questions be leading and assume guilt, if the confession in fact emanates from the free will of the accused and is unaffected by any illegal influence.
When considering a confession obtained by questioning the accused trial courts should exercise great diligence to ascertain whether such questioning was so repeated and persistent and applied under such attending circumstances of intimidation or inequality between the interrogator and the accused as to impair the freedom of will of the latter and thereby amount of compulsion.
In considering the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession the effect as well as the form of any apparent compulsion should be carefully weighed and considered, for a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded, whatever may have been the character of the compulsion.
In a prosecution for crime, the corpus delicti may be proven as well by circumstances as by direct evidence, although the probative deficiencies which sometimes inhere in circumstantial evidence should be borne in mind.
The corpus delicti need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite for the introduction in evidence of a confession of the accused. That degree of proof, though requisite to a conviction, is not a prerequisite to the admission of the confession.
In a prosecution for rape, certain evidence examined and found sufficient to prima facie establish the corpus delicti as a prerequisite to the admission in evidence of a confession of the accused.
In a prosecution for rape, testimony of a physician upon the question of penetration, although desirable, is not indispensable.
Generally it is harmful error to admit evidence of other or collateral crimes independent of and unconnected with the crime for which the defendant is on trial. To this general rule, however, there are several distinct exceptions, amongst which are that such evidence is admissible when it is relevant as a part of the res gestae, or tends to establish the identity of the person committing the crime laid in the indictment, or where it is impossible to give a complete or intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the other crime.
In a prosecution for rape, testimony as to the general reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity is admissible only for the purpose of showing a probability of her consent to the act charged. Such testimony is material only when the defense interposed at the trial involves a claim of present consent by the prosecutrix to the act charged in the indictment.
In a prosecution for rape, evidence of the general reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity does not extend to or affect her general credibility as a witness, nor is it competent as a substitute for or in lieu of testimony as to her general reputation for truth and veracity.
The proper foundation having been previously laid on cross-examination, prior inconsistent statements made by a witness produced by the opposing party relative to matters material to the issues in controversy are admissible in contradiction of his testimony at the trial, unless the witness distinctly admits having made such statements. Such testimony goes to the credibility of the witness.
The foundation for the impeachment of a witness produced by the opposing party is sufficiently laid when the circumstances of the supposed inconsistent statement are so designated that the attention of the witness sought to be discredited is fairly called to the time and place of the supposed statement and the person or persons to whom it was made in such manner that the witness cannot be taken by surprise, but is afforded ample opportunity to refresh his memory and make intelligent answers admitting the inconsistent statements or offering such explanation thereof as he may desire.
James H. Bunch, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.
Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., and J. B. Gaines, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Having been adjudged guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to death, plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, seeks reversal of the judgment by writ of error.
To a previous judgment of conviction and similar sentence which followed a former plea of guilty, a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the circuit judge. On writ of error, the order of the circuit judge denying a writ of error coram nobis was affirmed by this court; but on a rehearing subsequently granted the order was reversed. See Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So. 497, 502, 99 So. 121. A new trial followed, resulting in the judgment of which the defendant now seeks reversal.
The offense of which the defendant was convicted was committed in the city of De Land on December 7, 1921. When attacked, the victim resisted her assailant with the utmost vigor and determination and a violent struggle between them occurred in the bathroom of the victim's home, in which room the actual attack was precipitated and consummated. The testimony indicates that the victim was wearing, among other things, two rings. During the course of the struggle, the assailant forcibly removed one of these rings, but was unable to remove the other, a wedding ring. The struggle continued unabated until unconsciousness on the part of the victim intervened as her assailant was about to consummate his carnal attack upon her. Immediately after the accomplishment of the latter purpose and while the victim lay upon the bathroom floor, her hands bound by a towel, her assailant visited other parts of the house where he procured several other articles of jewelry and personal paraphernalia. After thus occupying himself for about 10 minutes, he returned to the bathroom, where the victim still lay, and after speaking briefly with her there, fled the scene. The perpetrator of the offense escaped apprehension at that time.
On December 12, 1921, the defendant was arrested in Jacksonville as he was leaving a pawnshop, suspicion having attached to him by reason of his possession of the jewelry and other articles taken from the person and home of the victim at the time of the attack upon her. The defendant was lodged in the city jail in Jacksonville, and on December 14, 1921, was visited in his cell there by an attorney at law, an official court reporter, the chief of police, assistant, chief of police, and keeper of the city jail of Jacksonville.
The following colloquy then occurred between the attorney and the defendant, in the presence of the other persons mentioned; the attorney asking the questions, the defendant answering them, as hereinafter indicated, and the official court reporter taking down all that was said by either the said attorney or the defendant. The others present said or did nothing, with the exception of the reporter, who asked the defendant how he spelled his name. At the time, the defendant was under arrest, and suspected of but not yet actually charged with or indicted for the crime above mentioned:
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Cross v. State
... ... 417, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536. As a prerequisite to the ... introduction in evidence of a confession of the accused, the ... corpus delicti need be established only prima facie, though ... its establishment beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to ... support a conviction. Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, ... 106 So. 479; Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So ... 130; Lee v. State (Fla.) 117 So. 699 ... The ... defendant also assails chapter 12022, supra, as being ... contrary to constitutional limitations, state and federal ... Statutes ... of ... ...
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Flowers v. State
...State, 118 Fla. 394, 159 So. 366; Dabney v. State, 119 Fla. 341, 161 So. 380; Harrison v. State, 110 Fla. 420, 148 So. 882; Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479; Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 So. 851; v. State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 So. 176; Sims v. State, 59 Fla. 38, 52 So. 198; Williams ......
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Anthony v. State, 70--457
...it is impossible to give a complete or intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the other crime, Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479; or where it is part of the res gestae, Kennedy v. State, 1939, 140 Fla. 124, 191 So. 193; or where it tends to disprove a d......
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Baker v. Jones
...is impossible to give a complete or intelligent account of the crime charged without referring to the other crime. See Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 S. 479 (1925). Evidence completing the story of the crime on trial is admissible under Florida Statute § 90.402. See Ferrell v. State, 68......