Beckwith v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 24 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:99-CV-413BN.,3:99-CV-413BN.
• Citation: 89 F.Supp.2d 788
• Parties: Byron De La BECKWITH, VI, Petitioner, v. James V. ANDERSON, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, and the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

Page 788

89 F.Supp.2d 788

Byron De La BECKWITH, VI, Petitioner, v. James V. ANDERSON, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, and the Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, Respondents.

No. 3:99-CV-413BN.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

February 24, 2000.

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Merrida P. Coxwell, Jr., Charles Richard Mullins, Coxwell & Associates, PLLC, Jackson, MS, for plaintiff.

Jo Anne McFarland McLeod, Jerrolyn M. Owens, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, MS, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BARBOUR, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on Petition Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioner Byron De La Beckwith, who is in state court custody under a sentence of life imprisonment. Having considered the Petition, Answer, all attachments to each, and supporting and opposing authority, the Court finds that the Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief is not well taken and should be denied.

In the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief, Beckwith requested the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, and requested authorization to conduct additional discovery. In a letter to the Court dated December 7, 1999, counsel for Beckwith withdrew these requests.¹ Therefore, the request for an evidentiary hearing and the request for additional discovery are denied as moot.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

This Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief (hereinafter "Petition") arises out of the conviction and subsequent life sentence of Petitioner Byron De La Beckwith for the murder of civil rights leader Medgar Evers. Evers was the first Field Secretary for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the State of Mississippi. Evers was murdered at his home in Jackson, Mississippi on June 12, 1963. Beckwith, a self-avowed white supremacist and pro-segregationist, was arrested and charged with the murder of Evers on June 23, 1963. The Hinds County grand jury indicted Beckwith with Evers' murder during its July, 1963, term.

In 1964, Beckwith stood trial for the murder of Evers on two occasions. The first trial took place in February, 1964, and the second trial occurred in April, 1964. Because of hung juries, both trials resulted in mistrials. Following the second trial, Beckwith was released on $10,000.00 bond. On March 10, 1969, the district attorney in charge of Beckwith's case moved the court to enter a nolle prosequi² of the indictment. On the same day, the three circuit judges of the Seventh Circuit Court District signed and entered an order granting a nolle prosequi. No objection was raised by the defense to entry of the nolle prosequi. Some time after his release from custody, Beckwith moved from Mississippi to Tennessee.

Although the murder of Medgar Evers received considerable attention over the years, no effort was made by the State of Mississippi to re-initiate criminal proceedings against Beckwith until 1990. During the December, 1990, term of the Hinds County grand jury, Beckwith was again indicted for the murder of Evers. Following an extradition contest in the Tennessee court system, Beckwith was extradited to Mississippi. Beckwith's request for bail was denied. The circuit court's denial of bail was affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court on March 25, 1992.

In April, 1992, Beckwith moved the circuit court for dismissal of the indictment. The motion for dismissal cited three constitutional grounds, namely (1) denial of the right to a speedy trial, (2) denial of due process rights, and (3) double jeopardy. Beckwith's motion for dismissal was denied on August 4, 1992. Beckwith then petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted on August 26, 1992. Beckwith v. State, 615 So.2d 1134 (Miss.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S.Ct. 232, 126 L.Ed.2d 187 (1993) (hereinafter "Beckwith I"). In Beckwith I, the court dismissed without prejudice Beckwith's interlocutory appeal as to his speedy trial and due process claims, holding essentially that those claims were premature but could be raised again on appeal in the event of Beckwith's conviction. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Beckwith's double jeopardy claim. The case proceeded to jury trial in 1994, resulting in Beckwith's conviction for the murder of Evers. Beckwith was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Feeling aggrieved by the jury's verdict, Beckwith again appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.³ Byron De La Beckwith, VI v. State, 707 So.2d 547 (Miss.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 880, 119 S.Ct. 187, 142 L.Ed.2d 153 (1998) (hereinafter "Beckwith II"). Affirming the trial court's verdict, the Mississippi Supreme Court held:

1) Beckwith's due process rights were not violated by the 26 year delay between the second mistrial in 1964 and the second indictment in 1990;

2) Racist letters indicating Beckwith's involvement in the Ku Klux Klan were relevant to establish motive;

3) The circuit court's refusal to allow trial testimony from the second 1964 trial to be read into evidence during the 1994 trial did not constitute error;

4) Impeachment of witnesses through use of grand jury testimony did not constitute error;

5) Admission of photographs of Evers' body in its casket did not constitute undue prejudice; and

6) Transfer of venue for jury selection based on racial demographics did not violate Beckwith's right to an impartial jury or right to equal protection.

See Beckwith II, 707 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1997).

Having exhausted all state court remedies, Beckwith petitioned this Court for habeas corpus relief. The Petition, which seeks relief from Beckwith's conviction and life sentence, was filed on June 15, 1999. The following three grounds for habeas corpus relief are stated in the Petition. The grounds are:

1) Violation of Beckwith's Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution to a speedy trial caused by the 26 year delay which began in 1964 and ended with Beckwith's reindictment in 1990;⁴

2) Violation of Beckwith's Fifth Amendment due process right under the United States Constitution to a speedy trial because the State waited 26 years to put him to trial.⁵ The 26 year delay allegedly crippled Beckwith's defense due to the deaths of witnesses, Beckwith's loss of memory and the loss of evidence; and

3) Violation of Beckwith's right to a fair trial and right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, and violation of Beckwith's compulsory process rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.⁶ These constitutional claims arise from alleged discovery violations relating to five witnesses who either testified in Beckwith's 1994 trial, or were prohibited from testifying by the trial court.

II. Analysis

A. Applicable Law / Standard of Review

Beckwith brings this Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which states in relevant part:

(a) [A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus ... pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus ... pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA], Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 12144, amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to include the contents § 2254(d). AEDPA became effective on April 26, 1996, the date on which President Clinton signed the act.⁷ Under AEDPA, pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under subsection (d)(1), whereas questions of fact are reviewed under subsection (d)(2). Corwin v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997)). When reviewing a purely legal question, a federal court may grant habeas relief "only if it determines that a state court's decision rested on a legal determination that was `contrary to ... clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.'" Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54, 57 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1123, 117 S.Ct. 2518, 138 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1997) (citing Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 768, implicitly overruled on other grounds by Lindh, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481)).

"Under the AEDPA deference scheme, a federal court will not disturb a state court's application of law to facts unless the state court's conclusions involved an `unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court." Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 812 (5th Cir.1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) (other citations omitted). For a state court's application of federal law to be "unreasonable," it must be "so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists." Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 418 (5th Cir.19...