Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | RHONE-POULEN,INC |
| Parties | West Berry BECTON, Sr., and Mary L. Becton v., as successor to Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc.; and Courtaulds PLC. 1960276. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Cecil Gardner of Gardner, Middlebrooks, Fleming & Hamilton, Mobile; and Janice Pennington and Misty A. Farris of Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, TX, for appellants.
Victor T. Hudson and William W. Watts of Reams, Philips, Brooks, Schell, Gaston & Hudson, Mobile, for Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., as successor in interest to Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc.
Wesley Pipes, Cooper C. Thurber, and William E. Shreve, Jr., of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., Mobile, for Courtaulds PLC.
On September 18, 1995, West Berry Becton 1 sued Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc. ("Rhone"), and various employees of Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. ("CFI"). 2 On February 6, 1996, Becton amended his complaint to add Courtaulds PLC as a defendant. Becton alleged that while employed with CFI, he sustained various injuries as a result of his continuous exposure to carbon disulfide ("CS sub2 "), a chemical used in a portion of CFI's rayon manufacturing process. Becton was employed at CFI from 1952 to 1986, and his last exposure to CS sub2 was in 1986, almost 9 years before this action was filed on September 19, 1995.
All of the defendants moved for summary judgments, asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. In opposition to these motions, Becton contended that a "federally mandated discovery rule" contained in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), also known as "the Superfund Act," postponed commencement of the statutory period until Becton knew or should have known that his injuries were related to exposure to hazardous substances, of which CS sub2 is one. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. The trial court entered summary judgments for Rhone and Courtaulds PLC. 3 Becton appeals as to those defendants. We affirm.
Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l ), governs actions for personal injury not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in § 6-2-38. Such actions must be filed within two years of the date of injury. For purposes of an action based on continuous exposure to a hazardous substance, the date of the injury is the day on which the plaintiff was last exposed to the hazardous substance causing the injuries. Hubbard v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 599 So.2d 20 (Ala.1992); Hillis v. Rentokil, Inc., 596 So.2d 888 (Ala.1992); American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., v. Phillips, 491 So.2d 904 (Ala.1986); Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516 (Ala.1979). A plaintiff's ignorance of the fact of injury, if there is no fraudulent concealment by the defendant, does not postpone the running of the limitations period. Garrett v. Raytheon Co., supra.
Under the facts of this case, Becton's action is time-barred because it was not filed within two years of the date of the last exposure, unless CERCLA preempts the Alabama "date of injury" rule in favor of the federally mandated "discovery rule." 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (). See, e.g., Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 28 F.3d 1089, 1091 (11th Cir.1994). Section 9658 essentially prevents a state statute of limitations from beginning to run on actions under state law for personal injuries or property damage "caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance ... released into the environment from a facility" until discovery of the causal relationship between the injury and the exposure. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) and (b)(4)(A).
Although this Court has not previously addressed the applicability of § 9658 to actions for personal injury pending in this State, the defendants argue that even if § 9658 did apply, Becton has not shown that he would come within that statute. Rather, the defendants argue that Becton seeks to apply § 9658 in a context completely outside the scope of CERCLA and the environmental concerns it was designed to reach. They maintain that most federal courts have refused to apply this statute to actions based on personal injuries caused by exposure to some hazardous substance in the absence of the existence of some potential or actual CERCLA liability or claim that has been or could have been asserted in connection with the alleged exposure.
The statute reads, in part, as follows:
Thus, the ultimate issue is whether this lawsuit, which Becton says he brought within two years of the date on which his carbon disulfide-related disease was diagnosed, was timely filed under § 9658 ().
Most federal courts have limited the application of § 9658 to situations where an underlying CERCLA claim has been made or could exist based on the presence of hazardous waste--where there is an underlying claim dealing with, or cause of action providing for, cleanup and remedial activities. See, e.g., Knox v. A C & S, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 752 (S.D.Ind.1988); Electric Power Board of Chattanooga v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 716 F.Supp. 1069 (E.D.Tenn.1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 724, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990); First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070, 110 S.Ct. 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1990); Covalt v. Carey Canada Inc., 860 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir.1988).
Although exhaustive research has revealed no cases directly on point or factually similar to this case, we nonetheless find the reasoning and rationale of Covalt v. Carey Canada Inc. (in which the court held that "[t]he interior of a place of employment is not 'the environment' for purposes of CERCLA--at least to the extent employees are the injured persons--and § 309(a)(1) therefore does not apply to Covalt's claim," 860 F.2d at 1439), persuasive in its interpretation of the application of CERCLA:
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