Beckman v. Beckman, s. 36985
| Decision Date | 17 August 1976 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 36985,37244,s. 36985 |
| Citation | 545 S.W.2d 300 |
| Parties | Anna M. BECKMAN, Respondent, v. James R. BECKMAN, Appellant. . Louis District, Division Two |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Wiseman, Shaikewitz, McGivern & Wahl, Richard Shaikewitz, Alton, for petitioner-appellant.
Shifrin, Treiman, Bamburg & Dempsey, Richard B. Dempsey, St. Louis, for respondent-appellee.
Cross appeals on monetary issues in a dissolution of marriage action.
Anna M. Beckman, petitioner, sued James R. Beckman, respondent, alleging their 29-year marriage was broken because he had mistreated her, committed adultery, drank to excess and been abusive. Respondent denied none of these allegations. The trial court dissolved the marriage, denied maintenance, divided the marital property and allowed attorney fees to the petitioner.
The major item of marital property was the respondent's 330 shares of stock in a 1,320-share family corporation operating a large farm. As hereafter detailed, the trial court valued the 330 shares at $248,000 and divided it by ordering respondent to pay petitioner $1,000 a month for 124 months. Both parties challenge that division, contending generally the court 'abused its discretion.' Throughout this opinion we bear in mind the definition of that repeated phrase: "An abuse of discretion is an erroneous finding and judgment which is clearly contrary to the facts and circumstances before the court--a judicial act which is untenable and clearly against reason and which works an injustice." State v. Letourneau, 515 S.W.2d 838(6) (Mo.App.1974).
The key issue concerns respondent's one-fourth of the shares of stock in the farming corporations. The principal corporate assets are the 1,200-acre farm and the equipment used to operate it. The trial court treated respondent's corporate stock as being worth one-fourth the value of the corporate assets. Petitioner introduced expert testimony that the farm with its improvements was worth $1,180,900; cattle on the farm, $35,515; farm equipment, $159,500.
Challenging the trial court's valuation of respondent's stock based on corporate net worth, petitioner argues the court should have valued the stock separately and intrinsically. She argues that one of the several accepted technical valuation methods should have been used to establish the value of the 330 shares of corporate stock, such as book value, par value, and capitalized earnings, among other methods. Petitioner, however, does not explain why the court should have been confined to one of these technical methods.
The trial court determined the value of respondent's 330 shares of corporate stock to be equal to one-fourth the value of the corporation's assets. This valuation may not have accorded with the technical methods of valuation urged by petitioner, but we cannot say it 'is clearly contrary to the facts or the logical deductions from the facts and circumstances before the court.' We hold this division was proper to a fair distribution of the marital property and that there was no abuse of discretion.
Petitioner next contends the trial court should have awarded her interest on the $124,000 respondent is to pay her in $1,000 monthly instllments. She argues that the value of her interest is decreased by payment over a long period of time and that respondent will have the use of her share of the property without compensation to her. One of the factors the trial court could have considered in dividing the marital property is 'the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective.' Section 452.330.1(3), RSMo. The court was mindful of the necessity of sustaining the respondent's farming operation in decreeing this deferred payment plan. This was a proper factor to have considered in devising the plan and in calculating the total amount of payments. We hold the trial court's disposition of property through this installment method was not unreasonable in light of the parties' economic circumstances.
Respondent's fault. Petitioner next contends the trial court erred by dividing the marital property by halves because respondent was solely at fault in bringing about the dissolution. This division was improper, she argues, because the Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Act rejected a 'no fault' approach by making 'the conduct of parties during the marriage' a factor to be considered in dividing the marital property. Section 452.330,...
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