Becnel v. Lamorak Ins. Co.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-14536 |
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Parties | JAMES BECNEL ET AL v. LAMORAK INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
SECTION “B” (5)
Before the Court are Defendant National Automotive Parts Association LLC's (“NAPA”) motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 360), Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion (Rec. Doc. 521), Defendant Huntington Ingalls Incorporated's (“Avondale”) opposition to NAPA's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc 527), and NAPA's reply in support (Rec. Doc. 597). For the following reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
The facts of this case have been laid out in greater detail in previously issued Orders and Reasons and are adopted by reference herein.
On September 12, 2019, National Auto Parts Association (“NAPA”) filed a Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction in state court prior to this matter being removed. See Rec. Doc. 360-3 (NAPA Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction). The Exception was overruled. See Rec. Doc. 360-4 (Judgment on NAPA Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction).
On April 26, 2022, NAPA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting similar, if not identical, arguments from its previously denied declinatory exception. Rec. Doc. 360-1. Plaintiff filed an opposition to NAPA's motion on May 17 2022. Rec. Doc. 521. On May 17, 2022, Defendant Avondale also filed an opposition to NAPA's motion for summary judgment. Rec. Doc. 527. Subsequently, on May 25, 2022, NAPA filed a reply to both Plaintiff and Avondale's oppositions. Rec. Doc. 597.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As such, the court should view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixon Bros. Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006).
When the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, who must show by “competent summary judgment evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618. However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Arcturus Corp., 912 F.3d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 2019).
NAPA contends its motion for summary judgment should be granted because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 360. NAPA cites the Louisiana Long-Arm statute, an affidavit from a corporate witness, as well as several cases in support of its claim. NAPA's main assertion is it lacks sufficient contacts with the state of Louisiana to justify this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs rebut NAPA's argument that it did not transact business in the state and assert that it is indeed a manufacturer under Louisiana law and has conducted sufficient business transactions within Louisiana to be hauled into court in this state.
In two seminal decisions, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2847, 2853-54 (2011), and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 757 (2014), the United States Supreme Court held that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a corporation is justified when the corporation is either incorporated in the forum state or has its principal place of business there. The decisions in Daimler and Goodyear also apply equally to limited liability corporations. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 ()
Here, defendant NAPA is a limited liability company with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Rec. Doc. 360. Thus, NAPA is a citizen of Atlanta and its place of incorporation. NAPA was not incorporated in Louisiana, nor does it have any corporate offices in this state. Therefore, this corporation is not at home in Louisiana for this Court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over this defendant. Given NAPA is a nonresident defendant, the Court must go further to determine whether we can nevertheless exercise personal jurisdiction over it as a non-resident defendant.
A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when: (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gross v. RSJ Int'l, LLC, No. CIV.A. 11-73, 2012 WL 729955 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999)). Because Louisiana's long-arm statute, La. R.S. § 13:3201, et seq., extends jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court's focus is solely on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (citing La. R.S. § 13:3201(B)).
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts” with that state, and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). This Circuit follows a three-step analysis for specific jurisdiction. Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir.2006).
First, the Court must determine “whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there.” Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th Cir.2000). Second, the Court considers “whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related contacts.” First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd. of People's Republic of China, 858 F.Supp.2d 658 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. First Inv. Corp. of Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2012), as revised (Jan. 17, 2013). The proper focus of the personal jurisdiction analysis is on the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir.2008). Lastly, “[i]f the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that its exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable.” Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985)).
Here, Plaintiffs and Avondale have offered substantial evidence that NAPA's activity satisfies the requirement of minimum contacts with Louisiana. Plaintiffs point to the deposition testimony of the decedent who testified that while working in the Becnel Garage from 1958 to 1963, and again from 1967 to 2008, he obtained replacement parts, and specifically Rayloc brakes, from Pope's Parts in Thibodeaux, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 521-6 (Discovery Deposition of James Becnel at pp. 336, 461, 465-66, 491, 555-56). The decedent also testified that Pope's Parts was a NAPA-branded distributor, and the brakes and clutches he ordered came in in boxes brandishing the NAPA logo. Id. Plaintiffs also attached a printout of the NAPA website, confirming and identifying Pope's Parts as a NAPA store. Rec. Doc. 521-11 (NAPA Website Printout). The decedent further testified that he obtained parts from the NAPA store located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 521-6 (Discovery Deposition of James Becnel at pp. 414); Rec. Doc. 5215 (Perpetuation Deposition of James Becnel at p. 98). Mr. Becnel also testified that he attended mechanic classes once a year that were held by NAPA in Thibodaux, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 521-6 (Discovery Deposition of James Becnel at pp. 334-35, 428-29).
Plaintiffs also point to the testimony of Thomas L. D'Aquin, Jr. (“D'Aquin”), a former employee of Genuine Parts Company (“GPC”), who confirmed that the parts the decedent claimed to have purchased from the New Orleans, LA distribution center would have been obtained from that location. Rec. Doc. 521-12 (Deposition of Thomas L. D'Aquin, Jr. at pp. 48-49). D'Aquin also testified that the various NAPA...
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