Becknell v. State

• Decision Date: 02 November 1904
• Citation: 82 S.W. 1039
• Parties: BECKNELL v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

82 S.W. 1039

BECKNELL v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

November 2, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Grayson County; J. M. Pearson, Judge.

Maggie Becknell was convicted of murder, and she appeals. Affirmed.

C. L. Vowell, for appellant. Howard Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROOKS, J.

Appellant was convicted of the murder of her own child, her punishment being assessed at 17 years' confinement in the penitentiary.

The first ground of the motion for new trial insists that the court erred in failing to give special charges requested, Nos. 3 and 4. Said charges, so far as applicable, were given in the main charge of the court, and there was no error in refusing them.

She also complains in the motion for new trial of the failure of the court to present to the jury in plain and direct language all matters of defense raised by the testimony, and insists the court erred in not presenting at all in an affirmative manner any defense, when there was testimony introduced by the state tending to prove that the infant died from natural causes, and tending to prove the infant fell into the well accidentally. These issues were properly charged upon by the court.

Appellant complains in motion for new trial of the following portion of the court's charge: "Do the facts and circumstances of the case at the time of the killing, and before and after that time, having connection with or relation to it, furnish satisfactory evidence of a sedate and deliberate mind on the part of the person killing, at the time he or she does the act?" The objection is because there was evidence tending to show that, if said infant met a violent death, either defendant or one Bud Watson killed it, and the above charge was calculated to lead the jury to believe that defendant might be responsible for the acts of said Watson. Taking the charge as a whole, we do not think it is subject to this criticism. The court properly presented the law applicable to the death of the child at the hands of Watson or defendant.

The fourth ground of the motion complains that the court, in giving a charge on circumstantial evidence, "deprived defendant of said charge by adding this clause, to wit, `unless you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with some other person in committing the offense.'" In this connection, appellant "insists there was no positive evidence of defendant's guilt, and she was entitled to a clear-cut and plain charge on circumstantial evidence; and because there was no proof that defendant acted with any one in the commission of any offense; and said charge was highly calculated to confuse the jury and lead them to believe the court thought defendant was acting with some one else. If she was, she was not...