Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc.
| Citation | 6 F.3d 211 |
| Decision Date | 04 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1286,93-1286 |
| Parties | 63 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 207, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,570, 62 USLW 2323 Paula HAAVISTOLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMUNITY FIRE COMPANY OF RISING SUN, INC.; Richard G. Ayers; Kimberly Baeder; Raymond Blakely; Betty Cameron; Wesley F. Cameron; Samuel H. Coale; William Ewing; Charles R. Goodie; Howard Goodie; William Haines; Wayne L. Ingerson; Jeffrey Kennerd; Harold Montgomery, Jr.; Gary R. Moore; Kenneth E. Morris; Jimmy G. Puffenbarger; Carl Rickenboch; Carol Tichnell; Donald K. Wehry; Carl D. Wiggins; Tamra Wiggins; Herrel Curry, Defendants-Appellees, and Michael Smith; Philip Smith; Wade Wiley, individually and in their capacity as Members of the Board of Directors of Community Fire Company of Rising Sun, Inc.; Kenneth E. Truitt, Defendants. Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Incorporated; Women's Law Center, Inc., Amici Curiae. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Awilda Rose Marques, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, argued (George A. Nilson, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, Susan K. Goering, Deborah A. Jeon, ACLU of Maryland, Centerville, MD, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Roger Norman Powell, John Paul Rufe, Baltimore, MD, for defendants-appellees.
S. William Livingston, Jr., Alan A. Pemberton, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for amici curiae.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Paula Haavistola brought an action against Community Fire Company of Rising Sun, Inc. ("Fire Company"), alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"). The district court granted summary judgment for the Fire Company on grounds that the Fire Company was not a state actor for the purposes of section 1983 and that Haavistola was not an employee covered by Title VII. Haavistola appeals the grant of summary judgment on both claims. Finding summary judgment to be an inappropriate juncture at which to resolve these complex issues, we reverse.
This suit stems from an occurrence on March 24, 1990, during which Haavistola claims she was sexually assaulted by Kenneth Truitt. At the time of the alleged assault, Haavistola and Truitt were volunteers at the Fire Company. The Fire Company is a privately-formed Maryland corporation that provides firefighting, emergency medical/paramedic, and rescue services to Rising Sun, Maryland and the surrounding area.
Haavistola promptly reported the alleged assault to Assistant Fire Chief Carl Rickenboch, who advised her to present her complaint to the Fire Company's Board of Directors at their next scheduled meeting. Haavistola appeared before the Board and detailed her allegations against Truitt. The Board asked Haavistola to confront Truitt with the charges, and after she agreed to do so, Truitt was brought into the meeting. Haavistola was asked to leave the meeting so the Board could question Truitt. The Board then asked Haavistola to return and make her charges against Truitt. Truitt summarily denied all of Haavistola's allegations. Following a brief deliberation outside the presence of Haavistola and Truitt, the Board voted to suspend both parties indefinitely from membership in the Fire Company.
Subsequent to her suspension, Haavistola filed a criminal complaint against Truitt in state court. Truitt ultimately was cleared of the charges and reinstated as a member in good standing with the Fire Company. The Fire Company refused to reinstate Haavistola. On April 25, 1990, Haavistola filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was deferred to the Maryland Commission on Human Relations. Then, on June 18, 1990, Haavistola brought this action against the Fire Company, alleging that its refusal to reinstate her represented discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e-2(a), -3(a).
The Fire Company filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was not a state actor covered by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and that it did not share an employer/employee relationship with Haavistola and thereby was excluded from coverage under Title VII. The district court granted the motion on both grounds, and Haavistola appeals.
We first summarize the legal standard by which we review the district court's grant of summary judgment. Our review is de novo and, therefore, we are constrained to review the record under the same standard by which the district court was bound. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (4th Cir.1987). Summary judgment is appropriate in those cases in which there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir.1992). In other words, summary judgment should be granted in those cases in which it is perfectly clear that no genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved and inquiry into the facts is unnecessary to clarify the application of the law. McKinney, 955 F.2d at 928; Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979). In making our determination under this standard, we must draw all permissible inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356-57, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); McKinney, 955 F.2d at 928.
Turning to the merits of this appeal, we must decide whether the record conclusively establishes on the basis of uncontroverted facts that (1) the Fire Company is not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and (2) Haavistola and the Fire Company did not share an employee/employer relationship governed by Title VII.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provides, in relevant part, that:
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
To establish a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory."
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (quoting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983). In cases construing section 1983, "under color" of law has been treated consistently as equivalent to the requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2769, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982).
In this case the Fire Company asserted and the district court agreed that the Fire Company did not act with the requisite state action to establish the second element needed to make out a successful claim under section 1983. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 812 F.Supp. 1379, 1390-1400 (D.Md.1993). The issue for our review is whether the Fire Company, a private corporation organized under the laws of Maryland, funded to some extent through state and local resources, and regulated extensively by the State of Maryland, acted under color of state law when it permanently suspended Haavistola from its membership. "Concededly, the defendant [is a] private part[y] and, therefore, the 'question is whether [its] conduct has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it "state" action....' " Alcena v. Raine, 692 F.Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2785, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)).
The Supreme Court has identified three situations in which particular conduct by a private entity constitutes "state action." The first situation is the symbiotic relationship and occurs when there is
a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity such that those actions may be fairly treated as those of the state; the inquiry is whether the state is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.
Alcena, 692 F.Supp. at 267 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. at 2785-86). The second situation involves extensive governmental regulation of a private entity: "a state may be held responsible for private conduct only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement that the action must in law be deemed to be that of the state." Id. (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. at 2786). The final situation occurs when "the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state." Id. (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. at 2786). Relevant to all three situations is the level of governmental funding the private entity receives, although "[r]eceipt of state funds [alone] is ... insufficient to transform ... private actions into state actions." Id.
Haavistola clearly failed to establish that the Fire Company acted under color of state law by means of a symbiotic relationship or excessive regulation. The Supreme Court has limited the symbiotic...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Talley v. Cnty. of Fresno
...Appeals, including the Second Circuit ( O'Connor, supra , 126 F.3d at pp. 115–116 ); Fourth Circuit ( Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. (4th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3d 211, 219–222 ( Haavistola )); Fifth Circuit ( Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5 (5th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 431, 439 ( Juino )......
-
Davis v. Hudgins
...violations occurred. Conduct by a private entity may constitute "state action" in three types of situations. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir.1993). The first situation occurs when "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of ......
-
Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n
...of evidence that an official renders services to PIAA in return for benefits distinguishes this case from Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 221-22 (4th Cir.1993). In Haavistola, the issue was whether insurance and other benefits were "indirect but significant remuneration [for p......
-
Krause v. Cherry Hill Fire Dist. 13
...clear how the absence of an employment application, demonstrates the absence of an employment relationship. See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 222 (4th Cir.1993) (district court erred in concluding that "because [the plaintiff] was not conscripted into service with the Fire C......
-
Volunteers Enter the Schoolhouse Gate
...Law-Statutory Protection for Volunteers Against Discrimination, 11 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93 (1989). But see Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 222 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that in the event a volunteer receives "indirect but significant remuneration" in exchange for services, the v......
-
When a Volunteer Becomes an Employee: the Fifth Circuit Incorrectly Determined That a Volunteer Is Not an Employee Within the Standards of Title Vii
...benefits for dependents, scholarships for dependents upon death or disability, group life insurance, and several other benefits."). 117. 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). 119. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc. (Haavistola II), 6 F.3d 211, 222 (4th Cir. 199......