Becking v. Neeley (In re Glendale Lee Becking Trust )
| Decision Date | 24 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Consolidated Nos. SD 37039,SD 37048,SD 37049 |
| Citation | 648 S.W.3d 810 |
| Parties | IN RE: the GLENDALE LEE BECKING TRUST, UNDER DATE OF FEBRUARY 21, 1995 AS AMENDED ON DECEMBER 4, 1997 and the G.L. Becking Trust f/b/o Cynthia Becking Cynthia Becking, Co-Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellant/Respondent, v. Dustin K. Neeley, Co-Trustee, Defendant-Respondent/Cross-Appellant/ and Lana Becking and Coby Ayers, Intervenors-Respondents/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
JOSEPH C. BLANTON, JR, Sikeston, Mo, for Appellant/Respondent.
DOUGLAS R. KENNEDY, Sikeston, Mo, for Respondents/Cross-Appellants.
These consolidated appeals concern a dispute between an estranged mother and son about the proper interpretation of a trust. Their dispute has been litigated in the form of competing petitions for declaratory judgment, motions for summary judgment, and, finally, a trial on all issues not decided by the circuit court's earlier grant of partial summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case with directions.
Appellant/Respondent, Cynthia Becking ("Mother"), is the daughter of Glendale Lee Becking ("Settlor") and the mother of Cross-Appellant/Respondent Dustin K. Neeley ("Son"), Settlor's grandson. Son left Mother's home at the age of 13 to live with Settlor and his wife. Intervenor/Cross-Appellant Lana Becking ("Sister") is Settlor's other daughter, Mother's sister. Intervenor/Cross-Appellant Coby Ayers is Sister's son ("Nephew").
On February 21, 1995, Settlor executed the "Trust Agreement of [Settlor]" ("Settlor's Trust") for the benefit of Settlor and his wife. Settlor later amended that document in December 1997 (as amended, "the Trust Agreement").1 Settlor's wife was no longer living when Settlor died in 2003. Upon Settlor's death, the Trust Agreement automatically created two new trusts, one for the benefit of each of Settlor's daughters, and all of the assets in Settlor's trust were equally divided and transferred into those new trusts. One of them, the "[Settlor] Trust for the benefit of [Mother]" ("Mother's trust"), is the trust at issue in this appeal.
The Trust Agreement named Sister and Mother, along with Settlor's grandsons, Son and Nephew, as co-trustees of Settlor's trust, and Son and Nephew were also automatically added as co-trustees of Mother's trust when Settlor died. The Trust Agreement provided that a majority of the co-trustees could perform any act authorized by the Trust Agreement.
After Settlor's death, Sister and Nephew declined to serve as trustees of Mother's trust, leaving Son and Mother as its only trustees. Mother and Son subsequently appointed Edward Riley as a third trustee, and Mr. Riley served in that position for some time before resigning.
After Mr. Riley resigned, Mother, acting alone, purported to appoint a new trustee, John A. Clark ("Mr. Clark"), without Son's agreement. Son believed that Mother was not eligible, on her own, to appoint a trustee, and he believed that her unilateral attempt to do so was void. Son believed that the Trust Agreement reserved the power to appoint a new trustee for Mother's trust to a majority vote of Mother, Son, Sister, and Nephew – not to Mother alone.
After Son objected to the appointment of Mr. Clark, Mother and Mr. Clark filed a petition for declaratory judgment that asked the circuit court to declare legal answers to the following questions:
When Mr. Clark resigned as a purported co-trustee, Mother purported to appoint Darlene O. Young ("Ms. Young") as a co-trustee of Mother's trust. Son also opposed that purported appointment.
When Mother attempted to increase the distributions from her trust from $1,000 per month to $2,500 per month -- with the increase to be taken from trust principal -- Son disputed her ability to invade trust principal for anything other than extraordinary medical expenses.2
Mother and Ms. Young then filed an amended petition for declaratory judgment that requested the following:
Son brought a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that: (1) Mother is entitled to receive distributions of principal only for her extraordinary medical expenses; and (2) Mother's purported appointment of Ms. Young as the third trustee was void. Son also asked the circuit court to award him legal fees and appoint an independently-selected third trustee.
Shortly thereafter, Mother and Son filed competing motions for summary judgment for the relief requested in their respective petitions for declaratory judgment. In regard to the only relief awarded by the circuit court, Son's motion asserted that the provisions of the Trust Agreement limited Mother to distributions of trust income, and Settlor did not intend for Mother to be able to use principal to pay for anything other than her extraordinary medical expenses. Mother asserted that the Trust Agreement permitted an invasion of trust principal to pay for her general welfare in addition to her extraordinary medical expenses.
The circuit court denied Mother's motion in full and granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Son that declared:
The Trustees shall pay to said Beneficiary [(Mother)] all of the net income from [Mother's trust]. In addition, the Trustees shall pay from time to time such amounts of principal as they deem proper for extraordinary medical expenses to be determined at the sole and absolute discretion of the Trustees.[4 ]
Ms. Young then refused to continue as the purported third trustee, and Mother filed a second amended petition that requested the appointment of James Dow ("Mr. Dow") as a third co-trustee or, in the alternative, that the circuit court appoint a third trustee.
Sister and Nephew (collectively, "Intervenors") were allowed to intervene in the suit on the ground that they were eligible to receive trust assets upon the death of Mother and Son. The parties’ remaining disputes -- whether the current trustees should continue, whether the appointment of a new trustee was appropriate, and whether legal costs should be paid from "the Trust funds" -- were then tried by the circuit court.
Mother provided the following testimony. She and Son were the current co-trustees of Mother's trust, but they have a strained relationship, and Son was hostile toward her. Mother met with Son to discuss repairs to her house, and because he had refused to allow Mother's trust to pay for those repairs, Mother wanted a third co-trustee to serve as a tiebreaker that might allow her to use trust assets to pay for repairs and other household expenses. Mother wanted to appoint Mr. Dow, a "friend from a friend[,]" to act as the third co-trustee.6 Mother also wanted Son removed as co-trustee because she felt that he had not worked with her in regard to her trust, and she did not believe that he had her best interests in mind. Mother also confirmed that all of the income earned by Mother's trust had been promptly paid to her, and she acknowledged that if Mother's trust paid her out of its principal balance, it would result in a decrease in the income that the trust would generate. Mother also admitted that although she had claimed that Son had instructed Edward Jones to ignore Mother, those statements were false, and she had not found any evidence to support her allegation.
Son testified that he had told Mother that he was willing to pay for her household repairs out of his own pocket, but Mother's trust could not pay for them using principal because the Trust Agreement did not allow it, and doing so would decrease Mother's future income from the trust. Son testified that he was hesitant about the appointment of a third trustee because that person would be entitled to payment from Mother's trust, and he did not believe that a third trustee was necessary. Further, Son believed that he, Nephew, and Sister were the persons entitled to make the decision on whom, if anyone, would be appointed as an additional trustee.
Charlie Flannigan ("Mr. Flannigan"), a financial advisor at Edward Jones, handled the account for Settlor's trust, and now handles Mother's trust account. Mr. Flannigan testified that he had received instructions from both Mother and Son regarding investments and paying out income, and that neither had ever asked him to do anything that he would consider unusual or antagonistic.
Following the trial, the court entered an amended judgment that incorporated the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Son and contained the following declarations:
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Malin v. Mo. Ass'n of Cmty. Task Forces
...need only consult what was properly put before it by way of Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses." In re Glendale Lee Becking Tr., 648 S.W.3d 810, 817 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (quoting Green, 606 S.W.3d at 121). "[A]rguments . . . that are completely disconnected from the numbered paragraph m......