Beckwith v. Hart, CIV.A. WMN-02-3733.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. WMN-02-3733.,CIV.A. WMN-02-3733.
• Citation: 263 F.Supp.2d 1018
• Parties: Richard L. BECKWITH Plaintiff v. Tammie J. HART, et al. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

263 F.Supp.2d 1018

Richard L. BECKWITH Plaintiff v. Tammie J. HART, et al. Defendants

No. CIV.A. WMN-02-3733.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

March 12, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas M. DiBiagio, Baltimore, MD, Michael A. DiPietro, Allen F. Loucks, Office of U.S. Atty., Baltimore, MD, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM

NICKERSON, District Judge.

On July 2, 2002 the above captioned complaint was filed in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, alleging that Defendant Hart had defamed Plaintiffs character. Paper No. 2. Subsequently, the action was removed to this Court because it is a claim made pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Paper No. 1. Currently pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. Paper No. 15. Although Plaintiff was notified by this Court that the Defendants had filed a dispositive motion which, if granted could result in the dismissal of his complaint, and he was notified of the need for his response thereto, he has failed to file a timely response. See Paper No. 16. Plaintiff contacted this Court by way of Motion for Indeterminate Extension of Time in this matter and was provided with an additional period of time within which to file his summary judgment response. See Paper No. 18. To date, there has been no response filed by Plaintiff and this case is now ripe for dispositive review.

In his complaint Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Hart "slander and libel plaintiff per se on numerous occasions by publishing statements, which defendant either knew, or should have known, were not true". Paper No. 2 at p. 1. He further alleges that Ms. Hart's statements "injure[d] plaintiffs standing and reputation further negligently, recklessly, and/or intentionally inflicting emotional distress and suffering upon the plaintiff." Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Hart referred to him as a liar and a vexatious litigant with a morally deviant character. Id. Mr. Beckwith seeks damages in the amount of $70,000 in addition to any punitive damages "to be fixed by jury". Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint which, although received by Counsel for defendants was never received in this Court. A copy of the amended complaint has been provided to the Court by Counsel and has now been docketed in the case. See Paper No. 19. In the amended complaint Plaintiff adds that "Defendant Hart struck the person of Plaintiff with an object, causing injury thereby to the person of Plaintiff." Id. at p. 2. He alleges that, in addition to Ms. Hart, three other prison employees witnessed the assault on Plaintiff and failed to obtain medical attention for Plaintiff. Id. He adds that Defendant Hart acted out of retaliation against him for litigation. Id. He claims that the use of force by Ms. Hart violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment; that his First Amendment rights were infringed; and that Defendants Holler, Giarth and Navalaney negligently failed to protect him from injury. Id.

Motion to Dismiss

Under the FTCA, the United States is liable, as a private person, for "injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting under the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994). As a waiver of sovereign immunity, the FTCA is to be narrowly construed. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992). Immunity is not waived for any claim based upon "the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d). Specifically exempted from the FTCA are claims alleging libel and slander. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also Talbert v. United States, 932 F.2d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.1991)(Federal employee's claim for negligent record keeping is barred by the libel and slander exemption of the FTCA). Plaintiffs claim against Ms. Hart for libel and slander must therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss shall be granted on this claim.

Motion for Summary Judgment

"[S]ummary judgment should be granted in those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not necessary to clarify the application of the law." Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sim, 6 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.... Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial" summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The facts in this case are not disputed. Although the complaint does not specify the particular events giving rise to this action, Defendants have explained the events occurring on the dates mentioned in the complaint and the amended complaint. See Paper No. 15 at pp. 3-6. As explained by Defendants:

On July 10, 2002, Ms. Hart, Mr. Giarth and Mr. Navalaney were conducting a team meeting in the A-Unit conference room at FCI, Cumberland. At approximately 1:40 p.m. that afternoon, Mr. Holler interrupted the meeting to tell Ms. Hart that inmate Beckwith wanted multiple Request for Administrative Remedy forms. Ms. Hart instructed Mr. Beckwith to enter the conference room to explain what he wanted. A brief discussion regarding whether inmate Beckwith had received responses to informal administrative remedy requests that are filed with staff before the formal administrative remedies are filed ensued, and Ms. Hart eventually instructed inmate Beckwith to leave the conference room so that the team could conclude the meeting.

After leaving the conference room, inmate Beckwith re-opened the conference room door and entered the room without knocking and without permission from a correctional officer or other staff. Ms. Hart instructed inmate Beckwith to leave the room and not to enter again without knocking. As Ms. Hart attempted to shut the conference room door, inmate Beckwith prevented her from doing so by placing his foot against the door. Ms. Hart asked inmate Beckwith to move his foot so that she could close the door and he complied. Inmate Beckwith did not inform Ms. Hart, Mr. Holler, Mr. Giarth or Mr. Navalaney that he was injured or in need of medical attention.

At approximately 2:05 p.m. on July 10, 2002, inmate Beckwith informed Senior Officer W. Whitaker that his foot had been struck by a door.... Officer Whitaker notified health services regarding inmate Beckwith's situation and released inmate Beckwith from the unit to go to health services.

Id. at pp. 5-6 (internal citations omitted). Upon being examined by the prison medical staff, which included an x-ray of his foot, it was determined that Plaintiff had not suffered an injury as a result of the events taking place on July 10, 2002. See Id. at Ex. B.

Negligence Claims

Other than his original libel and slander claims which are subject to dismissal, Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Hart was negligent when she hit him with the door. Paper No. 19 at p. 2. In addition he complains that Giarth, Holler and Navalaney were negligent by failing to prevent Defendant Hart from hitting him with the door; and that all named defendants were negligent in failing to obtain medical care for him. Id. To prevail on these claims Plaintiff must establish that his injuries were "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). In this case, Maryland law must be examined to determine if Plaintiff can make out a claim of negligence. Under Maryland law, "[t]he basic elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty or obligation under which the defendant is to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) actual loss or injury to the plaintiff proximately resulting from the breach." Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 714, 697 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1997). In applying these elements it is clear that Plaintiffs negligence claims must fail.

Plaintiff can not establish that any of the defendants breached the duty of care owed to him. As Federal Bureau of Prison employees, Defendants have a general duty to exercise ordinary diligence to keep inmates safe and free from harm. Cowart v. United States, 617 F.2d 112, 116 (5th Cir.1980) see also 18 U.S.C. § 4042. That duty does not encompass the notion that every injury, of any degree that befalls a federal prisoner is compensable under the FTCA. See Flechsig v. United States, 786 F.Supp. 646, 650 (E.D.Ky. 1991), aff'd 991 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.1993). When Defendant Hart closed the door she had no reason to believe that Plaintiff would in any way be harmed; it is not an act of negligence to close a door. Likewise, the failure of Giarth, Holler and Navalaney to rally to Mr. Beckwith's defense was not negligence. The inquiry in this case must focus on what is reasonable or foreseeable under the...